Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
> is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
> the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
> 
> This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
> removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
> the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
> an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>

Cc +linux-api@

> ---
> Changes in v2: 	Removed the follow_link() stub that returned -EPERM if
> 		the caller didn't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, since the caller
> 		in my chroot() scenario gets -EACCES anyway.
> 
>  fs/proc/base.c | 18 ------------------
>  1 file changed, 18 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 3f3d7ae..67b15ac 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -1632,8 +1632,6 @@ end_instantiate:
>  	return dir_emit(ctx, name, len, 1, DT_UNKNOWN);
>  }
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> -
>  /*
>   * dname_to_vma_addr - maps a dentry name into two unsigned longs
>   * which represent vma start and end addresses.
> @@ -1660,11 +1658,6 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
>  	if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
>  		return -ECHILD;
>  
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> -		status = -EPERM;
> -		goto out_notask;
> -	}
> -
>  	inode = dentry->d_inode;
>  	task = get_proc_task(inode);
>  	if (!task)
> @@ -1792,10 +1785,6 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir,
>  	int result;
>  	struct mm_struct *mm;
>  
> -	result = -EPERM;
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> -		goto out;
> -
>  	result = -ENOENT;
>  	task = get_proc_task(dir);
>  	if (!task)
> @@ -1849,10 +1838,6 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
>  	struct map_files_info *p;
>  	int ret;
>  
> -	ret = -EPERM;
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> -		goto out;
> -
>  	ret = -ENOENT;
>  	task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
>  	if (!task)
> @@ -2040,7 +2025,6 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_timers_operations = {
>  	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
>  	.release	= seq_release_private,
>  };
> -#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */
>  
>  static int proc_pident_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
>  	struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
> @@ -2537,9 +2521,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations;
>  static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
>  	DIR("task",       S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_task_inode_operations, proc_task_operations),
>  	DIR("fd",         S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fd_inode_operations, proc_fd_operations),
> -#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
>  	DIR("map_files",  S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_map_files_inode_operations, proc_map_files_operations),
> -#endif
>  	DIR("fdinfo",     S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, proc_fdinfo_inode_operations, proc_fdinfo_operations),
>  	DIR("ns",	  S_IRUSR|S_IXUGO, proc_ns_dir_inode_operations, proc_ns_dir_operations),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_NET
> -- 
> 1.8.1
> 
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

-- 
 Kirill A. Shutemov

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Cyrill Gorcunov]

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
> > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
> > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
> > 
> > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
> > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
> > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
> > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
> 
> Cc +linux-api@

Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
from security camp take a look as well.

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Andrew Morton]

On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> > > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> > > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
> > > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
> > > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.

This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
/proc/pid/maps?

> > > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
> > > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
> > > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
> > > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
> > 
> > Cc +linux-api@
> 
> Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
> from security camp take a look as well.

hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.

And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
/proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:

akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation 
akpm3:/usr/src/25> 

does not help.

The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:

:     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
:     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
:     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
:     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
:     
:     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
:     
:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so

afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case? 
(Please add to changelog).


There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 3:43 PM, Andrew Morton
<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> > On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
>> > > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
>> > > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
>> > > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
>> > > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
>
> This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
> far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
> /proc/pid/maps?
>
>> > > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
>> > > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
>> > > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
>> > > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
>> > >
>> > > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
>> >
>> > Cc +linux-api@
>>
>> Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
>> from security camp take a look as well.
>
> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
>
> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
>
> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation

If akpm's comments weren't clear: this needs to be fixed. Everything
in /proc should appear in Documentation.

> akpm3:/usr/src/25>
>
> does not help.
>
> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
>
> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> :
> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> :
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so

How is mmap offset represented in this output?

>
> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
> (Please add to changelog).

Both maps and map_files uses ptrace_may_access (via mm_acces) with
PTRACE_MODE_READ, so I'm happy from a info leak perspective.

Are mount namespaces handled in this output?

> There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Cyrill Gorcunov]

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 04:15:26PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
> 
> If akpm's comments weren't clear: this needs to be fixed. Everything
> in /proc should appear in Documentation.

I'll do that.

> > The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
> >
> > :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> > :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> > :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> > :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> > :
> > :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> > :
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
> 
> How is mmap offset represented in this output?

We're printing vm_area_struct:[vm_start;vm_end] only.

> > afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> > shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> > as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
> > (Please add to changelog).
> 
> Both maps and map_files uses ptrace_may_access (via mm_acces) with
> PTRACE_MODE_READ, so I'm happy from a info leak perspective.
> 
> Are mount namespaces handled in this output?

Could you clarify this moment, i'm not sure i get it.

> 
> > There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> > implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> > permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> > map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 11:37 PM, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 04:15:26PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >
>> > akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
>>
>> If akpm's comments weren't clear: this needs to be fixed. Everything
>> in /proc should appear in Documentation.
>
> I'll do that.
>
>> > The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
>> >
>> > :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
>> > :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
>> > :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
>> > :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
>> > :
>> > :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
>> > :
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
>>
>> How is mmap offset represented in this output?
>
> We're printing vm_area_struct:[vm_start;vm_end] only.
>
>> > afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
>> > shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
>> > as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
>> > (Please add to changelog).
>>
>> Both maps and map_files uses ptrace_may_access (via mm_acces) with
>> PTRACE_MODE_READ, so I'm happy from a info leak perspective.
>>
>> Are mount namespaces handled in this output?
>
> Could you clarify this moment, i'm not sure i get it.

I changed how I asked this question in my review of the documentation,
but it looks like these symlinks aren't "regular" symlinks (that are
up to the follower to have access to the file system path shown), but
rather they bypass VFS. As a result, I'm wondering how things like
mount namespaces might change this behavior: what is shown, the path
from the perspective of the target, or from the viewer (which may be
in separate mount namespaces).

-Kees

>
>>
>> > There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
>> > implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
>> > permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
>> > map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Cyrill Gorcunov]

On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 11:53:19AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >> Are mount namespaces handled in this output?
> >
> > Could you clarify this moment, i'm not sure i get it.
> 
> I changed how I asked this question in my review of the documentation,
> but it looks like these symlinks aren't "regular" symlinks (that are
> up to the follower to have access to the file system path shown), but
> rather they bypass VFS. As a result, I'm wondering how things like
> mount namespaces might change this behavior: what is shown, the path
> from the perspective of the target, or from the viewer (which may be
> in separate mount namespaces).

I must admit I personally didn't investigating how mount namespaces
might itercat with map-files. Pavel, could you share the thoughts?

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Pavel Emelyanov]

>>> Are mount namespaces handled in this output?
>>
>> Could you clarify this moment, i'm not sure i get it.
> 
> I changed how I asked this question in my review of the documentation,
> but it looks like these symlinks aren't "regular" symlinks (that are
> up to the follower to have access to the file system path shown), but
> rather they bypass VFS. As a result, I'm wondering how things like
> mount namespaces might change this behavior: what is shown, the path
> from the perspective of the target, or from the viewer (which may be
> in separate mount namespaces).

These work just like the /proc/$pid/fd/$n links do. When you readlink
on it the d_path() is called which walks up the dentry/vfsmnt tree
until it reaches either current root or the global one. For "another"
mount namespace case it produces the path relative to this namespace's
root.

Thanks,
Pavel

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Kirill A. Shutemov]

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 03:43:46PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> > > > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> > > > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
> > > > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
> > > > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
> 
> This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
> far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
> /proc/pid/maps?
> 
> > > > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
> > > > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
> > > > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
> > > > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
> > > 
> > > Cc +linux-api@
> > 
> > Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
> > from security camp take a look as well.
> 
> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
> 
> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
> 
> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation 
> akpm3:/usr/src/25> 
> 
> does not help.
> 
> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
> 
> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> :     
> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> :     
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
> 
> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case? 

Almost.

IIUC, before we haven't had a way to retrieve a file descriptor from
mapped file if it was closed and not accessible for direct re-open. Like
in chroot case or unlink after close.

I'm not sure what security implications this move has, if any. I don't see
anything obviously dangerous.

-- 
 Kirill A. Shutemov

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Cyrill Gorcunov]

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 03:43:46PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > 
> > Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
> > from security camp take a look as well.
> 
> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.

yup, I managed to forget CC him.

> 
> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
> 
> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation 
> akpm3:/usr/src/25> 
> 
> does not help.

Sigh. Imagine, for some reason I though we've the docs for that
entry, probably i though that way because of many fdinfo snippets
i've putted into /proc docs. my bad, sorry. I'll try to prepare
docs today.

> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
> 
> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> :     
> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> :     
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
> 
> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case? 
> (Please add to changelog).
> 
> There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?

I didn't find any bugs in map-files (and we use it for long time already)
so I think it is safe.

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Andrew Morton]

On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 09:46:47 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:

> > There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> > implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> > permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> > map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
> 
> I didn't find any bugs in map-files (and we use it for long time already)
> so I think it is safe.

You've been using map_files the way it was supposed to be used so no,
any bugs won't show up.  What happens if you don your evil black hat
and use map_files in ways that weren't anticipated?  Attack it?

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Cyrill Gorcunov]

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 10:50:23PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 09:46:47 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> 
> > > There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> > > implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> > > permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> > > map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
> > 
> > I didn't find any bugs in map-files (and we use it for long time already)
> > so I think it is safe.
> 
> You've been using map_files the way it was supposed to be used so no,
> any bugs won't show up.  What happens if you don your evil black hat
> and use map_files in ways that weren't anticipated?  Attack it?

Hard to say, Andrew. If I found a way to exploit this feature for
bad purpose for sure I would patch it out. At the moment I don't
see any. Touching another process memory via file descriptor
allows one to modify its contents but you have to be granted
ptrace-may-access which i consider as enough for security.

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Calvin Owens]

On Monday 01/26 at 15:43 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> > > > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> > > > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
> > > > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
> > > > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
> 
> This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
> far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
> /proc/pid/maps?

The biggest difference is that if you do something like this:

	fd = open("/stuff", O_BLAH);
	map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_BLAH, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
	close(fd);
	unlink("/stuff");
 
...then map_files/ gives you a way to get a file descriptor for
"/stuff", which you couldn't do with /proc/pid/maps.

It's also something of a win if you just want to see what is mapped at a
specific address, since you can just readlink() the symlink for the
address range you care about and it will go grab the appropriate VMA and
give you the answer. /proc/pid/maps requires walking the VMA tree, which
is quite expensive for processes with many thousands of threads, even
without the O(N^2) issue.

(You have to know what address range you want though, since readdir() on
map_files/ obviously has to walk the VMA tree just like /proc/N/maps.)

> > > > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
> > > > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
> > > > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
> > > > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
> > > 
> > > Cc +linux-api@
> > 
> > Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
> > from security camp take a look as well.
> 
> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
> 
> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
> 
> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation 
> akpm3:/usr/src/25> 
> 
> does not help.
> 
> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
> 
> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> :     
> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> :     
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
> 
> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case? 
> (Please add to changelog). 

Yes, the only difference is that you can follow the link as per above.
I'll resend with a new message explaining that and the deletion thing.
 
> There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?

While I was messing with it I used it a good bit and didn't see any
issues, although I didn't actively try to fuzz it or anything. I'd be
happy to write something to test hammering it in weird ways if you like.
I'm also happy to write testcases for namespaces.

So far as security issues, as others have pointed out you can't follow
the links unless you can ptrace the process in question, which seems
like a pretty solid guarantee. As Cyrill pointed out in the discussion
about the documentation, that's the same protection as /proc/N/fd/*, and
those links function in the same way.

Thanks,
Calvin

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Kees Cook]

On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 8:38 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On Monday 01/26 at 15:43 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
>> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>>
>> > On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> > > On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
>> > > > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
>> > > > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
>> > > > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
>> > > > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
>>
>> This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
>> far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
>> /proc/pid/maps?
>
> The biggest difference is that if you do something like this:
>
>         fd = open("/stuff", O_BLAH);
>         map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_BLAH, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
>         close(fd);
>         unlink("/stuff");
>
> ...then map_files/ gives you a way to get a file descriptor for
> "/stuff", which you couldn't do with /proc/pid/maps.
>
> It's also something of a win if you just want to see what is mapped at a
> specific address, since you can just readlink() the symlink for the
> address range you care about and it will go grab the appropriate VMA and
> give you the answer. /proc/pid/maps requires walking the VMA tree, which
> is quite expensive for processes with many thousands of threads, even
> without the O(N^2) issue.
>
> (You have to know what address range you want though, since readdir() on
> map_files/ obviously has to walk the VMA tree just like /proc/N/maps.)
>
>> > > > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
>> > > > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
>> > > > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
>> > > > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
>> > > >
>> > > > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
>> > >
>> > > Cc +linux-api@
>> >
>> > Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
>> > from security camp take a look as well.
>>
>> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
>>
>> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
>> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
>>
>> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
>> akpm3:/usr/src/25>
>>
>> does not help.
>>
>> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
>>
>> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
>> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
>> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
>> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
>> :
>> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
>> :
>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
>>
>> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
>> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
>> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
>> (Please add to changelog).
>
> Yes, the only difference is that you can follow the link as per above.
> I'll resend with a new message explaining that and the deletion thing.
>
>> There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
>> implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
>> permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
>> map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
>
> While I was messing with it I used it a good bit and didn't see any
> issues, although I didn't actively try to fuzz it or anything. I'd be
> happy to write something to test hammering it in weird ways if you like.
> I'm also happy to write testcases for namespaces.
>
> So far as security issues, as others have pointed out you can't follow
> the links unless you can ptrace the process in question, which seems
> like a pretty solid guarantee. As Cyrill pointed out in the discussion
> about the documentation, that's the same protection as /proc/N/fd/*, and
> those links function in the same way.

My concern here is that fd/* are connected as streams, and while that
has a certain level of badness as an external-to-the-process attacker,
PTRACE_MODE_READ is much weaker than PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH (which is
required for access to /proc/N/mem). Since these fds are the things
mapped into memory on a process, writing to them is a subset of access
to /proc/N/mem, and I don't feel that PTRACE_MODE_READ is sufficient.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Calvin Owens]

On Thursday 01/29 at 17:30 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 8:38 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > On Monday 01/26 at 15:43 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> >> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> > On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >> > > On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> >> > > > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> >> > > > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
> >> > > > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
> >> > > > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
> >>
> >> This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
> >> far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
> >> /proc/pid/maps?
> >
> > The biggest difference is that if you do something like this:
> >
> >         fd = open("/stuff", O_BLAH);
> >         map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_BLAH, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> >         close(fd);
> >         unlink("/stuff");
> >
> > ...then map_files/ gives you a way to get a file descriptor for
> > "/stuff", which you couldn't do with /proc/pid/maps.
> >
> > It's also something of a win if you just want to see what is mapped at a
> > specific address, since you can just readlink() the symlink for the
> > address range you care about and it will go grab the appropriate VMA and
> > give you the answer. /proc/pid/maps requires walking the VMA tree, which
> > is quite expensive for processes with many thousands of threads, even
> > without the O(N^2) issue.
> >
> > (You have to know what address range you want though, since readdir() on
> > map_files/ obviously has to walk the VMA tree just like /proc/N/maps.)
> >
> >> > > > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
> >> > > > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
> >> > > > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
> >> > > > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
> >> > >
> >> > > Cc +linux-api@
> >> >
> >> > Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
> >> > from security camp take a look as well.
> >>
> >> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
> >>
> >> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
> >> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
> >>
> >> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
> >> akpm3:/usr/src/25>
> >>
> >> does not help.
> >>
> >> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
> >>
> >> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> >> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> >> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> >> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> >> :
> >> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> >> :
> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
> >>
> >> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> >> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> >> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
> >> (Please add to changelog).
> >
> > Yes, the only difference is that you can follow the link as per above.
> > I'll resend with a new message explaining that and the deletion thing.
> >
> >> There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> >> implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> >> permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> >> map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
> >
> > While I was messing with it I used it a good bit and didn't see any
> > issues, although I didn't actively try to fuzz it or anything. I'd be
> > happy to write something to test hammering it in weird ways if you like.
> > I'm also happy to write testcases for namespaces.
> >
> > So far as security issues, as others have pointed out you can't follow
> > the links unless you can ptrace the process in question, which seems
> > like a pretty solid guarantee. As Cyrill pointed out in the discussion
> > about the documentation, that's the same protection as /proc/N/fd/*, and
> > those links function in the same way.
> 
> My concern here is that fd/* are connected as streams, and while that
> has a certain level of badness as an external-to-the-process attacker,
> PTRACE_MODE_READ is much weaker than PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH (which is
> required for access to /proc/N/mem). Since these fds are the things
> mapped into memory on a process, writing to them is a subset of access
> to /proc/N/mem, and I don't feel that PTRACE_MODE_READ is sufficient.

If you haven't done close() on a mmapped file, doesn't fd/* allow the
same access to the corresponding regions of memory? Or am I missing
something?
 
But that said, I can't think of any reason making it MODE_ATTACH would
be a problem. Would you rather that be enforced on follow_link() like
the original patch did, or enforce it for the whole directory?

Thanks,
Calvin
 
> -Kees
> 
> -- 
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Austin S Hemmelgarn]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6117 bytes --]

On 2015-01-30 20:58, Calvin Owens wrote:
> On Thursday 01/29 at 17:30 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 8:38 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> wrote:
>>> On Monday 01/26 at 15:43 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
>>>>>>> Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
>>>>>>> is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
>>>>>>> is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
>>>>>>> the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
>>>>
>>>> This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
>>>> far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
>>>> /proc/pid/maps?
>>>
>>> The biggest difference is that if you do something like this:
>>>
>>>          fd = open("/stuff", O_BLAH);
>>>          map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_BLAH, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
>>>          close(fd);
>>>          unlink("/stuff");
>>>
>>> ...then map_files/ gives you a way to get a file descriptor for
>>> "/stuff", which you couldn't do with /proc/pid/maps.
>>>
>>> It's also something of a win if you just want to see what is mapped at a
>>> specific address, since you can just readlink() the symlink for the
>>> address range you care about and it will go grab the appropriate VMA and
>>> give you the answer. /proc/pid/maps requires walking the VMA tree, which
>>> is quite expensive for processes with many thousands of threads, even
>>> without the O(N^2) issue.
>>>
>>> (You have to know what address range you want though, since readdir() on
>>> map_files/ obviously has to walk the VMA tree just like /proc/N/maps.)
>>>
>>>>>>> This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
>>>>>>> removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
>>>>>>> the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
>>>>>>> an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cc +linux-api@
>>>>>
>>>>> Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
>>>>> from security camp take a look as well.
>>>>
>>>> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
>>>>
>>>> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
>>>> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
>>>>
>>>> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
>>>> akpm3:/usr/src/25>
>>>>
>>>> does not help.
>>>>
>>>> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
>>>>
>>>> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
>>>> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
>>>> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
>>>> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
>>>> :
>>>> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
>>>> :
>>>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
>>>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
>>>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
>>>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
>>>> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
>>>>
>>>> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
>>>> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
>>>> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
>>>> (Please add to changelog).
>>>
>>> Yes, the only difference is that you can follow the link as per above.
>>> I'll resend with a new message explaining that and the deletion thing.
>>>
>>>> There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
>>>> implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
>>>> permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
>>>> map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
>>>
>>> While I was messing with it I used it a good bit and didn't see any
>>> issues, although I didn't actively try to fuzz it or anything. I'd be
>>> happy to write something to test hammering it in weird ways if you like.
>>> I'm also happy to write testcases for namespaces.
>>>
>>> So far as security issues, as others have pointed out you can't follow
>>> the links unless you can ptrace the process in question, which seems
>>> like a pretty solid guarantee. As Cyrill pointed out in the discussion
>>> about the documentation, that's the same protection as /proc/N/fd/*, and
>>> those links function in the same way.
>>
>> My concern here is that fd/* are connected as streams, and while that
>> has a certain level of badness as an external-to-the-process attacker,
>> PTRACE_MODE_READ is much weaker than PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH (which is
>> required for access to /proc/N/mem). Since these fds are the things
>> mapped into memory on a process, writing to them is a subset of access
>> to /proc/N/mem, and I don't feel that PTRACE_MODE_READ is sufficient.
>
> If you haven't done close() on a mmapped file, doesn't fd/* allow the
> same access to the corresponding regions of memory? Or am I missing
> something?
>
> But that said, I can't think of any reason making it MODE_ATTACH would
> be a problem. Would you rather that be enforced on follow_link() like
> the original patch did, or enforce it for the whole directory?
>
Whole directory would probably be better, as even just the mapped ranges 
could be considered sensitive information.  Ideally, the check should be 
done on both follow_link(), and the directory itself.



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Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Calvin Owens]

On Monday 02/02 at 09:01 -0500, Austin S Hemmelgarn wrote:
> On 2015-01-30 20:58, Calvin Owens wrote:
> >On Thursday 01/29 at 17:30 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 8:38 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >>>On Monday 01/26 at 15:43 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> >>>>On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>>On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >>>>>>On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> >>>>>>>Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> >>>>>>>is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
> >>>>>>>is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
> >>>>>>>the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
> >>>>
> >>>>This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
> >>>>far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
> >>>>/proc/pid/maps?
> >>>
> >>>The biggest difference is that if you do something like this:
> >>>
> >>>         fd = open("/stuff", O_BLAH);
> >>>         map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_BLAH, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> >>>         close(fd);
> >>>         unlink("/stuff");
> >>>
> >>>...then map_files/ gives you a way to get a file descriptor for
> >>>"/stuff", which you couldn't do with /proc/pid/maps.
> >>>
> >>>It's also something of a win if you just want to see what is mapped at a
> >>>specific address, since you can just readlink() the symlink for the
> >>>address range you care about and it will go grab the appropriate VMA and
> >>>give you the answer. /proc/pid/maps requires walking the VMA tree, which
> >>>is quite expensive for processes with many thousands of threads, even
> >>>without the O(N^2) issue.
> >>>
> >>>(You have to know what address range you want though, since readdir() on
> >>>map_files/ obviously has to walk the VMA tree just like /proc/N/maps.)
> >>>
> >>>>>>>This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
> >>>>>>>removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
> >>>>>>>the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
> >>>>>>>an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>Cc +linux-api@
> >>>>>
> >>>>>Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
> >>>>>from security camp take a look as well.
> >>>>
> >>>>hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
> >>>>
> >>>>And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
> >>>>/proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
> >>>>
> >>>>akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
> >>>>akpm3:/usr/src/25>
> >>>>
> >>>>does not help.
> >>>>
> >>>>The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
> >>>>
> >>>>:     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> >>>>:     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> >>>>:     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> >>>>:     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> >>>>:
> >>>>:     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> >>>>:
> >>>>:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> >>>>:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> >>>>:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> >>>>:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> >>>>:      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
> >>>>
> >>>>afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> >>>>shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> >>>>as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
> >>>>(Please add to changelog).
> >>>
> >>>Yes, the only difference is that you can follow the link as per above.
> >>>I'll resend with a new message explaining that and the deletion thing.
> >>>
> >>>>There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> >>>>implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> >>>>permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> >>>>map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
> >>>
> >>>While I was messing with it I used it a good bit and didn't see any
> >>>issues, although I didn't actively try to fuzz it or anything. I'd be
> >>>happy to write something to test hammering it in weird ways if you like.
> >>>I'm also happy to write testcases for namespaces.
> >>>
> >>>So far as security issues, as others have pointed out you can't follow
> >>>the links unless you can ptrace the process in question, which seems
> >>>like a pretty solid guarantee. As Cyrill pointed out in the discussion
> >>>about the documentation, that's the same protection as /proc/N/fd/*, and
> >>>those links function in the same way.
> >>
> >>My concern here is that fd/* are connected as streams, and while that
> >>has a certain level of badness as an external-to-the-process attacker,
> >>PTRACE_MODE_READ is much weaker than PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH (which is
> >>required for access to /proc/N/mem). Since these fds are the things
> >>mapped into memory on a process, writing to them is a subset of access
> >>to /proc/N/mem, and I don't feel that PTRACE_MODE_READ is sufficient.
> >
> >If you haven't done close() on a mmapped file, doesn't fd/* allow the
> >same access to the corresponding regions of memory? Or am I missing
> >something?
> >
> >But that said, I can't think of any reason making it MODE_ATTACH would
> >be a problem. Would you rather that be enforced on follow_link() like
> >the original patch did, or enforce it for the whole directory?
> >
> >
> Whole directory would probably be better, as even just the mapped
> ranges could be considered sensitive information. 

You can already get the ranges that are mapped from /proc/N/maps with
PTRACE_MODE_READ, so that part isn't new information.

> Ideally, the check should be done on both follow_link(), and the
> directory itself.

Oh, I didn't mean restricting readdir(), I meant restricting any access
through the directory similar to how the original CAP_SYS_ADMIN check
was done.
 
Thanks,
Calvin

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 5:58 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> wrote:
> On Thursday 01/29 at 17:30 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 8:38 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> wrote:
>> > On Monday 01/26 at 15:43 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
>> >> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> >> > > On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
>> >> > > > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
>> >> > > > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
>> >> > > > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
>> >> > > > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
>> >>
>> >> This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
>> >> far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
>> >> /proc/pid/maps?
>> >
>> > The biggest difference is that if you do something like this:
>> >
>> >         fd = open("/stuff", O_BLAH);
>> >         map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_BLAH, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
>> >         close(fd);
>> >         unlink("/stuff");
>> >
>> > ...then map_files/ gives you a way to get a file descriptor for
>> > "/stuff", which you couldn't do with /proc/pid/maps.
>> >
>> > It's also something of a win if you just want to see what is mapped at a
>> > specific address, since you can just readlink() the symlink for the
>> > address range you care about and it will go grab the appropriate VMA and
>> > give you the answer. /proc/pid/maps requires walking the VMA tree, which
>> > is quite expensive for processes with many thousands of threads, even
>> > without the O(N^2) issue.
>> >
>> > (You have to know what address range you want though, since readdir() on
>> > map_files/ obviously has to walk the VMA tree just like /proc/N/maps.)
>> >
>> >> > > > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
>> >> > > > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
>> >> > > > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
>> >> > > > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
>> >> > > >
>> >> > > > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
>> >> > >
>> >> > > Cc +linux-api@
>> >> >
>> >> > Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
>> >> > from security camp take a look as well.
>> >>
>> >> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
>> >>
>> >> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
>> >> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
>> >>
>> >> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
>> >> akpm3:/usr/src/25>
>> >>
>> >> does not help.
>> >>
>> >> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
>> >>
>> >> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
>> >> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
>> >> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
>> >> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
>> >> :
>> >> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
>> >> :
>> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
>> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
>> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
>> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
>> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
>> >>
>> >> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
>> >> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
>> >> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
>> >> (Please add to changelog).
>> >
>> > Yes, the only difference is that you can follow the link as per above.
>> > I'll resend with a new message explaining that and the deletion thing.
>> >
>> >> There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
>> >> implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
>> >> permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
>> >> map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
>> >
>> > While I was messing with it I used it a good bit and didn't see any
>> > issues, although I didn't actively try to fuzz it or anything. I'd be
>> > happy to write something to test hammering it in weird ways if you like.
>> > I'm also happy to write testcases for namespaces.
>> >
>> > So far as security issues, as others have pointed out you can't follow
>> > the links unless you can ptrace the process in question, which seems
>> > like a pretty solid guarantee. As Cyrill pointed out in the discussion
>> > about the documentation, that's the same protection as /proc/N/fd/*, and
>> > those links function in the same way.
>>
>> My concern here is that fd/* are connected as streams, and while that
>> has a certain level of badness as an external-to-the-process attacker,
>> PTRACE_MODE_READ is much weaker than PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH (which is
>> required for access to /proc/N/mem). Since these fds are the things
>> mapped into memory on a process, writing to them is a subset of access
>> to /proc/N/mem, and I don't feel that PTRACE_MODE_READ is sufficient.
>
> If you haven't done close() on a mmapped file, doesn't fd/* allow the
> same access to the corresponding regions of memory? Or am I missing
> something?
>

But if you have called close(), then you can't currently do things
like ftruncate or ioctl on the mapped file.  These things don't
persist across execve(), but the do persist across calls to setresuid,
etc that drop privileges.  The latter part makes me a tiny bit
nervous.

It also might be worth checking for drivers or arch code that creates
vmas that are backed by a different struct file than the struct file
that was mmapped in the first place.

--Andy

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable

[Calvin Owens]

On Monday 02/02 at 12:16 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 5:58 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > On Thursday 01/29 at 17:30 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 8:38 PM, Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >> > On Monday 01/26 at 15:43 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> >> >> On Tue, 27 Jan 2015 00:00:54 +0300 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> > On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >> >> > > On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> >> >> > > > Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> >> >> > > > is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
> >> >> > > > is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
> >> >> > > > the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
> >> >>
> >> >> This is the main (actually only) justification for the patch, and it it
> >> >> far too thin.  What does "not needed" mean.  Why can't people just use
> >> >> /proc/pid/maps?
> >> >
> >> > The biggest difference is that if you do something like this:
> >> >
> >> >         fd = open("/stuff", O_BLAH);
> >> >         map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_BLAH, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> >> >         close(fd);
> >> >         unlink("/stuff");
> >> >
> >> > ...then map_files/ gives you a way to get a file descriptor for
> >> > "/stuff", which you couldn't do with /proc/pid/maps.
> >> >
> >> > It's also something of a win if you just want to see what is mapped at a
> >> > specific address, since you can just readlink() the symlink for the
> >> > address range you care about and it will go grab the appropriate VMA and
> >> > give you the answer. /proc/pid/maps requires walking the VMA tree, which
> >> > is quite expensive for processes with many thousands of threads, even
> >> > without the O(N^2) issue.
> >> >
> >> > (You have to know what address range you want though, since readdir() on
> >> > map_files/ obviously has to walk the VMA tree just like /proc/N/maps.)
> >> >
> >> >> > > > This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
> >> >> > > > removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
> >> >> > > > the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
> >> >> > > > an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
> >> >> > > >
> >> >> > > > Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
> >> >> > >
> >> >> > > Cc +linux-api@
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
> >> >> > from security camp take a look as well.
> >> >>
> >> >> hm, who's that.  Kees comes to mind.
> >> >>
> >> >> And reviewers' task would be a heck of a lot easier if they knew what
> >> >> /proc/pid/map_files actually does.  This:
> >> >>
> >> >> akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
> >> >> akpm3:/usr/src/25>
> >> >>
> >> >> does not help.
> >> >>
> >> >> The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
> >> >>
> >> >> :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> >> >> :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> >> >> :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> >> >> :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> >> >> :
> >> >> :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> >> >> :
> >> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> >> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> >> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> >> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> >> >> :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
> >> >>
> >> >> afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> >> >> shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> >> >> as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
> >> >> (Please add to changelog).
> >> >
> >> > Yes, the only difference is that you can follow the link as per above.
> >> > I'll resend with a new message explaining that and the deletion thing.
> >> >
> >> >> There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> >> >> implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> >> >> permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> >> >> map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
> >> >
> >> > While I was messing with it I used it a good bit and didn't see any
> >> > issues, although I didn't actively try to fuzz it or anything. I'd be
> >> > happy to write something to test hammering it in weird ways if you like.
> >> > I'm also happy to write testcases for namespaces.
> >> >
> >> > So far as security issues, as others have pointed out you can't follow
> >> > the links unless you can ptrace the process in question, which seems
> >> > like a pretty solid guarantee. As Cyrill pointed out in the discussion
> >> > about the documentation, that's the same protection as /proc/N/fd/*, and
> >> > those links function in the same way.
> >>
> >> My concern here is that fd/* are connected as streams, and while that
> >> has a certain level of badness as an external-to-the-process attacker,
> >> PTRACE_MODE_READ is much weaker than PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH (which is
> >> required for access to /proc/N/mem). Since these fds are the things
> >> mapped into memory on a process, writing to them is a subset of access
> >> to /proc/N/mem, and I don't feel that PTRACE_MODE_READ is sufficient.
> >
> > If you haven't done close() on a mmapped file, doesn't fd/* allow the
> > same access to the corresponding regions of memory? Or am I missing
> > something?
> >
> 
> But if you have called close(), then you can't currently do things
> like ftruncate or ioctl on the mapped file.  These things don't
> persist across execve(), but the do persist across calls to setresuid,
> etc that drop privileges.  The latter part makes me a tiny bit
> nervous.

Hmm, in that scenario you would have to open() the map_files symlink,
and since you've dropped privileges that would only succeed if the user
you dropped to has permission to access that file anyway, right? 

In the deleted file case it does actually allow something that used to
be impossible, but relying on open/map/close/unlink to prevent a user
from opening a file they have permission to open is just buggy in
general.

But, O_TMPFILE lets you end up in that position without the race. The
manpage says that O_TMPFILE files "can never be reached via any
pathname", which isn't strictly true since you can get them from fd/* in
proc. But if you close() after mapping it they are currently truly
inaccessible via any path, and given the language in the manpage it
seems reasonable that somebody might rely on that and be lazy with the
permissions.

I hadn't thought about O_TMPFILE thing: I'm definitely convinced now
that PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH is the right thing here. But I think having to
reopen the file saves you even if you "leak" maps of files across a call
to setresuid/etc. 

> It also might be worth checking for drivers or arch code that creates
> vmas that are backed by a different struct file than the struct file
> that was mmapped in the first place.

Interesting, I'll look into this before I resend.

Thanks,
Calvin
 
> --Andy