From: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Subject: [PATCHv9 0/5] syscalls,x86,sparc: Add execveat() system call
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 17:27:47 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1416418072-18639-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> (raw)
This patch set adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).
The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc
filesystem, at least for executables (rather than scripts). The
current glibc version of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which
causes problems in sandboxed or otherwise restricted environments.
Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA
suggested (https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2)
syscall would be an appropriate generalization.
Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument
without back-compatibility concerns. The current implementation just
defines the AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other
flags could be added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces
(as suggested at https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).
Related history:
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
- http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
"prevent other people from wasting their time".
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
been fixed.
Changes since v8:
- Split core/fs changes from x86 changes [Thomas Gleixner]
Changes since v7:
- Speculatively wire up sparc version of syscall (untested)
- Fix leak of pathbuf in mainline arm [Oleg Nesterov]
- Add rcu_dereference_raw() on fdt access [sparse kbuild robot]
- Realigned comment [Andrew Morton]
- Merged up to v3.18-rc4
Changes since v6:
- Remove special case for O_PATH file descriptors [Andy Lutomirski]
- Use kasprintf rather than error-prone arithmetic [Kees Cook]
- Add test for long name [Kees Cook]
- Add test for non-executable O_PATH fd [Andy Lutomirski]
Changes since v5:
- Set new flag in bprm->interp_flags for O_CLOEXEC fds, so that binfmts
that invoke an interpreter fail the exec (as they will not be able
to access the invoked file). [Andy Lutomirski]
- Don't truncate long paths. [Andy Lutomirski]
- Commonize code to open the executed file. [Eric W. Biederman]
- Mark O_PATH file descriptors so they cannot be fexecve()ed.
- Make self-test more helpful, and add additional cases:
- file offset non-zero
- binary file without execute bit
- O_CLOEXEC fds
Changes since v4, suggested by Eric W. Biederman:
- Use empty filename with AT_EMPTY_PATH flag rather than NULL
pathname to request fexecve-like behaviour.
- Build pathname as "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>" (or "/dev/fd/<fd>")
rather than using d_path().
- Patch against v3.17 (bfe01a5ba249)
Changes since Meredydd's v3 patch:
- Added a selftest.
- Added a man page.
- Left open_exec() signature untouched to reduce patch impact
elsewhere (as suggested by Al Viro).
- Filled in bprm->filename with d_path() into a buffer, to avoid use
of potentially-ephemeral dentry->d_name.
- Patch against v3.14 (455c6fdbd21916).
David Drysdale (4):
syscalls: implement execveat() system call
x86: Hook up execveat system call.
syscalls: add selftest for execveat(2)
sparc: Hook up execveat system call.
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 3 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_32.S | 1 +
arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_64.S | 2 +
arch/x86/ia32/audit.c | 1 +
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 28 +++
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 1 +
fs/binfmt_em86.c | 4 +
fs/binfmt_misc.c | 4 +
fs/binfmt_script.c | 10 +
fs/exec.c | 113 +++++++--
fs/namei.c | 2 +-
include/linux/binfmts.h | 4 +
include/linux/compat.h | 3 +
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
include/linux/sched.h | 4 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 5 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +-
kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 +
lib/audit.c | 3 +
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore | 9 +
tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile | 25 ++
tools/testing/selftests/exec/execveat.c | 397 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
27 files changed, 617 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/execveat.c
--
2.1.0.rc2.206.gedb03e5
next reply other threads:[~2014-11-19 17:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-11-19 17:27 David Drysdale [this message]
2014-11-19 17:27 ` [PATCHv9 1/5] syscalls: implement execveat() system call David Drysdale
2014-11-19 17:27 ` [PATCHv9 2/5] x86: Hook up execveat " David Drysdale
[not found] ` <1416418072-18639-1-git-send-email-drysdale-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-11-19 17:27 ` [PATCHv9 3/5] syscalls: add selftest for execveat(2) David Drysdale
2014-11-19 17:27 ` [PATCHv9 4/5] sparc: Hook up execveat system call David Drysdale
2014-11-19 23:42 ` Stephen Rothwell
[not found] ` <20141120104223.2cea8043-3FnU+UHB4dNDw9hX6IcOSA@public.gmane.org>
2014-11-20 11:28 ` David Drysdale
2014-11-21 20:08 ` David Miller
2014-11-19 17:27 ` [PATCHv9 man-pages 5/5] execveat.2: initial man page for execveat(2) David Drysdale
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