From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: tabba@google.com
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, "Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>,
"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 08/11] KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 07:08:18 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260612070819.64FE01F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260612065925.755562-9-tabba@google.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] flush_hyp_vcpu() incorrectly copies MDCR_EL2 from the untrusted host context for protected VMs, violating EL2 security guidelines.
--
commit 11498ed516d4ebc65b4ad00086974239ee0e2eb4
Author: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives
This commit introduces primitives to translate a host vCPU into the
hypervisor's address space. It refactors handle___kvm_vcpu_run() to use
these new lookup primitives.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -214,23 +245,16 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
> goto out;
> }
>
> - if (!hyp_vcpu) {
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> -
> flush_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does flush_hyp_vcpu() incorrectly copy
mdcr_el2 from the untrusted host context for protected VMs?
Looking at flush_hyp_vcpu() in arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:
static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
[ ... ]
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
[ ... ]
}
According to the pKVM EL2 Security and Trust Boundary guidelines, trap
configuration registers like mdcr_el2 must be initialized in an EL2-private
context for protected VMs. They must not rely on values written by the host.
Because host_vcpu resides in untrusted host memory, this unconditional
assignment could allow a compromised host to overwrite the mdcr_el2
configuration of a protected VM. This could potentially allow the host to
manipulate guest debug exceptions and break guest confidentiality or
hypervisor isolation.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260612065925.755562-1-tabba@google.com?part=8
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-12 7:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-12 6:59 [PATCH v1 00/11] KVM: arm64: Rework pKVM vCPU state synchronisation tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 01/11] KVM: arm64: Add scoped resource management (guard) for hyp_spinlock tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 02/11] KVM: arm64: Use guard(hyp_spinlock) in pKVM hypervisor code tabba
2026-06-15 12:53 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-15 13:11 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 03/11] KVM: arm64: Use guard()/scoped_guard() in arm64 KVM EL1 code tabba
2026-06-15 12:59 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-15 13:17 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-18 9:23 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-06-18 9:24 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-18 9:41 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-06-18 9:46 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 04/11] KVM: arm64: Extract MPIDR computation into a shared header tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 05/11] KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code tabba
2026-06-12 7:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 7:53 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-15 13:11 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-15 13:29 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 06/11] KVM: arm64: Factor out reusable vCPU reset helpers tabba
2026-06-15 13:16 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-15 13:45 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 07/11] KVM: arm64: Move PSCI helper functions to a shared header tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 08/11] KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives tabba
2026-06-12 7:08 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-06-12 7:15 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 09/11] KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world switch tabba
2026-06-12 7:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 8:05 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12 8:09 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 10/11] KVM: arm64: Add primitives to flush/sync the VGIC state at EL2 tabba
2026-06-12 7:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 8:14 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-18 10:10 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-06-18 10:17 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v1 11/11] KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests tabba
2026-06-12 7:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 9:51 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-15 16:25 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-06-15 16:44 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-18 10:16 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-06-18 10:18 ` Fuad Tabba
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