From: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
To: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 03/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Forward FEAT_XNX permissions to the shadow stage-2
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 11:01:45 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251124190158.177318-4-oupton@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251124190158.177318-1-oupton@kernel.org>
Add support for FEAT_XNX to shadow stage-2 MMUs, being careful to only
evaluate XN[0] when the feature is actually exposed to the VM.
Restructure the layering of permissions in the fault handler to assume
pX and uX then restricting based on the guest's stage-2 afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_nested.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 23 ++++++++++++++----
arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 5 +++-
3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_nested.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_nested.h
index f7c06a840963..5d967b60414c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_nested.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_nested.h
@@ -120,9 +120,42 @@ static inline bool kvm_s2_trans_writable(struct kvm_s2_trans *trans)
return trans->writable;
}
-static inline bool kvm_s2_trans_executable(struct kvm_s2_trans *trans)
+static inline bool kvm_has_xnx(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- return !(trans->desc & BIT(54));
+ return cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_XNX) &&
+ kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, XNX, IMP);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_s2_trans_exec_el0(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_s2_trans *trans)
+{
+ u8 xn = FIELD_GET(KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_S2_XN, trans->desc);
+
+ if (!kvm_has_xnx(kvm))
+ xn &= FIELD_PREP(KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_S2_XN, 0b10);
+
+ switch (xn) {
+ case 0b00:
+ case 0b01:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_s2_trans_exec_el1(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_s2_trans *trans)
+{
+ u8 xn = FIELD_GET(KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_S2_XN, trans->desc);
+
+ if (!kvm_has_xnx(kvm))
+ xn &= FIELD_PREP(KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_S2_XN, 0b10);
+
+ switch (xn) {
+ case 0b00:
+ case 0b11:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
}
extern int kvm_walk_nested_s2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t gipa,
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
index 7cc964af8d30..96f1786c72fe 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -1521,6 +1521,16 @@ static void adjust_nested_fault_perms(struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
*prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested);
}
+static void adjust_nested_exec_perms(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
+ enum kvm_pgtable_prot *prot)
+{
+ if (!kvm_s2_trans_exec_el0(kvm, nested))
+ *prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_UX;
+ if (!kvm_s2_trans_exec_el1(kvm, nested))
+ *prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_PX;
+}
+
#define KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS (KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT | KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED)
static int gmem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
@@ -1572,11 +1582,12 @@ static int gmem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
if (writable)
prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W;
- if (exec_fault ||
- (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC) &&
- (!nested || kvm_s2_trans_executable(nested))))
+ if (exec_fault || cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC))
prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_X;
+ if (nested)
+ adjust_nested_exec_perms(kvm, nested, &prot);
+
kvm_fault_lock(kvm);
if (mmu_invalidate_retry(kvm, mmu_seq)) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
@@ -1851,11 +1862,13 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_NORMAL_NC;
else
prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_DEVICE;
- } else if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC) &&
- (!nested || kvm_s2_trans_executable(nested))) {
+ } else if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC)) {
prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_X;
}
+ if (nested)
+ adjust_nested_exec_perms(kvm, nested, &prot);
+
/*
* Under the premise of getting a FSC_PERM fault, we just need to relax
* permissions only if vma_pagesize equals fault_granule. Otherwise,
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
index f04cda40545b..92b2a69f0b89 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
@@ -788,7 +788,10 @@ int kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_s2_trans *trans)
return 0;
if (kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu)) {
- forward_fault = !kvm_s2_trans_executable(trans);
+ if (vcpu_mode_priv(vcpu))
+ forward_fault = !kvm_s2_trans_exec_el1(vcpu->kvm, trans);
+ else
+ forward_fault = !kvm_s2_trans_exec_el0(vcpu->kvm, trans);
} else {
bool write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-24 19:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-24 19:01 [PATCH v3 00/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Implement FEAT_XNX and FEAT_HAF Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 01/15] arm64: Detect FEAT_XNX Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 02/15] KVM: arm64: Add support for FEAT_XNX stage-2 permissions Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` Oliver Upton [this message]
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 04/15] KVM: arm64: Teach ptdump about FEAT_XNX permissions Oliver Upton
2025-11-25 17:39 ` Nathan Chancellor
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 05/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Advertise support for FEAT_XNX Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 06/15] KVM: arm64: Call helper for reading descriptors directly Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 07/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Stop passing vCPU through void ptr in S2 PTW Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 08/15] KVM: arm64: Handle endianness in read helper for emulated PTW Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 09/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Use pgtable definitions in stage-2 walk Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 10/15] KVM: arm64: Add helper for swapping guest descriptor Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 11/15] KVM: arm64: Propagate PTW errors up to AT emulation Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 12/15] KVM: arm64: Implement HW access flag management in stage-1 SW PTW Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 13/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Implement HW access flag management in stage-2 " Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 14/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Expose hardware access flag management to NV guests Oliver Upton
2025-11-24 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 15/15] KVM: arm64: selftests: Add test for AT emulation Oliver Upton
2026-02-28 9:43 ` Zenghui Yu
2026-03-17 12:51 ` Zenghui Yu
2025-11-24 21:25 ` [PATCH v3 00/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Implement FEAT_XNX and FEAT_HAF Marc Zyngier
2025-11-24 22:44 ` Oliver Upton
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