From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V32 0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:32:22 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
Fairly minimal changes since the last set: tracefs is restricted at
Steven's suggestion (but could do with a once-over, I'm very much not a
vfs person), debugfs is back to Dave's original implementation. I've
also fixed up a malformed patch that resulted from me getting confused
during rebase, and added some further documentation to the initial patch
in order to give a reference for the design goals.
next reply other threads:[~2019-04-04 0:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-04 0:32 Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-04-16 8:40 ` Andrew Donnellan
2019-04-18 6:38 ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-18 19:35 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-29 0:06 ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-29 4:54 ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-30 5:15 ` Andrew Donnellan
2019-04-29 22:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-05-02 21:07 ` James Morris
2019-05-02 21:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-05-02 23:19 ` James Morris
2019-05-03 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 08/27] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 09/27] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 7:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 16/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 17/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 18/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 19/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 1:33 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-04-04 7:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 20/27] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 21/27] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 22/27] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-30 19:19 ` Jann Horn
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 23/27] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 24/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 25/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 0:32 ` [PATCH V32 27/27] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 13:39 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-04-04 20:09 ` Matthew Garrett
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