From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2018 18:59:49 +0100
Message-ID: <20180405185949.309216bb@alans-desktop>
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> How? When there are random DMA-capable PCI devices that are driven by
> userland tools that are mmap()ing the BARs out of sysfs, how do we
> simultaneously avoid breaking those devices while also preventing the
> majority of users from being vulnerable to an attacker just DMAing over the
> kernel?

VT-D