linux-api.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>Peter
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 15:26:25 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180710222639.8241-14-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180710222639.8241-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

When a task does fork(), its shadow stack must be duplicated for
the child.  However, the child may not actually use all pages of
of the copied shadow stack.  This patch implements a flow that
is similar to copy-on-write of an anonymous page, but for shadow
stack memory.  A shadow stack PTE needs to be RO and dirty.  We
use this dirty bit requirement to effect the copying of shadow
stack pages.

In copy_one_pte(), we clear the dirty bit from the shadow stack
PTE.  On the next shadow stack access to the PTE, a page fault
occurs.  At that time, we then copy/re-use the page and fix the
PTE.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 mm/memory.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 7206a634270b..a2695dbc0418 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -2453,7 +2453,13 @@ static inline void wp_page_reuse(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
 	entry = pte_mkyoung(vmf->orig_pte);
-	entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+
+	if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+		entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
+	else
+		entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
+
+	entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
 	if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry, 1))
 		update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
 	pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
@@ -2526,7 +2532,11 @@ static int wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 		}
 		flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
 		entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
-		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+		if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+			entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
+		else
+			entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
+		entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
 		/*
 		 * Clear the pte entry and flush it first, before updating the
 		 * pte with the new entry. This will avoid a race condition
@@ -3201,6 +3211,14 @@ static int do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	mem_cgroup_commit_charge(page, memcg, false, false);
 	lru_cache_add_active_or_unevictable(page, vma);
 setpte:
+	/*
+	 * If this is within a shadow stack mapping, mark
+	 * the PTE dirty.  We don't use pte_mkdirty(),
+	 * because the PTE must have _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set.
+	 */
+	if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+		entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
+
 	set_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry);
 
 	/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
@@ -3983,6 +4001,14 @@ static int handle_pte_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	entry = vmf->orig_pte;
 	if (unlikely(!pte_same(*vmf->pte, entry)))
 		goto unlock;
+
+	/*
+	 * Shadow stack PTEs are copy-on-access, so do_wp_page()
+	 * handling on them no matter if we have write fault or not.
+	 */
+	if (is_shstk_mapping(vmf->vma->vm_flags))
+		return do_wp_page(vmf);
+
 	if (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) {
 		if (!pte_write(entry))
 			return do_wp_page(vmf);
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-07-10 22:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-10 22:26 [RFC PATCH v2 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:27   ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-11 15:25     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  9:57   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 13:47     ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-11 14:53       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:15     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:21   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:44   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:23     ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:52       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  8:48     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:52   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:28     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:24   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-07-10 23:06   ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:06     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-14 21:28       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:08   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:10   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:11     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:20   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 14:58     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/27] mm/mprotect: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:10   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:07       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:22         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:37   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:05     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:26       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:03         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:11           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:15           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 20:14             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 21:45               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 23:10                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19  0:06                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 17:06                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 19:31                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:29   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-17 23:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:40   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:45     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  9:36   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 21:10   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 21:51       ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 22:21         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 18:03           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:48   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 22:59     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:49       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  1:50         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  2:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13  4:16             ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  4:18               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:39                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13  5:55               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11  9:44   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:06     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:30       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 14:58     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:27       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:41         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 12:12   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:37     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 11:12   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 19:37   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:53     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/27] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/27] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  0:11   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:10     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:40       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:00         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:16           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:56             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:05               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 21:07   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/27] mm/mmap: Add IBT bitmap size to address space limit check Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:57   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:56     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/27] x86: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/27] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 10:20   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-11 15:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 14:03       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 22:37         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:08           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-13 16:07             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13  6:28         ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-13 13:33           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-14  6:27             ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/27] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 12:19   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 21:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 19:45   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180710222639.8241-14-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
    --to=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
    --cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
    --cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromiun.org \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).