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From: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>,
	will@kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>,
	maz@kernel.org,
	"Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
	kernel-team@android.com, surenb@google.com,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 0/8] KVM: arm64: Hypervisor stack enhancements
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 19:34:45 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220225033548.1912117-1-kaleshsingh@google.com> (raw)

Hi all,

This is v4 of the nVHE hypervisor stack enhancements.

Previous versions can be found at:
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220224051439.640768-1-kaleshsingh@google.com/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220222165212.2005066-1-kaleshsingh@google.com/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220210224220.4076151-1-kaleshsingh@google.com/

The previous cover letter has been copied below for convenience.

Thanks,
Kalesh

-----

This series is based on 5.17-rc5 and adds the following stack features to
the KVM nVHE hypervisor:

== Hyp Stack Guard Pages ==

Based on the technique used by arm64 VMAP_STACK to detect overflow.
i.e. the stack is aligned to twice its size which ensure that the 
'stack shift' bit of any valid SP is 0. The 'stack shift' bit can be
tested in the exception entry to detect overflow without corrupting GPRs.

== Hyp Stack Unwinder ==

Based on the arm64 kernel stack unwinder
(See: arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c)

The unwinding and dumping of the hyp stack is not enabled by default and
depends on CONFIG_NVHE_EL2_DEBUG to avoid potential information leaks.

When CONFIG_NVHE_EL2_DEBUG is enabled the host stage 2 protection is
disabled, allowing the host to read the hypervisor stack pages and unwind
the stack from EL1. This allows us to print the hypervisor stacktrace
before panicking the host; as shown below.

Example call trace:

[   98.916444][  T426] kvm [426]: nVHE hyp panic at: [<ffffffc0096156fc>] __kvm_nvhe_overflow_stack+0x8/0x34!
[   98.918360][  T426] nVHE HYP call trace:
[   98.918692][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc009615aac>] __kvm_nvhe_cpu_prepare_nvhe_panic_info+0x4c/0x68
[   98.919545][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc0096159a4>] __kvm_nvhe_hyp_panic+0x2c/0xe8
[   98.920107][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc009615ad8>] __kvm_nvhe_hyp_panic_bad_stack+0x10/0x10
[   98.920665][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc009610a4c>] __kvm_nvhe___kvm_hyp_host_vector+0x24c/0x794
[   98.921292][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc009615718>] __kvm_nvhe_overflow_stack+0x24/0x34
. . .

[   98.973382][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc009615718>] __kvm_nvhe_overflow_stack+0x24/0x34
[   98.973816][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc0096152f4>] __kvm_nvhe___kvm_vcpu_run+0x38/0x438
[   98.974255][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc009616f80>] __kvm_nvhe_handle___kvm_vcpu_run+0x1c4/0x364
[   98.974719][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc009616928>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_trap+0xa8/0x130
[   98.975152][  T426] kvm [426]: [<ffffffc009610064>] __kvm_nvhe___host_exit+0x64/0x64
[   98.975588][  T426] ---- end of nVHE HYP call trace ----


Kalesh Singh (8):
  KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range()
  KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range()
  KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack
  KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
  KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows
  KVM: arm64: Add hypervisor overflow stack
  KVM: arm64: Unwind and dump nVHE HYP stacktrace
  KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP backtrace

 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h     |  21 +++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h     |   4 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h  |  12 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c       | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig               |   5 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c                 |  34 ++++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c         |  16 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mm.h |   3 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S       |  29 ++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c   |   5 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mm.c         |  60 +++++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c      |  25 +++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c     |  30 +++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c                 |  65 ++++++---
 scripts/kallsyms.c                   |   2 +-
 15 files changed, 428 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)


base-commit: cfb92440ee71adcc2105b0890bb01ac3cddb8507
-- 
2.35.1.574.g5d30c73bfb-goog

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             reply	other threads:[~2022-02-25 14:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-25  3:34 Kalesh Singh [this message]
2022-02-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range() Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02  7:46   ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 17:24     ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-03 17:29       ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-03 17:45         ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02  7:53   ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 17:31     ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) " Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02  7:58   ` Marc Zyngier
2022-02-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] KVM: arm64: Add hypervisor overflow stack Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v4 7/8] KVM: arm64: Unwind and dump nVHE HYP stacktrace Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25  3:34 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP backtrace Kalesh Singh

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