From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2022 21:42:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0e529db5f814ef7af7b197962c752a1454510a49.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y6Li9oIl/tK96KUf@zn.tnic>
On Wed, 2022-12-21 at 11:41 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 21, 2022 at 12:37:51AM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> > You mean having separate paths for kernel IBT and user shadow stack
> > that compile out? I guess it could just all be in place if
> > CONFIG_X86_CET is in place.
> >
> > I don't know, I thought it was relatively clean, but I can remove
> > it.
>
> Yeah, I'm wondering if we really need the ifdeffery. I always
> question
> ifdeffery because it is a) ugly, b) a mess to deal with and having it
> is
> not really worth it. Yeah, we save a couple of KBs, big deal.
>
> What would practically happen is, shadow stack will be default-
> enabled
> on the majority of kernels out there - distro ones - so it will be
> enabled practically everywhere.
>
> And it'll be off only in some self-built kernels which are the very
> small minority.
>
> And how much are the space savings with the whole set applied, with
> and
> without the Kconfig item enabled? Probably only a couple of KBs.
Oh, you mean the whole Kconfig thing. Yea, I mean I see the point about
typical configs. But at least CONFIG_X86_CET seems consistent with
CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST, CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA, etc.
What about moving it out of traps.c to a cet.c, like
exc_vmm_communication for CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRT? Then the inclusion
logic lives in the build files, instead of an ifdef.
>
> And if so, I'm thinking we could at least make the traps.c stuff
> unconditional - it'll be there but won't run. Unless we get some
> weird
> #CP but it'll be caught by do_unexpected_cp().
>
> And you have feature tests everywhere so it's not like it'll get
> "misused".
>
> And when you do that, you'll have everything a lot simpler, a lot
> less
> Kconfig items to build-test and all good.
>
> Right?
>
> Or am I completely way off into the weeds here and am missing an
> important aspect...?
>
One aspect that has come up a couple of times, is how closely related
all these CET features are (or aren't). Shadow stack and IBT are mostly
separate, but do share an xfeature and an exception type. Similarly for
supervisor and user mode support for either of the CET features. So
maybe that is what is unusual here. There are some aspects that make
them look like separate features, which leads people to think they
should be separate in the code. But actually separating them leads to
excess ifdefery.
To me, putting the whole handler in even if there are no CET features
seems like too much. Leaving it in unconditionally is apparently also
inconsistent with some of the previous traps.c decisions. So I'd leave
CONFIG_X86_CET at least and it can help anyone building super stripped
down kernels. But I'm ok with whatever people think.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-21 21:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-03 0:35 [PATCH v4 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:20 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 8:58 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-12-05 21:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:20 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:22 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 11:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 22:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-08 11:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:23 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 12:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 18:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:24 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 21:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2023-01-04 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-20 21:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:29 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 21:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 11:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 23:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 1:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:32 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 13:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 22:26 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 13/39] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:33 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 14/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 15/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:34 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 16/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-04 14:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 1:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:34 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 18/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:37 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 19/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 20/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:38 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 21/39] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:38 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 22/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:39 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 24/39] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:40 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 25/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:42 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 26/39] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:43 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 27/39] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 28/39] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:45 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 29/39] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:46 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 30/39] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:51 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-05 22:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 31/39] x86/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:52 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 32/39] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:52 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 33/39] x86: Prevent 32 bit operations for 64 bit shstk tasks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-12-04 20:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-15 0:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 34/39] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 35/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:55 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 17:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-12-09 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 38/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:56 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 39/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:57 ` Kees Cook
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