From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Oleg Nesterov Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] exec: If possible don't wait for ptraced threads to be reaped Date: Sun, 2 Apr 2017 17:35:17 +0200 Message-ID: <20170402153517.GA12637@redhat.com> References: <87shmv6ufl.fsf@xmission.com> <20170303173326.GA17899@redhat.com> <87tw7axlr0.fsf@xmission.com> <87d1dyw5iw.fsf@xmission.com> <87tw7aunuh.fsf@xmission.com> <87lgsmunmj.fsf_-_@xmission.com> <20170304170312.GB13131@redhat.com> <8760ir192p.fsf@xmission.com> <878tnkpv8h.fsf_-_@xmission.com> <87vaqooggs.fsf_-_@xmission.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <87vaqooggs.fsf_-_-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> Sender: linux-api-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Andrew Morton , Aleksa Sarai , Andy Lutomirski , Attila Fazekas , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Michal Hocko , Ulrich Obergfell , linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On 04/01, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > --- a/fs/exec.c > +++ b/fs/exec.c > @@ -1052,6 +1052,7 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) > struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; > struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand; > spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock; > + bool may_hang; > > if (thread_group_empty(tsk)) > goto no_thread_group; > @@ -1069,9 +1070,10 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) > return -EAGAIN; > } > > + may_hang = atomic_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1; > sig->group_exit_task = tsk; > - sig->notify_count = zap_other_threads(tsk); > - if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) > + sig->notify_count = zap_other_threads(tsk, may_hang ? 1 : -1); Eric, this is amazing. So with this patch exec does different things depening on whether sighand is shared with another CLONE_SIGHAND task or not. To me this doesn't look sane in any case. And of course you do realize that it doesn't solve the problem entirely? If I modify my test-case a little bit int xxx(void *arg) { for (;;) pause(); } void *thread(void *arg) { ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0); return NULL; } int main(void) { int pid = fork(); if (!pid) { pthread_t pt; char stack[16 * 1024]; clone(xxx, stack + 16*1024, CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_VM, NULL); pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL); pthread_join(pt, NULL); execlp("echo", "echo", "passed", NULL); } sleep(1); // or anything else which needs ->cred_guard_mutex, // say open(/proc/$pid/mem) ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0,0); kill(pid, SIGCONT); return 0; } it should deadlock the same way? So what is the point to make the, well imo insane, patch if it doesn't solve the problem? And btw zap_other_threads(may_hang == 0) is racy. Either you need tasklist or exit_notify() should set tsk->exit_state under siglock, otherwise zap() can return the wrong count. Finally. This patch creates the nice security hole. Let me modify my test-case again: void *thread(void *arg) { ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0); return NULL; } int main(void) { int pid = fork(); if (!pid) { pthread_t pt; pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL); pthread_join(pt, NULL); execlp(path-to-setuid-binary, args); } sleep(1); // Now we can send the signals to setiuid app kill(pid+1, ANYSIGNAL); return 0; } I see another email from your with another proposal. I disagree, will reply soon. Oleg.