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From: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: will@kernel.org, broonie@kernel.org, maz@kernel.org,
	oliver.upton@linux.dev, shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com,
	joey.gouly@arm.com, james.morse@arm.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	scott@os.amperecomputing.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	yuzenghui@huawei.com, mark.rutland@arm.com,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] arm64: futex: support futex with FEAT_LSUI
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2025 20:53:57 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aKOE1aqe6EljRkuB@e129823.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aKNyj_6dZVp9O4BA@arm.com>

Hi Catalin,

> On Sat, Aug 16, 2025 at 03:57:49PM +0100, Yeoreum Yun wrote:
> > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_AS_HAS_LSUI
> > > > > +
> > > > > +#define __LSUI_PREAMBLE	".arch_extension lsui\n"
> > > > > +
> > > > > +#define LSUI_FUTEX_ATOMIC_OP(op, asm_op, mb)				\
> > > > > +static __always_inline int						\
> > > > > +__lsui_futex_atomic_##op(int oparg, u32 __user *uaddr, int *oval)	\
> > > > > +{									\
> > > > > +	int ret = 0;							\
> > > > > +	int val;							\
> > > > > +									\
> > > > > +	mte_enable_tco();						\
> > > >
> > >
> > > > The reason uaccess_disable_privileged() sets the MTE TCO (tag check
> > > > override) is because the user and the kernel may have different settings
> > > > for tag checking. If we use the user instructions provided by FEAT_LSUI,
> > > > we leave the MTE checking as is.
> > > >
> > > > The same comment for all the other functions here.
> > >
> > > You're right. Thanks for catching this :)
> >
> > But one bikeshedding question.
> > why we need to care about the different settings for tag checking when
> > we use uaccess_disable_privileged()?
>
> Because, for example, the user may not be interested in any tag check
> faults (has checking disabled) but the kernel uses KASAN with
> synchronous tag check faults. If it uses the privileged instructions as
> in the futex API, it either won't make progress or report errors to the
> user which it does not expect.
>
> > IIUC, the reason we uses to uaccess_disaable_privileged() to access
> > user memory with copy_from/to_user() and etc.
>
> We don't use uaccess_disable_privileged() with copy_from_user() since
> those use the unprivileged instructions already.

Thanks for your explaination :)

>
> > But, although tag check fault happens in kernel side,
> > It seems to be handled by fixup code if user address is wrong.
>
> The user may know it is wrong and not care (e.g. one wants to keep using
> a buggy application).

Then Does this example -- ignoring wrong and keep using a buggy
application shows us that we need to enable TCO when
we runs the LSUI instruction?

AFAIK, LSUI instruction also check memory tag -- i.e) ldtadd.
if passed user address which has unmatched tag and if user isn't
interested in tah check, It can meet the unexpected report from KASAN.

Am I missing something?

--
Sincerely,
Yeoreum Yun

  reply	other threads:[~2025-08-18 19:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-11 16:36 [PATCH v6 0/5] support FEAT_LSUI and apply it on futex atomic ops Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-11 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] arm64: cpufeature: add FEAT_LSUI Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-15 17:33   ` Catalin Marinas
2025-08-16 11:04     ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-11 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] KVM: arm64: expose FEAT_LSUI to guest Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-11 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] arm64: Kconfig: add LSUI Kconfig Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-11 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] arm64: futex: refactor futex atomic operation Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-15 16:38   ` Catalin Marinas
2025-08-16 13:03     ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-11 16:36 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] arm64: futex: support futex with FEAT_LSUI Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-15 17:02   ` Catalin Marinas
2025-08-16 12:30     ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-16 14:57       ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-18 18:35         ` Catalin Marinas
2025-08-18 19:53           ` Yeoreum Yun [this message]
2025-08-19  8:38             ` Catalin Marinas
2025-08-19  9:11               ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-08-19 14:29                 ` Catalin Marinas
2025-08-19 15:15                   ` Yeoreum Yun

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