From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Paul E. McKenney" Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2020 12:42:37 -0700 Message-ID: <20200706194237.GF9247@paulmck-ThinkPad-P72> References: <20200630173734.14057-1-will@kernel.org> <20200630173734.14057-19-will@kernel.org> <20200701170722.4rte5ssnmrn2uqzg@bakewell.cambridge.arm.com> <20200702072301.GA15963@willie-the-truck> <20200706160023.GB10992@arm.com> <20200706183542.GB23766@willie-the-truck> Reply-To: paulmck@kernel.org Mime-Version: 1.0 Return-path: DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1594064557; bh=gq8OONsZv2DL9Wl2RlB9KVkvm70QuCx2mh8QqqjtMbI=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Reply-To:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=lh3vxVKBCu2a1xT47mTYziII5iB0/8GAkDAt71DAfoKVDSx6FVqCJSq59QVsEGSnP Q60Pvq90qvfChKmNKQJkCuTpUGESomfnWfhOoPesvmXeSdfBqBsiWX1GemxQCisw41 x0SD+lBBhKrCWfQ4CGoMu0RtilR1klMo8qmHvImM= Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Marco Elver Cc: Will Deacon , Dave Martin , Mark Rutland , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Jason Wang , virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, Arnd Bergmann , Alan Stern , Sami Tolvanen , Matt Turner , Android Kernel Team , Kees Cook , Boqun Feng , Josh Triplett , Ivan Kokshaysky , Linux ARM , Richard Henderson , Nick Desaulniers <> On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 09:23:26PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote: > On Mon, 6 Jul 2020 at 20:35, Will Deacon wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 05:00:23PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote: > > > On Thu, Jul 02, 2020 at 08:23:02AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote: > > > > On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 06:07:25PM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote: > > > > > Also, can you illustrate code that can only be unsafe with Clang LTO? > > > > > > > > I don't have a concrete example, but it's an ongoing concern over on the LTO > > > > thread [1], so I cooked this to show one way we could deal with it. The main > > > > concern is that the whole-program optimisations enabled by LTO may allow the > > > > compiler to enumerate possible values for a pointer at link time and replace > > > > an address dependency between two loads with a control dependency instead, > > > > defeating the dependency ordering within the CPU. > > > > > > Why can't that happen without LTO? > > > > It could, but I'd argue that it's considerably less likely because there > > is less information available to the compiler to perform these sorts of > > optimisations. It also doesn't appear to be happening in practice. > > > > The current state of affairs is that, if/when we catch the compiler > > performing harmful optimistations, we look for a way to disable them. > > However, there are good reasons to enable LTO, so this is one way to > > do that without having to worry about the potential impact on dependency > > ordering. > > If it's of any help, I'll see if we can implement that warning in LLVM > if data dependencies somehow disappear (although I don't have any > cycles to pursue right now myself). Until then, short of manual > inspection or encountering a bug in the wild, there is no proof any of > this happens or doesn't happen. > > Also, as some anecdotal evidence it's extremely unlikely, even with > LTO: looking at the passes that LLVM runs, there are a number of > passes that seem to want to eliminate basic blocks, thereby getting > rid of branches. Intuitively, it makes sense, because branches are > expensive on most architectures (for GPU targets, I think it tries > even harder to get rid of branches). If we extend our reasoning and > assumptions of LTO's aggressiveness in that direction, we might > actually end up with fewer branches. That might be beneficial for the > data dependencies we worry about (but not so much for control > dependencies we want to keep). Still, no point in speculating (no pun > intended) until we have hard data what actually happens. :-) Anything along these lines would be very welcome!!! Thanx, Paul