From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795007551; b=FqNHS0r5MbZYNonJNKDyJhoyk1retrJXfM8lIDUg+Ik/Z63i0hV/jtOJavh7pSblcHR5 o+4pzFtj/SYC622ttnKmL0U0yVtZC4k8ibf4qNZvYzKazJnlqq1J8JHa2nCIasIdTx/s6 0xqRq8hLNWz7xrGmrNKnzbFMwxHfsb+LJnU6VeLMvmI8k6VSFOf5LiyVWOKyommJ6m8l4 6CO4RxvGKVUXRkaJPXc6YnTbalRxgBzCUnBDBvLiMF9UqA9kMnDlVxaHrXGph5l8HK/ok uQ2W0jDTiRJBCaBhFUalEVtOSqSUnpvJmUurjtIEx8+lnVPpjO1T95HSr1iwBnJINIw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795007551; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=I1vWLb4kBx/eVsIs5pdih0gN+x99z2ISx2RwkUP35zg=; b=QyyIgpeIeGl8YT7ejNDYm27R3BgjsXqNZU4At67t3sVDkMZ8bTn6GlkTrOywqoumWdh4 WIusQT4XHCKOGm3dFaG479wfyCt2Y3PKZihZMFkrhKhWf1LSnOWeuDU0TIL4e3wLwqStM c1Yk9asuMNJzAjGTKG7lQ8/04s0As8TviYAnfBwOTR9yiwq1F4UsO/NudCu3p36+ws3Lz oFeg51dmtsaaIhoDk2MlNVhKKj7KWoK/nQKT7cZmWcvG+iIMWfEBP8NsT3iw6hifPXi2e mTbAI3srNMQfcTW4DtAJuSghFEGuqa0/+bw3tEZXXnVZmKwG+kd1+wHdqqqN6XnItKQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=SzEQGEef; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D1B94606A31C; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 13:12:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=SzEQGEef Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A9EC01F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 13:12:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795007551; bh=I1vWLb4kBx/eVsIs5pdih0gN+x99z2ISx2RwkUP35zg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=SzEQGEef4Q5ibf23T4lKW8nd/bWvXR3SKus+tk9JqTx/RBbroWEwaw8n1qjKt8tqh D6toOaficzYKJohi6nFFPdQ0dHHOo0lmScOntNtVSnnZkOUdRuBTbwOh3EZ67r0Ghq otw4njjF6x8O8SsPuoJHdf4ULJkvht7GS4f/qL4YSAjbwiYgEezzcgXniZGY6CMdYN z6UTvn/0ksbMaDGL3PbPu6qlubTctcCsiCIBM4Zx07AT0NE/nXRht/lIRWhRSZ7vXx da0sBTZToeWs1oL/si/pp9zSk1tMjSHqIGAh70OtVJHSqc3IAzQwiC3A2TCrF8pzjI yGMfwzc8mXi0g== Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:12:27 +0200 From: Leon Romanovsky To: Alexey Kardashevskiy Cc: Robin Murphy , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Danilo Krummrich , Dmitry Torokhov , Andrew Lunn , Heiner Kallweit , Russell King , "David S. Miller" , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Johannes Berg , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , Bjorn Helgaas , "Joerg Roedel (AMD)" , Suravee Suthikulpanit , Vasant Hegde , Will Deacon , David Woodhouse , Lu Baolu , Johan Hovold , Eric Dumazet , Marcel Holtmann , Luiz Augusto von Dentz , Nipun Gupta , Nikhil Agarwal , Pieter Jansen van Vuuren , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev, linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev, Jason Gunthorpe Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 18/19] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Message-ID: <20261118131227.GF162713@unreal> References: <20261109-device-trust-core-v2-0-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com> <20261109-device-trust-core-v2-18-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com> <20261110122237.GG8635@unreal> <20261117124801.GD124972@unreal> X-Mailing-List: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:33:45PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote: > On 17/11/26 23:48, Leon Romanovsky wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 05:13:59PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote: > > > On 10/11/2026 12:22 pm, Leon Romanovsky wrote: > > > > On Mon, Nov 09, 2026 at 01:53:02PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote: > > > > > On 09/11/2026 7:33 am, Leon Romanovsky wrote: > > > > > [...] > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c > > > > > > index b486b8bbd1fcd..8be2a246d4903 100644 > > > > > > --- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c > > > > > > +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c > > > > > > @@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static int iommu_get_def_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group, > > > > > > static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group, > > > > > > int target_type) > > > > > > { > > > > > > - struct device *untrusted = NULL; > > > > > > + struct device *restricted = NULL; > > > > > > struct group_device *gdev; > > > > > > int driver_type = 0; > > > > > > @@ -1901,14 +1901,15 @@ static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group, > > > > > > driver_type = iommu_get_def_domain_type(group, gdev->dev, > > > > > > driver_type); > > > > > > - if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) && to_pci_dev(gdev->dev)->untrusted) { > > > > > > + if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) && > > > > > > + pci_dev_default_is_restricted(to_pci_dev(gdev->dev))) { > > > > > > > > > > I think this should be the generic device_is_adversarial(gdev->dev) now - in > > > > > fact probably all the dev_is_pci()/to_pci_dev() stanzas aren't conceptually > > > > > PCI-specific, just an artefact of the current "untrusted" flag being so. > > > > > > > > I wanted to do the same, but iommu_get_default_domain_type() may be called > > > > before the PCI device's trust level has been set. At that point, we are > > > > still in "disabled" mode, whereas device_is_adversarial() checks for > > > > "adversarial" mode. > > > > > > > > The below is from AI, I asked to present me the path for that: > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > For a newly discovered PCI device with an available IOMMU and a new IOMMU group: > > > > pci_scan_single_device() > > > > pci_device_add() > > > > device_add() > > > > bus_notify(dev, BUS_NOTIFY_ADD_DEVICE) > > > > blocking_notifier_call_chain() > > > > notifier_call_chain() > > > > iommu_bus_notifier() > > > > iommu_probe_device(dev) > > > > __iommu_probe_device(dev, NULL) > > > > iommu_setup_default_domain(group, 0) > > > > iommu_get_default_domain_type(group, 0) > > > > > > > > For a device whose initial policy is adversary, its state during that call is: > > > > dev->trust_policy = DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY > > > > dev->trust_level = DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED > > > > dev->trust_committed_level = DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED > > > > dev->driver = NULL > > > > > > > > device_is_adversarial(dev) = false > > > > > > > > The active level changes later, during binding: > > > > really_probe() > > > > device_trust_prepare() > > > > __device_trust_prepare() > > > > WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_level, DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY) > > > > dev->bus->dma_configure() > > > > call_driver_probe() > > > > > > OK, that seems less than ideal. Feels like it would be better if bus code > > > set the initial device state prior to device_add, so then it only ever > > > changes later as a result of an explicit attestation/acceptance process. If > > > the initial IOMMU probe still has to poke into bus-specific code to avoid > > > always making a worst-case assumption, doesn't that rather defeat the point > > > of having a generic abstraction? > > > > As Jason said, this is part of a very large series. Each series is an > > adventure in itself. Even Greg's seemingly simple request to convert the > > USB authorization knob to this new scheme has been extremely painful > > because of AI reviews. They keep pointing out bugs and gaps that are > > automatically attributed to me simply because I'm touching that part of > > the code. > > > > > > > > Even with the slightly dubious argument that this series only intends to > > > shuffle the existing PCI code around rather than fully introduce the generic > > > abstraction that it claims to, if the PCI behaviour is still just based on > > > propagating the internal "untrusted" flag plus the new global override, both > > > of which *are* known at add_device time into the common trust state, then > > > there seems little excuse for not doing that up-front so that the new API > > > *can* just work as expected. > > > > I would prefer to keep both PCI and USB out of this series on device trust > > levels. Let's see what people say if I drop them in v3. > > > I'd rather you did not as it is going to make experiments with CoCo VMs harder. I haven't dropped it yet :(, but it's unlikely that you need USB there. Regarding PCI, these patches convert the ->untrusted knob, which is orthogonal to your experiments. <...> > > > Urgh, I can be absolutely certain I'm not the only one who is going to be > > > confused this way... I see "disabled" and instinctively take it to mean > > > disabling the device_trust *mechanism*, as the logical thing that people > > > will reach for in terms of "I don't care what this new thing is, just get it > > > out of my way and let my drivers work like they always used to; I want to > > > disable the new thing." > > > > I completely agree. I was under the impression that these names had already > > been decided, since I picked up where Dan left off.>> > > > From there it then also makes perfect self-consistent sense that > > > "device_trust=full" would be the opposite end of the scale as in "Apply the > > > explicit trust model 'fully', to all devices regardless of their bus-level > > > default." > > > > > > Now I guess you could name it something like "device.default_trust_level" to > > > attempt to make it clearer that it represents a value the value represents > > > the "trust" *of* each individual device itself, but TBH it's still liable to > > > look backwards to many users - similarly it's hard to guess that > > > FOO_POLICY_DISABLED might mean something entirely different from "don't > > > enforce the policy for FOO.", thus rather than try to contort the naming of > > > everything, I'd still be much more inclined to just flip the meanings to be > > > more intuitive from the outsider perspective. > > > > > > Say you upgrade your kernel and find your boot is broken because it now > > > flibbles, but at least there is a "flibble" parameter whose values are > > > "disabled", "wibble" and "frobble". Are you really going to spend time > > > straight off reading up on what flibbling is to understand what wibbles and > > > frobbles mean? Or is your instinct just going to be to try the seemingly > > > obvious way of disabling flibbling, and then getting positively annoyed if > > > that only makes it flibble harder? > > > > What about: blocked, adversarial and unrestricted > > yes, that's better. > > > instead of: disabled, adversarial and full > > may be simplify: blocked, restricted, unrestricted? Thanks, "adversarial" is Dan's legacy, let's keep that name. > > > > > > Thanks > > > > > > > > Robin. > > -- > Alexey >