From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V6 02/10] audit: add container id
Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 08:57:42 -0600
Message-ID: <20190529145742.GA8959@cisco>
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To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@redhat.com>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, netdev@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, sgrubb@redhat.com, omosnace@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, simo@redhat.com, eparis@parisplace.org, serge@hallyn.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, nhorman@tuxdriver.com
List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org

On Mon, Apr 08, 2019 at 11:39:09PM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier.
> A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier.

...

>  /**
> + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid
> + * @contid: contid value
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
> + *
> + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write().
> + */
> +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
> +{
> +	u64 oldcontid;
> +	int rc = 0;
> +	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> +	uid_t uid;
> +	struct tty_struct *tty;
> +	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
> +
> +	task_lock(task);
> +	/* Can't set if audit disabled */
> +	if (!task->audit) {
> +		task_unlock(task);
> +		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +	}
> +	oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task);
> +	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> +	/* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */
> +	if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> +		rc = -EINVAL;
> +	/* if we don't have caps, reject */
> +	else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> +		rc = -EPERM;
> +	/* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */
> +	else if (!list_empty(&task->children))
> +		rc = -EBUSY;
> +	else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task)))
> +		rc = -EALREADY;
> +	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> +	if (!rc)
> +		task->audit->contid = contid;
> +	task_unlock(task);
> +
> +	if (!audit_enabled)
> +		return rc;

...but it is allowed to change it (assuming
capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL), of course)? Seems like this might be more
immediately useful since we still live in the world of majority
privileged containers if we didn't allow changing it, in addition to
un-setting it.

Tycho