From: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, qperret@google.com
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Always check the state from hyp_ack_unshare()
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 15:44:06 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241128154406.602875-1-qperret@google.com> (raw)
There are multiple pKVM memory transitions where the state of a page is
not cross-checked from the completer's PoV for performance reasons.
For example, if a page is PKVM_PAGE_OWNED from the initiator's PoV,
we should be guaranteed by construction that it is PKVM_NOPAGE for
everybody else, hence allowing us to save a page-table lookup.
When it was introduced, hyp_ack_unshare() followed that logic and bailed
out without checking the PKVM_PAGE_SHARED_BORROWED state in the
hypervisor's stage-1. This was correct as we could safely assume that
all host-initiated shares were directed at the hypervisor at the time.
But with the introduction of other types of shares (e.g. for FF-A or
non-protected guests), it is now very much required to cross check this
state to prevent the host from running __pkvm_host_unshare_hyp() on a
page shared with TZ or a non-protected guest.
Thankfully, if an attacker were to try this, the hyp_unmap() call from
hyp_complete_unshare() would fail, hence causing to WARN() from
__do_unshare() with the host lock held, which is fatal. But this is
fragile at best, and can hardly be considered a security measure.
Let's just do the right thing and always check the state from
hyp_ack_unshare().
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c | 3 ---
1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
index caba3e4bd09e..e75374d682f4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
@@ -783,9 +783,6 @@ static int hyp_ack_unshare(u64 addr, const struct pkvm_mem_transition *tx)
if (tx->initiator.id == PKVM_ID_HOST && hyp_page_count((void *)addr))
return -EBUSY;
- if (__hyp_ack_skip_pgtable_check(tx))
- return 0;
-
return __hyp_check_page_state_range(addr, size,
PKVM_PAGE_SHARED_BORROWED);
}
--
2.47.0.338.g60cca15819-goog
next reply other threads:[~2024-11-28 15:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-28 15:44 Quentin Perret [this message]
2024-11-29 9:58 ` [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Always check the state from hyp_ack_unshare() Will Deacon
2024-11-29 13:10 ` Quentin Perret
2024-12-05 10:02 ` Quentin Perret
2024-12-18 21:30 ` Oliver Upton
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