From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 1/2] vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs. Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 12:30:52 -0700 Message-ID: <20150710193052.GB19824@kroah.com> References: <87381eyz26.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87pp4eqktr.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20150704231118.GT17109@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <87mvz4yomp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87h9pcyokc.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <55A00DE9.7060806@nod.at> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <55A00DE9.7060806-/L3Ra7n9ekc@public.gmane.org> Sender: linux-api-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Richard Weinberger Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , Linux Containers , Linus Torvalds , linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Linux API , Andy Lutomirski , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Kenton Varda , Michael Kerrisk-manpages , =?iso-8859-1?Q?St=E9phane?= Graber , Eric Windisch , Tejun Heo , Seth Forshee , Omar Sandoval , Ivan Delalande , Al Viro List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 08:24:41PM +0200, Richard Weinberger wrote: > Am 10.07.2015 um 18:17 schrieb Eric W. Biederman: > > > > Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several > > applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and > > then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs. > > Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause > > a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems. > > > > Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by > > adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and > > enforce that flag. > > > > Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user > > visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the > > execute bit is cleared. > > > > The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any > > executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects. > > > > This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for > > adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify > > existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will > > not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs. > > > > Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we > > are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the > > implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables > > on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create > > a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of > > some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions). > > Would it make sense to add SB_I_NOEXEC to more pseudo filesystems? > Say pstore or devpts? And configfs and cgroupfs?