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From: Oxana Kharitonova <webprosto@gmail.com>
To: mic@digikod.net, brauner@kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	gnoack@google.com, utilityemal77@gmail.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, webprosto@gmail.com,
	landlock@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/4] samples/landlock: Add POSIX message queue scoping to sandboxer
Date: Mon,  2 Nov 2026 14:46:00 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261102144708.920232-5-webprosto@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261102144708.920232-1-webprosto@gmail.com>

Add "q" to LL_SCOPED to enable LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE
and "posix_msg_queue" to LL_QUIET_ACCESS to quiet related audit
denials. Update the supported ABI version to 13 and disable the
new scope when running on older kernels.

For example, on a kernel supporting Landlock ABI 13:

  LL_FS_RO="/" LL_FS_RW="" LL_SCOPED="q" \
    ./samples/landlock/sandboxer /bin/sh

The resulting shell and its children cannot open POSIX message
queues created outside their Landlock domain. They can create
queues and open queues created within that domain.

Signed-off-by: Oxana Kharitonova <webprosto@gmail.com>
---
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index 1362f08ff14b..e8e05c4d6f63 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -441,10 +441,12 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
 	bool error = false;
 	bool abstract_scoping = false;
 	bool signal_scoping = false;
+	bool posix_msg_queue_scoping = false;
 
 	/* Scoping is not supported by Landlock ABI */
 	if (!(ruleset_attr->scoped &
-	      (LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL)))
+	      (LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL |
+	       LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE)))
 		goto out_unset;
 
 	env_type_scope = getenv(env_var);
@@ -461,6 +463,9 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
 		} else if (strcmp("s", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 &&
 			   !signal_scoping) {
 			signal_scoping = true;
+		} else if (strcmp("q", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 &&
+			   !posix_msg_queue_scoping) {
+			posix_msg_queue_scoping = true;
 		} else {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Unknown or duplicate scope \"%s\"\n",
 				ipc_scoping_name);
@@ -477,6 +482,8 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
 		ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
 	if (!signal_scoping)
 		ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL;
+	if (!posix_msg_queue_scoping)
+		ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE;
 
 	unsetenv(env_var);
 	return error;
@@ -555,6 +562,9 @@ static int add_quiet_access(const char *const env_var,
 				LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
 		else if (strcmp(str_access, "signal") == 0)
 			ruleset_attr->quiet_scoped |= LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL;
+		else if (strcmp(str_access, "posix_msg_queue") == 0)
+			ruleset_attr->quiet_scoped |=
+				LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE;
 		else {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Unknown quiet access \"%s\"\n",
 				str_access);
@@ -570,7 +580,7 @@ static int add_quiet_access(const char *const env_var,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 12
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 13
 
 #define XSTR(s) #s
 #define STR(s) XSTR(s)
@@ -618,6 +628,7 @@ static const char help[] =
 	"* " ENV_SCOPED_NAME ": actions denied on the outside of the landlock domain\n"
 	"  - \"a\" to restrict opening abstract unix sockets\n"
 	"  - \"s\" to restrict sending signals\n"
+	"  - \"q\" to restrict opening POSIX message queues\n"
 	"\n"
 	"A sandboxer should not log denied access requests to avoid spamming logs, "
 	"but to test audit we can set " ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME "=1\n"
@@ -634,6 +645,7 @@ static const char help[] =
 	"  - \"udp_connect\" to quiet udp connect / send denials\n"
 	"  - \"abstract_unix_socket\" to quiet abstract unix socket denials\n"
 	"  - \"signal\" to quiet signal denials\n"
+	"  - \"posix_msg_queue\" to quiet POSIX message queue denials\n"
 	"\n"
 	"Example:\n"
 	ENV_FS_RO_NAME "=\"${PATH}:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
@@ -643,7 +655,7 @@ static const char help[] =
 	ENV_UDP_CONNECT_SEND_NAME "=\"53\" "
 	ENV_NS_NAME "=\"user:uts:net\" "
 	ENV_CAP_NAME "=\"" CAP_VALUE_EXAMPLE "\" "
-	ENV_SCOPED_NAME "=\"a:s\" "
+	ENV_SCOPED_NAME "=\"a:s:q\" "
 	"%1$s bash -i\n"
 	"\n"
 	"This sandboxer can use Landlock features up to ABI version "
@@ -667,7 +679,8 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP |
 				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP,
 		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
-			  LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+			  LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL |
+			  LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE,
 		.quiet_access_fs = 0,
 		.quiet_access_net = 0,
 		.quiet_scoped = 0,
@@ -780,6 +793,11 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 		ruleset_attr.handled_permissions &=
 			~(LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE |
 			  LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE);
+		__attribute__((fallthrough));
+	case 12:
+		/* Removes POSIX message queue scoping for ABI < 13 */
+		ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE;
+
 		/* Must be printed for any ABI < LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST. */
 		fprintf(stderr,
 			"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
-- 
2.43.0


      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-02 14:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-02 14:45 [PATCH v2 0/4] Landlock: Restrict POSIX message queue creation and access Oxana Kharitonova
2026-11-02 14:45 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] ipc: Move MQUEUE_MAGIC to a shared header Oxana Kharitonova
2026-11-06  9:14   ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-02 14:45 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] Landlock: Enforce MAKE_REG for POSIX message queue creation Oxana Kharitonova
2026-11-03  2:42   ` kernel test robot
2026-11-02 14:45 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] Landlock: Add POSIX message queue scoping Oxana Kharitonova
2026-11-03  4:55   ` kernel test robot
2026-11-03  5:22   ` kernel test robot
2026-11-02 14:46 ` Oxana Kharitonova [this message]

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