From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0264EC38A29 for ; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 21:31:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mm01.cs.columbia.edu (mm01.cs.columbia.edu [128.59.11.253]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AB0DE20644 for ; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 21:31:49 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="PFMFUepT" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org AB0DE20644 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kvmarm-bounces@lists.cs.columbia.edu Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mm01.cs.columbia.edu (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63C1C4B26F; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 17:31:49 -0400 (EDT) X-Virus-Scanned: at lists.cs.columbia.edu Authentication-Results: mm01.cs.columbia.edu (amavisd-new); dkim=softfail (fail, message has been altered) header.i=@kernel.org Received: from mm01.cs.columbia.edu ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mm01.cs.columbia.edu [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jEqRW7vEBmLc; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 17:31:48 -0400 (EDT) Received: from mm01.cs.columbia.edu (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mm01.cs.columbia.edu (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4911F4B1D8; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 17:31:48 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mm01.cs.columbia.edu (Postfix) with ESMTP id 754FD4B23B for ; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 17:31:46 -0400 (EDT) X-Virus-Scanned: at lists.cs.columbia.edu Received: from mm01.cs.columbia.edu ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mm01.cs.columbia.edu [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uz4hNFS6RfAv for ; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 17:31:45 -0400 (EDT) Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by mm01.cs.columbia.edu (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6EA0D4B231 for ; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 17:31:44 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (236.31.169.217.in-addr.arpa [217.169.31.236]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BDBBC2076B; Tue, 14 Apr 2020 21:31:41 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1586899903; bh=+4zzU2fuJ9s9+cU9NhMA4XEGvV70Ry3qcTYCVF/73gw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=PFMFUepTALEYUPqJXI/PzspEAX4Pv39fFv/FXh0r88qaYB0hLf1esUplItP5A4JOw 4EezN0pOI2paWuXZj7UuomuNpYnE5R0311Na6W8nQfCz4E+2zs2RmutkgKwRMDQjDP rM1Et8rMdPVTGoY3YFsP/xzC3b3vBAVNRmOxQHmA= From: Will Deacon To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu Subject: [PATCH 8/8] arm64: cpufeature: Add an overview comment for the cpufeature framework Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 22:31:14 +0100 Message-Id: <20200414213114.2378-9-will@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200414213114.2378-1-will@kernel.org> References: <20200414213114.2378-1-will@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Cc: Sai Prakash Ranjan , kernel-team@android.com, Anshuman Khandual , Marc Zyngier , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Doug Anderson , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon X-BeenThere: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: Where KVM/ARM decisions are made List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: kvmarm-bounces@lists.cs.columbia.edu Sender: kvmarm-bounces@lists.cs.columbia.edu Now that Suzuki isn't within throwing distance, I thought I'd better add a rough overview comment to cpufeature.c so that it doesn't take me days to remember how it works next time. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 680a453ca8c4..421ca99dc8fc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -3,6 +3,49 @@ * Contains CPU feature definitions * * Copyright (C) 2015 ARM Ltd. + * + * A note for the weary kernel hacker: the code here is confusing and hard to + * follow! That's partly because it's solving a nasty problem, but also because + * there's a little bit of over-abstraction that tends to obscure what's going + * on behind a maze of helper functions and macros. + * + * The basic problem is that hardware folks have started gluing together CPUs + * with distinct architectural features; in some cases even creating SoCs where + * user-visible instructions are available only on a subset of the available + * cores. We try to address this by snapshotting the feature registers of the + * boot CPU and comparing these with the feature registers of each secondary + * CPU when bringing them up. If there is a mismatch, then we update the + * snapshot state to indicate the lowest-common denominator of the feature, + * known as the "safe" value. This snapshot state can be queried to view the + * "sanitised" value of a feature register. + * + * The sanitised register values are used to decide which capabilities we + * have in the system. These may be in the form of traditional "hwcaps" + * advertised to userspace or internal "cpucaps" which are used to configure + * things like alternative patching and static keys. While a feature mismatch + * may result in a TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC kernel taint, a capability mismatch + * may prevent a CPU from being onlined at all. + * + * Some implementation details worth remembering: + * + * - Mismatched features are *always* sanitised to a "safe" value, which + * usually indicates that the feature is not supported. + * + * - A mismatched feature marked with FTR_STRICT will cause a "SANITY CHECK" + * warning when onlining an offending CPU and the kernel will be tainted + * with TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC. + * + * - Features marked as FTR_VISIBLE have their sanitised value visible to + * userspace. FTR_VISIBLE features in registers that are only visible + * to EL0 by trapping *must* have a corresponding HWCAP so that late + * onlining of CPUs cannot lead to features disappearing at runtime. + * + * - A "feature" is typically a 4-bit register field. A "capability" is the + * high-level description derived from the sanitised field value. + * + * - Read the Arm ARM (DDI 0487F.a) section D13.1.3 ("Principles of the ID + * scheme for fields in ID registers") to understand when feature fields + * may be signed or unsigned (FTR_SIGNED and FTR_UNSIGNED accordingly). */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "CPU features: " fmt -- 2.26.0.110.g2183baf09c-goog _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm