From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in
 confidentiality mode
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2019 10:57:17 +0900
Message-ID: <20190623105717.7a22195ea66f276c38ae5096@kernel.org>
References: <20190622000358.19895-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
        <20190622000358.19895-23-matthewgarrett@google.com>
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To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, "Naveen N . Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>, Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>, davem@davemloft.net, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org

On Fri, 21 Jun 2019 17:03:51 -0700
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:

> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> 
> Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is
> locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration.
> This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal
> crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed
> modules.

Looks (and sounds) good to me.

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

Thank you,

> 
> Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
> Cc: davem@davemloft.net
> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
> ---
>  include/linux/security.h     | 1 +
>  kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c  | 5 +++++
>  security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
>  3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 3875f6df2ecc..e6e3e2403474 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>  	LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE,
>  	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
>  	LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
> +	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
>  	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c b/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c
> index 5d5129b05df7..5a76a0f79d48 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  #include <linux/rculist.h>
>  #include <linux/error-injection.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  
>  #include "trace_dynevent.h"
>  #include "trace_kprobe_selftest.h"
> @@ -415,6 +416,10 @@ static int __register_trace_kprobe(struct trace_kprobe *tk)
>  {
>  	int i, ret;
>  
> +	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KPROBES);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
>  	if (trace_probe_is_registered(&tk->tp))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index 4c9b324dfc55..5a08c17f224d 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
>  	[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
> +	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
>  };
>  
> -- 
> 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog
> 


-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>