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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2015 18:31:49 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150610163149.GA5092@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVuNzZRAw40reo_2ne9saO5KbbG-omFUQXDo=+XFhpuWA@mail.gmail.com>

On 06/09, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Tycho Andersen
> >
> > @@ -556,6 +556,15 @@ static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data)
> >         if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
> >                 return -EINVAL;
> >
> > +       if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {

Well, we should do this if

			(data & O_SUSPEND) && !(flags & O_SUSPEND)

or at least if

			(data ^ flags) & O_SUSPEND


> > +               if (!config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
> > +                   !config_enabled(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
> > +                       return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > +                       return -EPERM;
>
> I tend to think that we should also require that current not be using
> seccomp.  Otherwise, in principle, there's a seccomp bypass for
> privileged-but-seccomped programs.

Andy, I simply can't understand why do we need any security check at all.

OK, yes, in theory we can have a seccomped CAP_SYS_ADMIN process, seccomp
doesn't filter ptrace, you hack that process and force it to attach to
another CAP_SYS_ADMIN/seccomped process, etc, etc... Looks too paranoid
to me.

But damn, I said many times that I won't argue ;)

> > @@ -590,6 +590,10 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> >  {
> >         int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
> >
> > +       if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
> > +           unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
> > +               return;
> > +
> >         if (mode == 0)
> >                 return;
> >         else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
> > @@ -691,6 +695,10 @@ u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd)
> >         int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
> >                 syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
> >
> > +       if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
> > +           unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
> > +               return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
> > +
>
> If it's not hard, it might still be nice to try to fold this into
> mode.  This code is rather hot.  If it would be a mess, then don't
> worry about it for now.

IMO, this would be a mess ;) At least compared to this simple patch.

Suppose we add SECCOMP_MODE_SUSPENDED. Not only this adds the problems
with detach if the tracer dies.

We need to change copy_seccomp(). And it is not clear what should we
do if the child is traced too.

We need to change prctl_set_seccomp() paths.

And even the "tracee->seccomp.mode = SECCOMP_MODE_SUSPENDED" code needs
some locking even if the tracee is stopped, we need to avoid the races
with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC from other threads.

Oleg.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-06-10 16:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-06-10  0:49 [PATCH v4] seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume Tycho Andersen
     [not found] ` <1433897388-9567-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-10  1:08   ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]     ` <CALCETrVuNzZRAw40reo_2ne9saO5KbbG-omFUQXDo=+XFhpuWA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-10 15:19       ` Tycho Andersen
2015-06-10 16:31     ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
     [not found]       ` <20150610163149.GA5092-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-10 17:20         ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]           ` <CALCETrX_GXgjPRXXT4jMZtjR6vMQrmYbk_OwrAoxaJWFT0+0Fw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-10 17:29             ` Serge Hallyn
2015-06-10 17:42               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-06-10 19:20             ` Oleg Nesterov
2015-06-10 20:18             ` Kees Cook
     [not found]               ` <CAGXu5jJovcC1S4OANpqbVe6e86xr4W9Y7897MsSDOpvEqezpnA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-10 20:26                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2015-06-12 23:27                 ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]                   ` <CALCETrUSjKVWoMM8aVeevAZRHqtiE7zOSUvjdW_yCBTnR07Ahg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-12 23:29                     ` Kees Cook
     [not found]                       ` <CAGXu5jKD8nj-E87em6BqS_TAeca4-kqL2u7jqYFompzqPrvqfA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-13 15:06                         ` Tycho Andersen
2015-06-10 20:33   ` Kees Cook
     [not found]     ` <CAGXu5jKuf6PoBDDkr21ZHOMnWpRAZ-G=NA7rVMx_1qiHZ-8DzA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-10 20:57       ` Tycho Andersen

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