From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 09:14:50 +0100
Message-ID: <20170324081450.GA5891@osiris>
References: <20170323203419.GA62859@beast>
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To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Ren=E9?= Nyffenegger <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>Borislav Petkov <b>
List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org

On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 01:34:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> This adds CORRUPT_USER_DS to check that the get_fs() test on syscall return
> still sees USER_DS during the new VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE checks.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

...

> +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Test that USER_DS has been set correctly on exiting a syscall.
> +	 * Since setting this higher than USER_DS (TASK_SIZE) would introduce
> +	 * an exploitable condition, we lower it instead, since that should
> +	 * not create as large a problem on an unprotected system.
> +	 */
> +	mm_segment_t lowfs;
> +#ifdef MAKE_MM_SEG
> +	lowfs = MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE);
> +#else
> +	lowfs = TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE;
> +#endif
> +
> +	pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
> +	set_fs(lowfs);
> +}

This won't work on architectures where the set_fs() argument does not
contain an address but an address space identifier. This is true e.g. for
s390 and as far as I know also for sparc.
On s390 we have complete distinct address spaces for kernel and user space
that each start at address zero.