From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/9] seccomp: move no_new_privs into seccomp
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 21:30:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140624193055.GA4482@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVgpP=zOtiQafVgcic2T95TdEM5DTvHYXWTbcZ14xBqHQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 06/24, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 24, 2014 at 12:18 PM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> -struct seccomp { };
> >> +struct seccomp {
> >> + unsigned long flags;
> >> +};
> >
> > A bit messy ;)
> >
> > I am wondering if we can simply do
> >
> > static inline bool current_no_new_privs(void)
> > {
> > if (current->no_new_privs)
> > return true;
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> > if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP))
> > return true;
> > #endif
>
> Nope -- privileged users can enable seccomp w/o nnp.
Indeed, I am stupid.
Still it would be nice to cleanup this somehow. The new member is only
used as a previous ->no_new_privs, just it is long to allow the concurent
set/get. Logically it doesn't even belong to seccomp{}.
Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-24 19:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-23 21:58 [PATCH v7 0/9] seccomp: add thread sync ability Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 1/9] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 2/9] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook
2014-06-26 12:37 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-27 18:45 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 3/9] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook
2014-06-24 16:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 18:02 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5j+G8qAkGD7H=3R2iw2ZTqZSrMPa2f=czoEjwSW5wKqUWQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-06-24 18:35 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 20:26 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 18:30 ` Oleg Nesterov
[not found] ` <20140624183024.GA1258-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-06-24 19:46 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 4/9] seccomp: move no_new_privs into seccomp Kees Cook
2014-06-24 19:18 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 19:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-24 19:30 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2014-06-24 19:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrU9x05ADgz9JToiw_BuCPz1h0xmOh=1R3eojL9far1aEA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-06-24 19:50 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jJjuNmf=FRzUPMChvL4D_xkg034pUbRAbaK38f37GYC0A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-06-24 19:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 5/9] seccomp: split mode set routines Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 6/9] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 7/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-06-24 17:08 ` Oleg Nesterov
[not found] ` <20140624170800.GA30480-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-06-24 18:19 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 17:27 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 18:05 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 18:37 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 19:08 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <1403560693-21809-1-git-send-email-keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 8/9] ARM: add seccomp syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 9/9] MIPS: " Kees Cook
2014-06-23 22:01 ` [PATCH v7 1/1] man-pages: seccomp.2: document syscall Kees Cook
[not found] ` <20140623220150.GM5412-oSa+0FWJbaXR7s880joybQ@public.gmane.org>
2014-06-24 10:23 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-06-24 16:43 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 17:48 ` [PATCH v7.1 " Kees Cook
2014-06-24 18:06 ` [PATCH v7 " Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrV=nAuWi8_Xj6KnJ6P1Yiaw36+n50-gHKaTgea4yH85Eg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-06-24 19:18 ` Kees Cook
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