From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 16/16] x86/tdx: Add cmdline option to force use of ioremap_host_shared Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2021 16:59:51 -0400 Message-ID: <20211012165705-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <20211009003711.1390019-1-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> <20211009003711.1390019-17-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> <20211009070132-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <8c906de6-5efa-b87a-c800-6f07b98339d0@linux.intel.com> <20211011075945-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <9d0ac556-6a06-0f2e-c4ff-0c3ce742a382@linux.intel.com> <20211011142330-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <4fe8d60a-2522-f111-995c-dcbefd0d5e31@linux.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Return-path: DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1634072400; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=Exp5E6dmY1PTSyKlOFa3gXPk4wQssFca5mHGxtbGag0=; b=igCTC4SM7jQR6qapOSFWL9jNvG9gX07POR3VmciQplPTVSGQ3ElgA0RNw0ZP49hiCd7Si5 xebfs9UCwTBAZMyKD6gHkCBYQ8Pz435UgOqpimFhX5oM7cXE+yZI0ZdDIWJk0ZFPvgbk65 FFKsvX22zCQrcTmUlfWAgPnpz1omz5Y= Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4fe8d60a-2522-f111-995c-dcbefd0d5e31@linux.intel.com> List-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Andi Kleen Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , Bjorn Helgaas , Richard Henderson , Thomas Bogendoerfer , James E J Bottomley , Helge Deller , "David S . Miller" , Arnd Bergmann , Jonathan Corbet , Paolo Bonzini , David Hildenbrand , Andrea Arcangeli , Josh Poimboeuf , Peter H Anvin On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 10:55:20AM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote: > > > I mean ... it's already wide spread. > > > I meant wide spread usage with confidential guests. > > > If we support it with TDX > > it will be used with TDX. > > It has some security trade offs. The main reason to use TDX is security. > Also when people take the VT-d tradeoffs they might be ok with the BIOS > trade offs too. > > -Andi Interesting. VT-d tradeoffs ... what are they? Allowing hypervisor to write into BIOS looks like it will trivially lead to code execution, won't it? -- MST