From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, pbonzini@redhat.com,
chenhuacai@kernel.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, anup@brainfault.org,
paul.walmsley@sifive.com, palmer@dabbelt.com,
aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
brauner@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
xiaoyao.li@intel.com, yilun.xu@intel.com,
chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
amoorthy@google.com, dmatlack@google.com,
yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
mic@digikod.net, vbabka@suse.cz, ackerleytng@google.com,
mail@maciej.szmigiero.name, michael.roth@amd.com,
wei.w.wang@intel.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com,
isaku.yamahata@gmail.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
suzuki.poulose@arm.com, steven.price@arm.com,
quic_mnalajal@quicinc.com, quic_tsoni@quicinc.com,
quic_svaddagi@quicinc.com, quic_cvanscha@quicinc.com,
quic_pderrin@quicinc.com, quic_pheragu@quicinc.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, james.morse@arm.com,
yuzenghui@huawei.com, oliver.upton@linux.dev, maz@kernel.org,
will@kernel.org, keirf@google.com, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: folio_mmapped
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 23:02:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7470390a-5a97-475d-aaad-0f6dfb3d26ea@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGtprH-17s7ipmr=+cC6YuH-R0Bvr7kJS7Zo9a+Dc9VEt2BAcQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 18.03.24 18:06, Vishal Annapurve wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 4, 2024 at 12:17 PM David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 04.03.24 20:04, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Mon, Mar 04, 2024, Quentin Perret wrote:
>>>>> As discussed in the sub-thread, that might still be required.
>>>>>
>>>>> One could think about completely forbidding GUP on these mmap'ed
>>>>> guest-memfds. But likely, there might be use cases in the future where you
>>>>> want to use GUP on shared memory inside a guest_memfd.
>>>>>
>>>>> (the iouring example I gave might currently not work because
>>>>> FOLL_PIN|FOLL_LONGTERM|FOLL_WRITE only works on shmem+hugetlb, and
>>>>> guest_memfd will likely not be detected as shmem; 8ac268436e6d contains some
>>>>> details)
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps it would be wise to start with GUP being forbidden if the
>>>> current users do not need it (not sure if that is the case in Android,
>>>> I'll check) ? We can always relax this constraint later when/if the
>>>> use-cases arise, which is obviously much harder to do the other way
>>>> around.
>>>
>>> +1000. At least on the KVM side, I would like to be as conservative as possible
>>> when it comes to letting anything other than the guest access guest_memfd.
>>
>> So we'll have to do it similar to any occurrences of "secretmem" in
>> gup.c. We'll have to see how to marry KVM guest_memfd with core-mm code
>> similar to e.g., folio_is_secretmem().
>>
>> IIRC, we might not be able to de-reference the actual mapping because it
>> could get free concurrently ...
>>
>> That will then prohibit any kind of GUP access to these pages, including
>> reading/writing for ptrace/debugging purposes, for core dumping purposes
>> etc. But at least, you know that nobody was able to optain page
>> references using GUP that might be used for reading/writing later.
>>
>
> There has been little discussion about supporting 1G pages with
> guest_memfd for TDX/SNP or pKVM. I would like to restart this
> discussion [1]. 1G pages should be a very important usecase for guest
> memfd, especially considering large VM sizes supporting confidential
> GPU/TPU workloads.
>
> Using separate backing stores for private and shared memory ranges is
> not going to work effectively when using 1G pages. Consider the
> following scenario of memory conversion when using 1G pages to back
> private memory:
> * Guest requests conversion of 4KB range from private to shared, host
> in response ideally does following steps:
> a) Updates the guest memory attributes
> b) Unbacks the corresponding private memory
> c) Allocates corresponding shared memory or let it be faulted in
> when guest accesses it
>
> Step b above can't be skipped here, otherwise we would have two
> physical pages (1 backing private memory, another backing the shared
> memory) for the same GPA range causing "double allocation".
>
> With 1G pages, it would be difficult to punch KBs or even MBs sized
> hole since to support that:
> 1G page would need to be split (which hugetlbfs doesn't support today
> because of right reasons), causing -
> - loss of vmemmap optimization [3]
> - losing ability to reconstitute the huge page again,
> especially as private pages in CVMs are not relocatable today,
> increasing overall fragmentation over time.
> - unless a smarter algorithm is devised for memory
> reclaim to reconstitute large pages for unmovable memory.
>
> With the above limitations in place, best thing could be to allow:
> - single backing store for both shared and private memory ranges
> - host userspace to mmap the guest memfd (as this series is trying to do)
> - allow userspace to fault in memfd file ranges that correspond to
> shared GPA ranges
> - pagetable mappings will need to be restricted to shared memory
> ranges causing higher granularity mappings (somewhat similar to what
> HGM series from James [2] was trying to do) than 1G.
> - Allow IOMMU also to map those pages (pfns would be requested using
> get_user_pages* APIs) to allow devices to access shared memory. IOMMU
> management code would have to be enlightened or somehow restricted to
> map only shared regions of guest memfd.
> - Upon conversion from shared to private, host will have to ensure
> that there are no mappings/references present for the memory ranges
> being converted to private.
>
> If the above usecase sounds reasonable, GUP access to guest memfd
> pages should be allowed.
To say it with nice words: "Not a fan".
First, I don't think only 1 GiB will be problematic. Already 2 MiB ones
will be problematic and so far it is even unclear how guest_memfd will
consume them in a way acceptable to upstream MM. Likely not using
hugetlb from what I recall after the previous discussions with Mike.
Second, we should find better ways to let an IOMMU map these pages,
*not* using GUP. There were already discussions on providing a similar
fd+offset-style interface instead. GUP really sounds like the wrong
approach here. Maybe we should look into passing not only guest_memfd,
but also "ordinary" memfds.
Third, I don't think we should be using huge pages where huge pages
don't make any sense. Using a 1 GiB page so the VM will convert some
pieces to map it using PTEs will destroy the whole purpose of using 1
GiB pages. It doesn't make any sense.
A direction that might make sense is either (A) enlighting the VM about
the granularity in which memory can be converted (but also problematic
for 1 GiB pages) and/or (B) physically restricting the memory that can
be converted.
For example, one could create a GPA layout where some regions are backed
by gigantic pages that cannot be converted/can only be converted as a
whole, and some are backed by 4k pages that can be converted back and
forth. We'd use multiple guest_memfds for that. I recall that physically
restricting such conversions/locations (e.g., for bounce buffers) in
Linux was already discussed somewhere, but I don't recall the details.
It's all not trivial and not easy to get "clean".
Concluding that individual pieces of a 1 GiB / 2 MiB huge page should
not be converted back and forth might be a reasonable. Although I'm sure
people will argue the opposite and develop hackish solutions in
desperate ways to make it work somehow.
Huge pages, and especially gigantic pages, are simply a bad fit if the
VM will convert individual 4k pages.
But to answer your last question: we might be able to avoid GUP by using
a different mapping API, similar to the once KVM now provides.
--
Cheers,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-18 22:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-22 16:10 [RFC PATCH v1 00/26] KVM: Restricted mapping of guest_memfd at the host and pKVM/arm64 support Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/26] KVM: Split KVM memory attributes into user and kernel attributes Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/26] KVM: Introduce kvm_gmem_get_pfn_locked(), which retains the folio lock Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/26] KVM: Add restricted support for mapping guestmem by the host Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-26 8:58 ` Fuad Tabba
2024-02-26 9:57 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-26 17:30 ` Fuad Tabba
2024-02-27 7:40 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/26] KVM: Don't allow private attribute to be set if mapped by host Fuad Tabba
2024-04-17 23:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-18 10:54 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/26] KVM: Don't allow private attribute to be removed for unmappable memory Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/26] KVM: Implement kvm_(read|/write)_guest_page for private memory slots Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/26] KVM: arm64: Turn llist of pinned pages into an rb-tree Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/26] KVM: arm64: Implement MEM_RELINQUISH SMCCC hypercall Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/26] KVM: arm64: Strictly check page type in MEM_RELINQUISH hypercall Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/26] KVM: arm64: Avoid unnecessary unmap walk " Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/26] KVM: arm64: Add initial support for KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/26] KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to receive SHARE and UNSHARE notifications Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/26] KVM: arm64: Create hypercall return handler Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/26] KVM: arm64: Refactor code around handling return from host to guest Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/26] KVM: arm64: Rename kvm_pinned_page to kvm_guest_page Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/26] KVM: arm64: Add a field to indicate whether the guest page was pinned Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/26] KVM: arm64: Do not allow changes to private memory slots Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/26] KVM: arm64: Skip VMA checks for slots without userspace address Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/26] KVM: arm64: Handle guest_memfd()-backed guest page faults Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/26] KVM: arm64: Track sharing of memory from protected guest to host Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/26] KVM: arm64: Mark a protected VM's memory as unmappable at initialization Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/26] KVM: arm64: Handle unshare on way back to guest entry rather than exit Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/26] KVM: arm64: Check that host unmaps memory unshared by guest Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/26] KVM: arm64: Add handlers for kvm_arch_*_set_memory_attributes() Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/26] KVM: arm64: Enable private memory support when pKVM is enabled Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 16:10 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/26] KVM: arm64: Enable private memory kconfig for arm64 Fuad Tabba
2024-02-22 23:43 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/26] KVM: Restricted mapping of guest_memfd at the host and pKVM/arm64 support Elliot Berman
2024-02-23 0:35 ` folio_mmapped Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-26 9:28 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-02-26 21:14 ` folio_mmapped Elliot Berman
2024-02-27 14:59 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-02-28 10:48 ` folio_mmapped Quentin Perret
2024-02-28 11:11 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-02-28 12:44 ` folio_mmapped Quentin Perret
2024-02-28 13:00 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-02-28 13:34 ` folio_mmapped Quentin Perret
2024-02-28 18:43 ` folio_mmapped Elliot Berman
2024-02-28 18:51 ` Quentin Perret
2024-02-29 10:04 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-02-29 19:01 ` folio_mmapped Fuad Tabba
2024-03-01 0:40 ` folio_mmapped Elliot Berman
2024-03-01 11:16 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-04 12:53 ` folio_mmapped Quentin Perret
2024-03-04 20:22 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-01 11:06 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-04 12:36 ` folio_mmapped Quentin Perret
2024-03-04 19:04 ` folio_mmapped Sean Christopherson
2024-03-04 20:17 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-04 21:43 ` folio_mmapped Elliot Berman
2024-03-04 21:58 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-19 9:47 ` folio_mmapped Quentin Perret
2024-03-19 9:54 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-18 17:06 ` folio_mmapped Vishal Annapurve
2024-03-18 22:02 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2024-03-18 23:07 ` folio_mmapped Vishal Annapurve
2024-03-19 0:10 ` folio_mmapped Sean Christopherson
2024-03-19 10:26 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-19 13:19 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-19 14:31 ` folio_mmapped Will Deacon
2024-03-19 23:54 ` folio_mmapped Elliot Berman
2024-03-22 16:36 ` Will Deacon
2024-03-22 18:46 ` Elliot Berman
2024-03-27 19:31 ` Will Deacon
2024-03-22 17:52 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-22 21:21 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-26 22:04 ` folio_mmapped Elliot Berman
2024-03-27 17:50 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-27 19:34 ` folio_mmapped Will Deacon
2024-03-28 9:06 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-28 10:10 ` folio_mmapped Quentin Perret
2024-03-28 10:32 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-28 10:58 ` folio_mmapped Quentin Perret
2024-03-28 11:41 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-03-29 18:38 ` folio_mmapped Vishal Annapurve
2024-04-04 0:15 ` folio_mmapped Sean Christopherson
2024-03-19 15:04 ` folio_mmapped Sean Christopherson
2024-03-22 17:16 ` folio_mmapped David Hildenbrand
2024-02-26 9:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/26] KVM: Restricted mapping of guest_memfd at the host and pKVM/arm64 support Fuad Tabba
2024-02-23 12:00 ` Alexandru Elisei
2024-02-26 9:05 ` Fuad Tabba
2024-02-26 9:47 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-27 9:37 ` Fuad Tabba
2024-02-27 14:41 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-27 14:49 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-28 9:57 ` Fuad Tabba
2024-02-28 10:12 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-28 14:01 ` Quentin Perret
2024-02-29 9:51 ` David Hildenbrand
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