From: "Tyler Hicks (Microsoft)" <code@tyhicks.com>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
landlock@lists.linux.dev,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-Fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
eCryptfs <ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Does Landlock not work with eCryptfs?
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 17:45:23 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZB4oA1Q2Q8tq6POc@sequoia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZByG4u1L6yF5kfeD@nuc>
On 2023-03-23 18:05:38, Günther Noack wrote:
> +ecryptfs mailing list FYI
>
> Just some additional data points on the Landlock/eCryptfs issues.
>
> On Tue, Mar 21, 2023 at 07:16:28PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > On 21/03/2023 18:24, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > On Tue, Mar 21, 2023 at 05:36:19PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > > There is an inconsistency between ecryptfs_dir_open() and ecryptfs_open().
> > > > ecryptfs_dir_open() actually checks access right to the lower directory,
> > > > which is why landlocked processes may not access the upper directory when
> > > > reading its content. ecryptfs_open() uses a cache for upper files (which
> > > > could be a problem on its own). The execution flow is:
> > > >
> > > > ecryptfs_open() -> ecryptfs_get_lower_file() -> ecryptfs_init_lower_file()
> > > > -> ecryptfs_privileged_open()
> > > >
> > > > In ecryptfs_privileged_open(), the dentry_open() call failed if access to
> > > > the lower file is not allowed by Landlock (or other access-control systems).
> > > > Then wait_for_completion(&req.done) waits for a kernel's thread executing
> > > > ecryptfs_threadfn(), which uses the kernel's credential to access the lower
> > > > file.
> > > >
> > > > I think there are two main solutions to fix this consistency issue:
> > > > - store the mounter credentials and uses them instead of the kernel's
> > > > credentials for lower file and directory access checks (ecryptfs_dir_open
> > > > and ecryptfs_threadfn changes);
> > > > - use the kernel's credentials for all lower file/dir access check,
> > > > especially in ecryptfs_dir_open().
> > > >
> > > > I think using the mounter credentials makes more sense, is much safer, and
> > > > fits with overlayfs. It may not work in cases where the mounter doesn't have
> > > > access to the lower file hierarchy though.
> > > >
> > > > File creation calls vfs_*() helpers (lower directory) and there is not path
> > > > nor file security hook calls for those, so it works unconditionally.
> > > >
> > > > From Landlock end users point of view, it makes more sense to grants access
> > > > to a file hierarchy (where access is already allowed) and be allowed to
> > > > access this file hierarchy, whatever it belongs to a specific filesystem
> > > > (and whatever the potential lower file hierarchy, which may be unknown to
> > > > users). This is how it works for overlayfs and I'd like to have the same
> > > > behavior for ecryptfs.
> > >
> > > So given that ecryptfs is marked as "Odd Fixes" who is realistically
> > > going to do the work of switching it to a mounter's credentials model,
> > > making sure this doesn't regress anything, and dealing with any
> > > potential bugs caused by this. It might be potentially better to just
> > > refuse to combine Landlock with ecryptfs if that's possible.
>
> There is now a patch to mark it orphaned (independent of this thread):
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230320182103.46350-1-frank.li@vivo.com/
I have little time to devote to eCryptfs these days. I'm not sure it
needs to be fully orphaned but I think deprecation and marking for
removal is the responsible thing to do.
> > If Tyler is OK with the proposed solutions, I'll get a closer look at it in
> > a few months. If anyone is interested to work on that, I'd be happy to
> > review and test (the Landlock part).
>
> I wonder whether this problem of calling security hooks for the
> underlying directory might have been affecting AppArmor and SELinux as
> well? There seem to be reports on the web, but it's possible that I
> am misinterpreting some of them:
Yes, this eCryptfs design problem is common for other LSMs, as well.
Tyler
>
> https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Roadmap
> mentions this "unscheduled wishlist item":
> "eCryptfs + SELinux/AppArmor integration, to protect encrypted data from root"
>
> https://askubuntu.com/a/1195430
> reports that AppArmor does not work on an eCryptfs mount for their use case
> "i tried adding the [eCryptfs] source folder as an alias in apparmor and it now works."
>
> —Günther
>
> --
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-24 22:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-19 15:56 Does Landlock not work with eCryptfs? Günther Noack
2023-03-19 21:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-20 17:15 ` Günther Noack
2023-03-20 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-21 16:36 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-21 17:24 ` Christian Brauner
2023-03-21 18:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 17:05 ` Günther Noack
2023-03-24 22:45 ` Tyler Hicks (Microsoft) [this message]
2023-03-24 22:53 ` Tyler Hicks
2023-03-26 21:19 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-27 21:01 ` Günther Noack
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=ZB4oA1Q2Q8tq6POc@sequoia \
--to=code@tyhicks.com \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=gnoack3000@gmail.com \
--cc=landlock@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox