From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Cc: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: nv: Check RW permissions for insn abort due to S1PTW
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 10:57:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86ldc4qmzz.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ajul3_7XpTeDn57I@kernel.org>
On Wed, 24 Jun 2026 10:39:43 +0100,
Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 24, 2026 at 09:41:26AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> > > index 5bf3d7e1d92c..d5c61e0027c8 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> > > @@ -479,21 +479,12 @@ static __always_inline int kvm_vcpu_sys_get_rt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > >
> > > static inline bool kvm_is_write_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > > {
> > > - if (kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu)) {
> > > - /*
> > > - * Only a permission fault on a S1PTW should be
> > > - * considered as a write. Otherwise, page tables baked
> > > - * in a read-only memslot will result in an exception
> > > - * being delivered in the guest.
> > > - *
> > > - * The drawback is that we end-up faulting twice if the
> > > - * guest is using any of HW AF/DB: a translation fault
> > > - * to map the page containing the PT (read only at
> > > - * first), then a permission fault to allow the flags
> > > - * to be set.
> > > - */
> > > - return kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(vcpu);
> > > - }
> > > + /*
> > > + * The architecture sucks; assume that the S1PTW fetched for write if
> > > + * HA is enabled at stage-1.
> > > + */
> > > + if (kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu))
> > > + return effective_tcr_ha(vcpu);
> >
> > OK, so you're trading the implicit state machine (translation fault ->
> > RO, permission fault -> RW) for a direct TCR.HA lookup, because the
> > only reason you'd get a S1PTW fault for write is if you were updating
> > the descriptor. This is cute, and I wish I had thought of that, as it
> > saves us a round trip.
> >
> > But why can't that happen with HD? Surely this results in a similar
> > fault, and I think we should also evaluate that bit.
>
> The effective value of both HAFT and HD is 0 if TCR_ELx.HA is 0. So
> evaluating HA covers them all :)
Indeed it does! Maybe worth capturing in a comment, because it isn't
completely obvious (we have R_SNVTX for HAFT, but you need to dive
into the TCR_EL1 register description to read the blurb about the
effective value of HD).
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-24 9:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-23 21:13 [PATCH] KVM: arm64: nv: Check RW permissions for insn abort due to S1PTW Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 21:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-24 0:07 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 8:41 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-06-24 9:39 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 9:57 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
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