From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
security@kernel.org, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 22:25:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1449523512-29200-2-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1449523512-29200-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net>
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++-----
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ff81026..7c57c7f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -398,12 +398,10 @@ static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
*/
static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
{
- switch (mode) {
- case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
- return MAY_READ;
- case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
return MAY_READWRITE;
- }
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+ return MAY_READ;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index d3c19c9..cb6ed10 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
int rc = 0;
/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
- if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
switch (ptrace_scope) {
case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED:
/* No additional restrictions. */
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
}
}
- if (rc) {
+ if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
"ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
child->pid, current->comm, current->pid);
--
2.1.4
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-12-07 21:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-08 12:08 [PATCH] ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks Jann Horn
2015-11-09 20:55 ` Andrew Morton
2015-11-09 21:06 ` Willy Tarreau
[not found] ` <20151109125554.43e6a711e59d1b8bf99cdeb1-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
2015-11-09 21:12 ` Jann Horn
2015-11-09 21:19 ` Andrew Morton
[not found] ` <20151109131902.db961a5fe7b7fcbeb14f72fc-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
2015-12-06 2:04 ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 20:32 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jJKOnWWSuLO5zWZ9=7Nhv0hWvJ0wEVJ3n+URY7-q_BCJw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-12-07 20:38 ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:25 ` Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:25 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2015-12-07 21:30 ` [PATCH 1/2] security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks Kees Cook
2015-12-07 21:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-12-07 21:25 ` [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks Jann Horn
2015-12-07 21:27 ` Kees Cook
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