From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Amirmohammad Eftekhar" <amirmohammad.eftekhar@cispa.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Reset the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE bit in vmcb02 on every nested VMRUN
Date: Sat, 17 Oct 2026 00:44:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-175078@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261016235221.33726-2-amirmohammad.eftekhar@cispa.de>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] KVM: nSVM: guest-triggerable WARN_ON_ONCE in nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts()
--
commit f74a55775787865d4cf964f0af9f8bea8ecd1acb
Author: Amirmohammad Eftekhar <amirmohammad.eftekhar@cispa.de>
KVM: nSVM: Reset the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE bit in vmcb02 on every nested VMRUN
This commit clears SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE in
vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 before conditionally setting it in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(), and adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() in
nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts() if both INTERCEPT_VMLOAD and
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE are set in vmcb02.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> index f9090b601efaa..67985c676db35 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> @@ -197,6 +197,14 @@ void nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> } else {
> WARN_ON_ONCE(!(vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 & SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE));
> }
> +
> + /*
> + * If KVM is intercepting VMLOAD/VMSAVE, virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE must be
> + * off, or hardware would honor the virtualization and render the
> + * intercept inert.
> + */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(vmcb_is_intercept(&vmcb02->control, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD) &&
> + (vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 & SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE));
> }
[Severity: High]
Can an L1 guest or host userspace trigger this WARN_ON_ONCE() at will, and is
the hardware precedence between INTERCEPT_VMLOAD and
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE reversed in the comment and commit message?
In nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(), SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE is set
in vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 whenever !nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm)
is true:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c:nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept() {
if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
return true;
if (!nested_npt_enabled(svm))
return true;
if (!(svm->nested.ctl.misc_ctl2 & SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE))
return true;
return false;
}
nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept() does not check whether INTERCEPT_VMLOAD is
set in vmcb12 or vmcb01. Immediately after setting
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE, nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() calls
nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts(), which copies vmcb01->control.intercepts and
unconditionally ORs vmcb12_ctrl->intercepts into vmcb02->control.intercepts:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c:nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts() {
...
for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
vmcb02->control.intercepts[i] = vmcb01->control.intercepts[i];
...
for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
vmcb02->control.intercepts[i] |= vmcb12_ctrl->intercepts[i];
}
If an L1 guest sets both INTERCEPT_VMLOAD in vmcb12->control.intercepts and
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE in vmcb12->control.misc_ctl2 (with nested NPT
and X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD enabled), vmcb02 will have both bits set and
hit the new WARN_ON_ONCE() on VMRUN.
This occurs in normal software as well as malicious guests:
1. KVM's own selftest in
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_vmsave_vmload_test.c:l1_guest_code()
explicitly sets both INTERCEPT_VMLOAD | INTERCEPT_VMSAVE and
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE in vmcb12 and runs L2 to verify that
SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE is still delivered:
/* ..and SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE set */
svm->vmcb->control.misc_ctl2 |= SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE;
svm->vmcb->save.rip = (u64)l2_guest_code_vmsave;
run_guest(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb_gpa);
GUEST_ASSERT_EQ(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code, SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE);
2. KVM running as an L1 hypervisor sets SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE in
init_vmcb() and never clears it, while svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts()
sets INTERCEPT_VMLOAD whenever L2 has EFER.SVME=0 or an Intel-compatible
CPUID:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts() {
/*
* No need to toggle any of the vgif/vls/etc. enable bits here, as they
* are set when the VMCB is initialized and never cleared (if the
* relevant intercepts are set, the enablements are meaningless anyway).
*/
...
}
3. Host userspace can also trigger this warning via KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE
(svm_set_nested_state() -> nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() ->
nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts()), either by supplying a vmcb12 with both
bits set, or by calling KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE before the first KVM_RUN while
vmcb01->control.intercepts still has INTERCEPT_VMLOAD set from init_vmcb() (as
KVM_REQ_RECALC_INTERCEPTS is not serviced until vcpu_enter_guest()), or by
calling KVM_SET_CPUID2 to clear X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD while in guest
mode.
As noted in the svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts() comment and verified by
nested_vmsave_vmload_test.c, AMD SVM hardware gives INTERCEPT_VMLOAD and
INTERCEPT_VMSAVE precedence over SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE. Should the
WARN_ON_ONCE() be dropped (or should SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE not be
set when INTERCEPT_VMLOAD/VMSAVE is set), and the hardware behavior
description in the commit message updated?
> @@ -986,6 +994,13 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>
> /* SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_LBR is controlled by svm_update_lbrv() */
>
> + /*
> + * vmcb02 is reused across nested VMRUNs and the VLS bit below is only
> + * OR-set, so clear it first; a stale bit would let L2 run VMLOAD/VMSAVE
> + * unintercepted even on a VMRUN that asks KVM to intercept them.
> + */
> + vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 &= ~SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE;
> +
> if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
> vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 |= SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE;
>
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261016235221.33726-2-amirmohammad.eftekhar@cispa.de?part=1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-17 0:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-16 23:52 [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Reset the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE bit in vmcb02 on every nested VMRUN Amirmohammad Eftekhar
2026-10-17 0:44 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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