From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Christian Brauner Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] pid: add pidfd_open() Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2019 17:38:55 +0100 Message-ID: <20190330163854.t67m2h6m3hmshqtg@brauner.io> References: <20190329155425.26059-1-christian@brauner.io> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Daniel Colascione Cc: Linus Torvalds , Jann Horn , Andrew Lutomirski , David Howells , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Linux API , Linux List Kernel Mailing , Arnd Bergmann , "Eric W. Biederman" , Konstantin Khlebnikov , Kees Cook , Alexey Dobriyan , Thomas Gleixner , Michael Kerrisk-manpages , Jonathan Kowalski , "Dmitry V. Levin" , Andrew Morton , Oleg Nesterov , Nagarathnam List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 09:34:02AM -0700, Daniel Colascione wrote: > On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 9:24 AM Linus Torvalds > wrote: > > > > On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 9:19 AM Christian Brauner wrote: > > > > > > From pure API perspective that's all I care about: independence of procfs. > > > Once we have pidfd_open() we can cleanly signal threads etc. > > > > But "independence from procfs" means that you damn well don't then do > > "oh, now I have a pidfd, I want to turn it into a /proc fd and then > > munge around there". > > > > So I'm literally saying that it had better really *be* independent > > from /proc. It is the standalone version, but it's most definitely > > also the version that doesn't then give you secret access to /proc. > > Just to be clear, I'm not proposing granting secret access to procfs, > and as far as I can see, nobody else is either. We've been talking > about making it easier to avoid races when you happen to want a pidfd > and a procfs fd that point to the same process, not granting access > that you didn't have before. If you'd rather not connect procfs and > pidfds, we can take this functionality off the table. This is dead! Nothing like this will make it through this tree. I have no intention of endangering pidfd_send_signal(). Christian