From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, kernel-team@android.com,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/9] KVM: arm64: Move kvm_get_hyp_vector() out of header file
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 21:47:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201109214726.15276-4-will@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201109214726.15276-1-will@kernel.org>
kvm_get_hyp_vector() has only one caller, so move it out of kvm_mmu.h
and inline it into a new function, cpu_set_hyp_vector(), for setting
the vector.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 43 -----------------------------
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
index 331394306cce..23182e7d9413 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -208,52 +208,9 @@ static inline int kvm_write_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa,
return ret;
}
-/*
- * EL2 vectors can be mapped and rerouted in a number of ways,
- * depending on the kernel configuration and CPU present:
- *
- * - If the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, the hardening sequence is
- * placed in one of the vector slots, which is executed before jumping
- * to the real vectors.
- *
- * - If the CPU also has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, the slot
- * containing the hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page,
- * and executed before jumping to the real vectors.
- *
- * - If the CPU only has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, then an
- * empty slot is selected, mapped next to the idmap page, and
- * executed before jumping to the real vectors.
- *
- * Note that ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is somewhat incompatible with
- * VHE, as we don't have hypervisor-specific mappings. If the system
- * is VHE and yet selects this capability, it will be ignored.
- */
extern void *__kvm_bp_vect_base;
extern int __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
-static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
-{
- struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
- void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
- int slot = -1;
-
- if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) && data->fn) {
- vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs));
- slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot;
- }
-
- if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS) && !has_vhe()) {
- vect = __kvm_bp_vect_base;
- if (slot == -1)
- slot = __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
- }
-
- if (slot != -1)
- vect += slot * SZ_2K;
-
- return vect;
-}
-
#define kvm_phys_to_vttbr(addr) phys_to_ttbr(addr)
static __always_inline u64 kvm_get_vttbr(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index 476bc613d0e6..c63c0b3c9b17 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1375,13 +1375,55 @@ static void cpu_hyp_reset(void)
__hyp_reset_vectors();
}
+/*
+ * EL2 vectors can be mapped and rerouted in a number of ways,
+ * depending on the kernel configuration and CPU present:
+ *
+ * - If the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, the hardening sequence is
+ * placed in one of the vector slots, which is executed before jumping
+ * to the real vectors.
+ *
+ * - If the CPU also has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, the slot
+ * containing the hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page,
+ * and executed before jumping to the real vectors.
+ *
+ * - If the CPU only has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, then an
+ * empty slot is selected, mapped next to the idmap page, and
+ * executed before jumping to the real vectors.
+ *
+ * Note that ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is somewhat incompatible with
+ * VHE, as we don't have hypervisor-specific mappings. If the system
+ * is VHE and yet selects this capability, it will be ignored.
+ */
+static void cpu_set_hyp_vector(void)
+{
+ struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
+ void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
+ int slot = -1;
+
+ if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) && data->fn) {
+ vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs));
+ slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot;
+ }
+
+ if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS) && !has_vhe()) {
+ vect = __kvm_bp_vect_base;
+ if (slot == -1)
+ slot = __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
+ }
+
+ if (slot != -1)
+ vect += slot * SZ_2K;
+
+ *this_cpu_ptr_hyp_sym(kvm_hyp_vector) = (unsigned long)vect;
+}
+
static void cpu_hyp_reinit(void)
{
kvm_init_host_cpu_context(&this_cpu_ptr_hyp_sym(kvm_host_data)->host_ctxt);
cpu_hyp_reset();
-
- *this_cpu_ptr_hyp_sym(kvm_hyp_vector) = (unsigned long)kvm_get_hyp_vector();
+ cpu_set_hyp_vector();
if (is_kernel_in_hyp_mode())
kvm_timer_init_vhe();
--
2.29.2.222.g5d2a92d10f8-goog
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-09 21:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-09 21:47 [PATCH v2 0/9] Rework hyp vector handling Will Deacon
2020-11-09 21:47 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] KVM: arm64: Remove redundant Spectre-v2 code from kvm_map_vector() Will Deacon
2020-11-09 21:47 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] KVM: arm64: Tidy up kvm_map_vector() Will Deacon
2020-11-09 21:47 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2020-11-09 21:47 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] KVM: arm64: Make BP hardening globals static instead Will Deacon
2020-11-09 21:47 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] KVM: arm64: Move BP hardening helpers into spectre.h Will Deacon
2020-11-09 21:47 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] KVM: arm64: Re-jig logic when patching hardened hyp vectors Will Deacon
2020-11-09 21:47 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically Will Deacon
2020-11-12 11:07 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-11-12 11:27 ` Will Deacon
2020-11-12 12:05 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-11-12 12:24 ` Will Deacon
2020-11-09 21:47 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] arm64: spectre: Rename ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS to ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A Will Deacon
2020-11-09 21:47 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] arm64: spectre: Consolidate spectre-v3a detection Will Deacon
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