From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Kees Cook Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2019 11:24:35 -0700 Message-ID: <201907021115.DCD56BBABB@keescook> References: <20190627201923.2589391-1-songliubraving@fb.com> <20190627201923.2589391-2-songliubraving@fb.com> <21894f45-70d8-dfca-8c02-044f776c5e05@kernel.org> <3C595328-3ABE-4421-9772-8D41094A4F57@fb.com> <0DE7F23E-9CD2-4F03-82B5-835506B59056@fb.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Song Liu , "linux-security@vger.kernel.org" , Networking , bpf , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , Kernel Team , Lorenz Bauer , Jann Horn , Greg KH , Linux API List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Jul 01, 2019 at 06:59:13PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > I think I'm understanding your motivation. You're not trying to make > bpf() generically usable without privilege -- you're trying to create > a way to allow certain users to access dangerous bpf functionality > within some limits. > > That's a perfectly fine goal, but I think you're reinventing the > wheel, and the wheel you're reinventing is quite complicated and > already exists. I think you should teach bpftool to be secure when > installed setuid root or with fscaps enabled and put your policy in > bpftool. If you want to harden this a little bit, it would seem > entirely reasonable to add a new CAP_BPF_ADMIN and change some, but > not all, of the capable() checks to check CAP_BPF_ADMIN instead of the > capabilities that they currently check. If finer grained controls are wanted, it does seem like the /dev/bpf path makes the most sense. open, request abilities, use fd. The open can be mediated by DAC and LSM. The request can be mediated by LSM. This provides a way to add policy at the LSM level and at the tool level. (i.e. For tool-level controls: leave LSM wide open, make /dev/bpf owned by "bpfadmin" and bpftool becomes setuid "bpfadmin". For fine-grained controls, leave /dev/bpf wide open and add policy to SELinux, etc.) With only a new CAP, you don't get the fine-grained controls. (The "request abilities" part is the key there.) -- Kees Cook