From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>,
Serge Hallyn
<serge.hallyn-GeWIH/nMZzLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>,
Seth Forshee
<seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>,
Linux API <linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Linux Containers
<containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org>,
Kenton Varda <kenton-AuYgBwuPrUQTaNkGU808tA@public.gmane.org>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages
<mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Linux FS Devel
<linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"libvir-list-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org"
<libvir-list-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Cedric Bosdonnat <cbosdonnat-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 13:31:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150616123148.GB18689@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87mw0c1x8p.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
On Sat, Jun 06, 2015 at 01:56:54PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Richard Weinberger <richard-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org> writes:
>
> > [CC'ing libvirt-lxc folks]
> >
> > Am 28.05.2015 um 23:32 schrieb Eric W. Biederman:
> >> Richard Weinberger <richard-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org> writes:
> >>
> >>> Am 28.05.2015 um 21:57 schrieb Eric W. Biederman:
> >>>>> FWIW, it breaks also libvirt-lxc:
> >>>>> Error: internal error: guest failed to start: Failed to re-mount /proc/sys on /proc/sys flags=1021: Operation not permitted
> >>>>
> >>>> Interesting. I had not anticipated a failure there? And it is failing
> >>>> in remount? Oh that is interesting.
> >>>>
> >>>> That implies that there is some flag of the original mount of /proc that
> >>>> the remount of /proc/sys is clearing, and that previously
> >>>>
> >>>> The flags specified are current rdonly,remount,bind so I expect there
> >>>> are some other flags on proc that libvirt-lxc is clearing by accident
> >>>> and we did not fail before because the kernel was not enforcing things.
> >>>
> >>> Please see:
> >>> http://libvirt.org/git/?p=libvirt.git;a=blob;f=src/lxc/lxc_container.c;h=9a9ae5c2aaf0f90ff472f24fda43c077b44998c7;hb=HEAD#l933
> >>> lxcContainerMountBasicFS()
> >>>
> >>> and:
> >>> http://libvirt.org/git/?p=libvirt.git;a=blob;f=src/lxc/lxc_container.c;h=9a9ae5c2aaf0f90ff472f24fda43c077b44998c7;hb=HEAD#l850
> >>> lxcBasicMounts
> >>>
> >>>> What are the mount flags in a working libvirt-lxc?
> >>>
> >>> See:
> >>> test1:~ # cat /proc/self/mountinfo
> >>> 149 147 0:56 / /proc rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime - proc proc rw
> >>> 150 149 0:56 /sys /proc/sys ro,nodev,relatime - proc proc rw
> >>
> >>> If you need more info, please let me know. :-)
> >>
> >> Oh interesting I had not realized libvirt-lxc had grown an unprivileged
> >> mode using user namespaces.
> >>
> >> This does appear to be a classic remount bug, where you are not
> >> preserving the permissions. It appears the fact that the code
> >> failed to enforce locked permissions on the fresh mount of proc
> >> was hiding this bug until now.
> >>
> >> I expect what you actually want is the code below:
> >>
> >> diff --git a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> >> index 9a9ae5c2aaf0..f008a7484bfe 100644
> >> --- a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> >> +++ b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> >> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ typedef struct {
> >>
> >> static const virLXCBasicMountInfo lxcBasicMounts[] = {
> >> { "proc", "/proc", "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, false, false, false },
> >> - { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false },
> >> + { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false },
> >> { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv4", "/proc/sys/net/ipv4", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true },
> >> { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv6", "/proc/sys/net/ipv6", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true },
> >> { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false },
> >>
> >> Or possibly just:
> >>
> >> diff --git a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> >> index 9a9ae5c2aaf0..a60ccbd12bfc 100644
> >> --- a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> >> +++ b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> >> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ typedef struct {
> >>
> >> static const virLXCBasicMountInfo lxcBasicMounts[] = {
> >> { "proc", "/proc", "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, false, false, false },
> >> - { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false },
> >> + { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, true, false, false },
> >> { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv4", "/proc/sys/net/ipv4", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true },
> >> { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv6", "/proc/sys/net/ipv6", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true },
> >> { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false },
> >>
> >> As the there is little point in making /proc/sys read-only in a
> >> user-namespace, as the permission checks are uid based and no-one should
> >> have the global uid 0 in your container. Making mounting /proc/sys
> >> read-only rather pointless.
> >
> > Eric, using the patch below I was able to spawn a user-namespace enabled container
> > using libvirt-lxc. :-)
> >
> > I had to:
> > 1. Disable the read-only mount of /proc/sys which is anyway useless in the user-namespace case.
> > 2. Disable the /proc/sys/net/ipv{4,6} bind mounts, this ugly hack is only needed for the non user-namespace case.
> > 3. Remove MS_RDONLY from the sysfs mount (For the non user-namespace case we'd have to keep this, though).
> >
> > Daniel, I'd take this as a chance to disable all the MS_RDONLY games if user-namespace are configured.
> > With Eric's fixes they hurt us. And as I wrote many times before if root within the user-namespace
> > is able to do nasty things in /sys and /proc that's a plain kernel bug which needs fixing. There is no
> > point in mounting these read-only. Except for the case then no user-namespace is used.
> >
>
> For clarity the patch below appears to be the minimal change needed to
> fix this security issue.
>
> AKA add mnt_mflags in when remounting something read-only.
>
> /proc/sys needed to be updated so it had the proper flags to be added
> back in.
>
> I hope this helps.
>
> diff --git a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> index 9a9ae5c2aaf0..11e9514e0761 100644
> --- a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> +++ b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c
> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ typedef struct {
>
> static const virLXCBasicMountInfo lxcBasicMounts[] = {
> { "proc", "/proc", "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, false, false, false },
> - { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false },
> + { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false },
> { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv4", "/proc/sys/net/ipv4", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true },
> { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv6", "/proc/sys/net/ipv6", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true },
> { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false },
> @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ static int lxcContainerMountBasicFS(bool userns_enabled,
>
> if (bindOverReadonly &&
> mount(mnt_src, mnt->dst, NULL,
> - MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT|MS_RDONLY, NULL) < 0) {
> + MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT|mnt_mflags|MS_RDONLY, NULL) < 0) {
> virReportSystemError(errno,
> _("Failed to re-mount %s on %s flags=%x"),
> mnt_src, mnt->dst,
Thanks Richard / Eric for the suggested patches. I'll apply Eric's
simplified patch to libvirt now, and backport it to our stable
libvirt branches.
Regards,
Daniel
--
|: http://berrange.com -o- http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :|
|: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org :|
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-06-16 12:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-05-14 17:30 [CFT][PATCH 0/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87pp63jcca.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-14 17:31 ` [CFT][PATCH 01/10] mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:32 ` [CFT][PATCH 02/10] mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with mount attributes Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:32 ` [CFT][PATCH 03/10] vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:34 ` [CFT][PATCH 06/10] proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:34 ` [CFT][PATCH 07/10] kernfs: Add support for always " Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:35 ` [CFT][PATCH 08/10] sysfs: Add support for permanently " Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87fv6zhxkp.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-14 20:31 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
[not found] ` <20150514203131.GB16416-U8xfFu+wG4EAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-14 21:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:36 ` [CFT][PATCH 09/10] sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_empty_dir Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <878ucrhxi9.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-11 18:44 ` Tejun Heo
2015-08-11 18:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-11 19:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXE=fKa3XkEEo6y2=ZNtsuBfX=kaoyDwiP0C2BwqKJWjw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 0:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87mvxxcogp.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 20:00 ` Tejun Heo
2015-08-12 20:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87r3n82qxd.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 21:05 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <877fp1hcuj.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-11 20:11 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <CAOS58YOHU8SFv4UXeBRr4t88UU=DXQCPg2HU_dMBmgM7WBB1zQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 0:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87fv3pe3zn.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 3:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87a8txb1k8.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 4:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <871tf9b19v.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 19:15 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <20150812191515.GA4496-qYNAdHglDFBN0TnZuCh8vA@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 20:07 ` [PATCH] fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0 Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87mvxw46fc.fsf_-_-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-08-12 20:18 ` Tejun Heo
2015-05-14 17:37 ` [CFT][PATCH 10/10] mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:33 ` [CFT][PATCH 04/10] fs: Add helper functions " Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 17:33 ` [CFT][PATCH 05/10] sysctl: Allow creating " Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-14 20:29 ` [CFT][PATCH 0/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-14 21:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87oalmg90j.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-15 6:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrU1yxcDfv4YV3wVpWMAdiOOsSUFOPUpFAN-mVA4M-OxdQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-15 6:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:05 ` [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2) Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:06 ` [CFT][PATCH 02/10] mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with mount attributes Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87siaxuvik.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-16 2:06 ` [CFT][PATCH 01/10] mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 03/10] vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 04/10] fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:08 ` [CFT][PATCH 05/10] sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:08 ` [CFT][PATCH 06/10] proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:09 ` [CFT][PATCH 07/10] kernfs: Add support for always empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-16 2:09 ` [CFT][PATCH 08/10] sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-18 13:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-16 2:10 ` [CFT][PATCH 09/10] sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-18 13:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-05-16 2:11 ` [CFT][PATCH 10/10] mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-22 17:39 ` [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2) Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87wq004im1.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-22 18:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrUhXBR5WQ6gXr9KzGc4=7tph7kzopY29Hug4g+FhOzEKg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-22 20:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-28 14:08 ` Serge Hallyn
2015-05-28 15:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-28 17:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXXax28s9kMTQ-zDx0MttQWG4rg2y-oz3bSGiumSL=3sg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 18:20 ` Kenton Varda
[not found] ` <CAOP=4wid+N_80iyPpiVMN96_fuHZZRGtYQ6AOPn-HFBj2H6Vgg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 19:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87fv6gikfn.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 20:12 ` Kenton Varda
2015-05-28 20:47 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-05-28 21:07 ` Kenton Varda
[not found] ` <CAOP=4wiAA4SqvMn_rQJHOjg6M-75bi_G9Fx8ENgVnYdkT5WVQA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 21:12 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-05-29 0:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-05-29 0:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXO21Y7PR=pKqaqJb1YZArNyjAv7Z-J44O53FcfLM_0Tw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-29 4:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87fv6g80g7.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-29 4:54 ` Kenton Varda
2015-05-29 17:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-06-03 21:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87k2vkebri.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-03 21:15 ` [CFT][PATCH 11/10] mnt: Avoid unnecessary regressions in fs_fully_visible Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87eglseboh.fsf_-_-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-04 4:35 ` [CFT][PATCH 11/10] mnt: Avoid unnecessary regressions in fs_fully_visible (take 2) Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <874mmodral.fsf_-_-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-04 5:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-06-05 0:46 ` [CFT][PATCH 11/10] mnt: Avoid unnecessary regressions in fs_fully_visible Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrWwtFaiaYGLoq4EPkrgcq9nEA2GseVfP3iBkbYZ8NfGPg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-06 19:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-06-04 5:19 ` [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2015-06-04 6:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87h9qo6la9.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-04 7:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-06-16 12:23 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-05-28 21:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20150528210438.GA14849-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 21:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-28 21:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-05-28 19:36 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <55676E32.3050006-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 19:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-05-28 20:30 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <55677AEF.1090809-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 21:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87iobcfkwx.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-28 21:46 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <55678CCA.80807-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-16 12:30 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-05-29 9:30 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <556831CF.9040600-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org>
2015-05-29 17:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-06-06 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87mw0c1x8p.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-16 12:31 ` Daniel P. Berrange [this message]
[not found] ` <20150616123148.GB18689-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2015-06-16 12:46 ` Richard Weinberger
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