From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Fuad Tabba" <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Cc: "Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, "Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC under pKVM
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 07:05:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260914070536.877D91F000FF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260914065136.3418404-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Double-fetch (TOCTOU) and unvalidated dereference of the host-controlled `vcpu->kvm` pointer creates an arbitrary EL2 memory leak.
--
commit 6841c04b3ad40b222469871cbf4d11537656c507
Author: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC under pKVM
This commit pins the host vCPU and its VM around __kvm_adjust_pc() when no
hyp vCPU is loaded, to prevent the hypervisor from panicking by dereferencing
an unmapped host vCPU. A loaded hyp vCPU implies both are already pinned.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> index 9a3b92e626adb..e41b4c181eb62 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
[ ... ]
> +static void adjust_pc_unloaded(struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu)
> +{
> + struct kvm *host_kvm;
> +
> + if (hyp_pin_shared_mem(host_vcpu, host_vcpu + 1))
> + return;
> +
> + /* The exception entry reads the VM's MTE flag. */
> + host_kvm = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu->kvm);
> + if (!hyp_pin_shared_mem(host_kvm, host_kvm + 1)) {
> + __kvm_adjust_pc(host_vcpu);
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this create a double-fetch (TOCTOU)
vulnerability that allows the host kernel to leak arbitrary EL2 memory?
When a vCPU is unloaded, adjust_pc_unloaded() reads host_vcpu->kvm from
host-shared memory (the first fetch) and pins it. When a vCPU is loaded,
handle___kvm_adjust_pc() directly calls __kvm_adjust_pc(host_vcpu) on the
host_vcpu without pinning it here.
In either case, deep inside the __kvm_adjust_pc() call path,
enter_exception64() in arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c re-reads vcpu->kvm
directly from the host-shared vcpu structure (the second fetch):
if (kvm_has_mte(kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm)))
Because the host kernel can concurrently modify host_vcpu->kvm between the
pin (if any) and this second fetch, it could redirect the pointer to an
arbitrary EL2 address. kvm_has_mte() would then dereference this unvalidated
pointer to test the KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED bit (bit 1).
If that bit is set, it updates the PSR_TCO_BIT in the vCPU's CPSR, which gets
written back to host-accessible memory in host_vcpu->arch.ctxt.regs.pstate. By
shifting the base address and observing the result, the host could leak
EL2-private or protected guest memory bit by bit.
> + hyp_unpin_shared_mem(host_kvm, host_kvm + 1);
> + }
> +
> + hyp_unpin_shared_mem(host_vcpu, host_vcpu + 1);
> +}
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260914065136.3418404-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-14 7:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-14 6:51 [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 7:05 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-14 8:13 ` Fuad Tabba
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