From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 13:06:45 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190606200646.3951-27-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190606200646.3951-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, unsigned long *addr)
Return CET feature status.
The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
information:
*addr = SHSTK/IBT status
*(addr + 1) = SHSTK base address
*(addr + 2) = SHSTK size
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features)
Disable CET features specified in 'features'. Return
-EPERM if CET is locked.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
Lock in CET feature.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK, unsigned long *addr)
Allocate a new SHSTK.
The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer and indicates
the desired SHSTK size to allocate. On returning to the caller
the buffer contains the address of the new SHSTK.
There is no CET enabling arch_prctl function. By design, CET is
enabled automatically if the binary and the system can support it.
The parameters passed are always unsigned 64-bit. When an ia32
application passing pointers, it should only use the lower 32 bits.
Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 29 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 4 +-
6 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 52c506a68848..2df357dffd24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -14,19 +14,24 @@ struct sc_ext;
struct cet_status {
unsigned long shstk_base;
unsigned long shstk_size;
+ unsigned int locked:1;
unsigned int shstk_enabled:1;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2);
int cet_setup_shstk(void);
int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg);
void cet_disable_shstk(void);
void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
int cet_restore_signal(bool ia32, struct sc_ext *sc);
int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, struct sc_ext *sc);
#else
+static inline int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; }
static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; }
+static inline int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg) { return -EINVAL; }
static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline int cet_restore_signal(bool ia32, struct sc_ext *sc) { return -EINVAL; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index 5a6aac9fa41f..d962f0ec9ccf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -14,4 +14,9 @@
#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002
#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS 0x3001
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE 0x3002
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK 0x3003
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK 0x3004
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 584ed7e9a599..d908c95306fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o cet_prctl.o
###
# 64 bit specific files
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index 9ef1af617d38..0004333f8373 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -127,6 +127,35 @@ static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
return 0;
}
+int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg)
+{
+ unsigned long len = *arg;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long token;
+ unsigned long ssp;
+
+ addr = do_mmap_locked(0, len, PROT_READ,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK);
+ if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Restore token is 8 bytes and aligned to 8 bytes */
+ ssp = addr + len;
+ token = ssp;
+
+ if (!in_ia32_syscall())
+ token |= TOKEN_MODE_64;
+ ssp -= 8;
+
+ if (write_user_shstk_64(ssp, token)) {
+ vm_munmap(addr, len);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *arg = addr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int cet_setup_shstk(void)
{
unsigned long addr, size;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9c9d4262b07e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/elfcore.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+/* See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst. */
+
+static int handle_get_status(unsigned long arg2)
+{
+ unsigned int features = 0;
+ unsigned long shstk_base, shstk_size;
+ unsigned long buf[3];
+
+ if (current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+ features |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK;
+
+ shstk_base = current->thread.cet.shstk_base;
+ shstk_size = current->thread.cet.shstk_size;
+
+ buf[0] = (unsigned long)features;
+ buf[1] = shstk_base;
+ buf[2] = shstk_size;
+ return copy_to_user((unsigned long __user *)arg2, buf,
+ sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+static int handle_alloc_shstk(unsigned long arg2)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ unsigned long arg;
+ unsigned long addr = 0;
+ unsigned long size = 0;
+
+ if (get_user(arg, (unsigned long __user *)arg2))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ size = arg;
+ err = cet_alloc_shstk(&arg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ addr = arg;
+ if (put_user(addr, (unsigned long __user *)arg2)) {
+ vm_munmap(addr, size);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2)
+{
+ if (!cpu_x86_cet_enabled())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (option) {
+ case ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS:
+ return handle_get_status(arg2);
+
+ case ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE:
+ if (current->thread.cet.locked)
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+ cet_disable_free_shstk(current);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK:
+ current->thread.cet.locked = 1;
+ return 0;
+
+ case ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK:
+ return handle_alloc_shstk(arg2);
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 58b1c52b38b5..e0090f2790df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,
return get_cpuid_mode();
case ARCH_SET_CPUID:
return set_cpuid_mode(task, cpuid_enabled);
+ default:
+ return prctl_cet(option, cpuid_enabled);
}
-
- return -EINVAL;
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-06 20:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-06 20:06 [PATCH v7 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 21:18 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-06 22:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 22:08 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-06 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07 1:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 05/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07 7:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-07 16:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 06/27] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 09/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 10/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 12/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 13/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 14/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 15/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07 7:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 16/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 17/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 18/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07 7:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-07 7:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-07 16:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 22/27] binfmt_elf: Extract .note.gnu.property from an ELF file Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07 7:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-07 16:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07 18:01 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-10 16:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-10 16:57 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-10 17:24 ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-11 11:41 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-11 19:31 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-12 9:32 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-12 19:04 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-13 13:26 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-17 11:08 ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-17 12:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-18 9:12 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-18 12:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-18 12:47 ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-18 12:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-18 13:32 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-18 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-18 15:49 ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-18 15:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-18 16:05 ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-18 16:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-18 16:20 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-18 16:25 ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-18 16:50 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07 7:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-11 17:55 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-11 19:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2019-11-01 14:03 ` Adrian Hunter
2019-11-01 14:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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