From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Topi Miettinen Subject: Re: [PATCH] Allow restricting permissions in /proc/sys Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2019 12:52:02 +0200 Message-ID: <0ba24187-caf6-c851-baaa-f768885cda47@gmail.com> References: <74a91362-247c-c749-5200-7bdce704ed9e@gmail.com> <20191112232239.yevpeemgxz4wy32b@wittgenstein> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Andy Lutomirski , Christian Brauner Cc: Luis Chamberlain , Kees Cook , Alexey Dobriyan , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)" , Linux API , Andrew Morton List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On 13.11.2019 6.50, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 3:22 PM Christian Brauner > wrote: >> >> [Cc+ linux-api@vger.kernel.org] >> >> since that's potentially relevant to quite a few people. >> >> On Sun, Nov 03, 2019 at 04:55:48PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote: >>> Several items in /proc/sys need not be accessible to unprivileged >>> tasks. Let the system administrator change the permissions, but only >>> to more restrictive modes than what the sysctl tables allow. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen >>> --- >>> fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- >>> 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c >>> index d80989b6c344..88c4ca7d2782 100644 >>> --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c >>> +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c >>> @@ -818,6 +818,10 @@ static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int >>> mask) >>> if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) >>> return -EACCES; >>> >>> + error = generic_permission(inode, mask); >>> + if (error) >>> + return error; >>> + >>> head = grab_header(inode); >>> if (IS_ERR(head)) >>> return PTR_ERR(head); >>> @@ -837,9 +841,35 @@ static int proc_sys_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, >>> struct iattr *attr) >>> struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); >>> int error; >>> >>> - if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) >>> + if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) >>> return -EPERM; > > Supporting at least ATTR_GID would make this much more useful. Yes, also XATTR/ACL support would be useful. But so far I've tried to allow only tightening of permissions. >>> >>> + if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { >>> + struct ctl_table_header *head = grab_header(inode); >>> + struct ctl_table *table = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_entry; >>> + umode_t max_mode = 0777; /* Only these bits may change */ >>> + >>> + if (IS_ERR(head)) >>> + return PTR_ERR(head); >>> + >>> + if (!table) /* global root - r-xr-xr-x */ >>> + max_mode &= ~0222; >>> + else /* >>> + * Don't allow permissions to become less >>> + * restrictive than the sysctl table entry >>> + */ >>> + max_mode &= table->mode; > > Style nit: please put braces around multi-line if and else branches, > even if they're only multi-line because of comments. OK, thanks. >>> + >>> + sysctl_head_finish(head); >>> + >>> + /* Execute bits only allowed for directories */ >>> + if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) >>> + max_mode &= ~0111; > > Why is this needed? > In general, /proc/sys does not allow executable permissions for the files, so I've continued this policy. -Topi