From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg-U8xfFu+wG4EAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Ashwin Ganti
<ashwin.ganti-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
rsc-kPPrOchjzlEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
ericvh-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Ron Minnich <rminnich-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
jt.beard-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
Andrew Morton
<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
Andrew Morgan <morgan-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
oleg-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
Eric Paris <eparis-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap-/UHa2rfvQTnk1uMJSBkQmQ@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] p9auth: add p9auth driver
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 2010 22:36:14 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20100424033614.GA4180@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <m1zl0xo1m9.fsf-+imSwln9KH6u2/kzUuoCbdi2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org):
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> writes:
>
> > Quoting Greg KH (greg-U8xfFu+wG4EAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org):
> >> On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 08:29:08PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >> > This is a driver that adds Plan 9 style capability device
> >> > implementation. See Documentation/p9auth.txt for a description
> >> > of how to use this.
> >>
> >> Hm, you didn't originally write this driver, so it would be good to get
> >> some original authorship information in here to keep everything correct,
> >> right?
> >
> > That's why I left the MODULE_AUTHOR line in there - not sure what
> > else to do for that. I'll add a comment in p9auth.txt, especially
> > pointing back to Ashwin's original paper.
> >
> >> > Documentation/p9auth.txt | 47 ++++
> >> > drivers/char/Kconfig | 2 +
> >> > drivers/char/Makefile | 2 +
> >> > drivers/char/p9auth/Kconfig | 9 +
> >> > drivers/char/p9auth/Makefile | 1 +
> >> > drivers/char/p9auth/p9auth.c | 517 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>
> >> Is this code really ready for drivers/char/? What has changed in it
> >> that makes it ok to move out of the staging tree?
> >
> > It was dropped from staging :) I don't particularly care to see it
> > go back into staging, as opposed to working out issues out of tree
> > (assuming they are solvable). For one thing, as you note below,
> > there is the question of whether it should be a device driver at
> > all.
> >
> >> And who is going to maintain it? You? Or someone else?
> >
> > If Ashwin doesn't want to maintain it, I'll do it. Either way.
> >
> >> > 6 files changed, 578 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >> > create mode 100644 Documentation/p9auth.txt
> >> > create mode 100644 drivers/char/p9auth/Kconfig
> >> > create mode 100644 drivers/char/p9auth/Makefile
> >> > create mode 100644 drivers/char/p9auth/p9auth.c
> >> >
> >> > diff --git a/Documentation/p9auth.txt b/Documentation/p9auth.txt
> >> > new file mode 100644
> >> > index 0000000..14a69d8
> >> > --- /dev/null
> >> > +++ b/Documentation/p9auth.txt
> >> > @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
> >> > +The p9auth device driver implements a plan-9 factotum-like
> >> > +capability API. Tasks which are privileged (authorized by
> >> > +possession of the CAP_GRANT_ID privilege (POSIX capability))
> >> > +can write new capabilities to /dev/caphash. The kernel then
> >> > +stores these until a task uses them by writing to the
> >> > +/dev/capuse device. Each capability represents the ability
> >> > +for a task running as userid X to switch to userid Y and
> >> > +some set of groups. Each capability may be used only once,
> >> > +and unused capabilities are cleared after two minutes.
> >> > +
> >> > +The following examples shows how to use the API. Shell 1
> >> > +contains a privileged root shell. Shell 2 contains an
> >> > +unprivileged shell as user 501 in the same user namespace. If
> >> > +not already done, the privileged shell should create the p9auth
> >> > +devices:
> >> > +
> >> > + majfile=/sys/module/p9auth/parameters/cap_major
> >> > + minfile=/sys/module/p9auth/parameters/cap_minor
> >> > + maj=`cat $majfile`
> >> > + mknod /dev/caphash c $maj 0
> >> > + min=`cat $minfile`
> >> > + mknod /dev/capuse c $maj 1
> >> > + chmod ugo+w /dev/capuse
> >>
> >> That is incorrect, you don't need the cap_major/minor files at all, the
> >> device node should be automatically created for you, right?
> >
> > Hmm, where? Not in /dev on my SLES11 partition...
> >
> >> And do you really want to do all of this control through a device node?
> >> Why?
> >
> > Well...
> >
> > At first I was thinking same as you were. So I was going to switch
> > to a pure syscall-based approach. But it just turned out more
> > complicated. The factotum server would call sys_grantid(), and
> > the target task would end up doing some huge sys_setresugid() or
> > else multiple syscalls using the granted id. It just was uglier.
> > I think there's an experimental patchset sitting somewhere I could
> > point to (if I weren't embarassed :).
> >
> > Another possibility would be to use netlink, but that doesn't
> > appear as amenable to segragation by user namespaces. The pid
> > (presumably/hopefully global pid, as __u32) is available, so it
> > shouldn't be impossible, but a simple device with simple synchronous
> > read/write certainly has its appeal. Firing off a message hoping
> > that at some point our credentials will be changes, less so.
>
> pid in the netlink context is the netlink port-id. It is a very
> different concept from struct pid. These days netlink calls to
> the kernel are synchronous, not that I would encourage netlink
> for anything except networking code.
>
> Can we make this a trivial filesystem? I expect that would match
> up better with whatever plan9 userspace apps already exist,
> remove the inode double translation, and would make it much more
> reasonable to do a user namespace aware version if and when
BTW, this current version is user namespace aware.
> that becomes necessary.
An fs actually seems overkill for two write-only files for
process-related information. Would these actually be candidates
for new /proc files?
/proc/grantcred - replaces /dev/caphash, for privileged
tasks to tell the kernel about new setuid
capabilities
/proc/self/usecred - replaces /dev/capuse for unprivileged
tasks to make use of a setuid capability
-serge
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-04-24 3:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20100421012749.GA21338@us.ibm.com>
[not found] ` <20100421012749.GA21338-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-21 1:29 ` [PATCH 3/3] p9auth: add p9auth driver Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20100421012908.GB24251-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-21 3:04 ` Greg KH
[not found] ` <20100421030406.GB10258-U8xfFu+wG4EAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-21 3:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 4:18 ` Ashwin Ganti
2010-04-21 13:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20100421134759.GE16326-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-21 14:44 ` Ashwin Ganti
2010-04-21 4:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <m1zl0xo1m9.fsf-+imSwln9KH6u2/kzUuoCbdi2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-21 13:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-24 3:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2010-04-24 16:25 ` ron minnich
[not found] ` <n2s13426df11004240925id540ed94mc2ebafada0099ec4-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-24 18:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-04-25 3:24 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 9:27 ` Alan Cox
[not found] ` <20100421102739.6ad932fb-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-21 13:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 14:19 ` Alan Cox
[not found] ` <20100421151917.5ae20265-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-21 15:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 19:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-04-21 20:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-22 4:57 ` Kyle Moffett
[not found] ` <w2wf73f7ab81004212157o371c5738o10c8b6ff807ba36a-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2010-04-22 14:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 13:55 ` Eric Paris
2010-04-21 14:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 10:49 ` David Howells
2010-04-21 13:40 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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