From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Steven Rostedt Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf, capabilities: introduce CAP_BPF Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2019 19:37:27 -0400 Message-ID: <20190928193727.1769e90c@oasis.local.home> References: <20190827205213.456318-1-ast@kernel.org> <20190828003447.htgzsxs5oevn3eys@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> <20190828044340.zeha3k3cmmxgfqj7@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> <20190828225512.q6qbvkdiqih2iewk@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> <20190829040721.ef6rumbaunkavyrr@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20190829040721.ef6rumbaunkavyrr@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Andy Lutomirski , Alexei Starovoitov , Kees Cook , LSM List , James Morris , Jann Horn , Peter Zijlstra , Masami Hiramatsu , "David S. Miller" , Daniel Borkmann , Network Development , bpf , kernel-team , Linux API List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Wed, 28 Aug 2019 21:07:24 -0700 Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > > > > This won’t make me much more comfortable, since CAP_BPF lets it do an ever-growing set of nasty things. I’d much rather one or both of two things happen: > > > > 1. Give it CAP_TRACING only. It can leak my data, but it’s rather hard for it to crash my laptop, lose data, or cause other shenanigans. > > > > 2. Improve it a bit do all the privileged ops are wrapped by capset(). > > > > Does this make sense? I’m a security person on occasion. I find > > vulnerabilities and exploit them deliberately and I break things by > > accident on a regular basis. In my considered opinion, CAP_TRACING > > alone, even extended to cover part of BPF as I’ve described, is > > decently safe. Getting root with just CAP_TRACING will be decently > > challenging, especially if I don’t get to read things like sshd’s > > memory, and improvements to mitigate even that could be added. I > > am quite confident that attacks starting with CAP_TRACING will have > > clear audit signatures if auditing is on. I am also confident that > > CAP_BPF *will* allow DoS and likely privilege escalation, and this > > will only get more likely as BPF gets more widely used. And, if > > BPF-based auditing ever becomes a thing, writing to the audit > > daemon’s maps will be a great way to cover one’s tracks. > > CAP_TRACING, as I'm proposing it, will allow full tracefs access. > I think Steven and Massami prefer that as well. > That includes kprobe with probe_kernel_read. > That also means mini-DoS by installing kprobes everywhere or running > too much ftrace. I was talking with Kees at Plumbers about this, and we were talking about just using simple file permissions. I started playing with some patches to allow the tracefs be visible but by default it would only be visible by root. rwx------ Then a start up script (or perhaps mount options) could change the group owner, and change this to: rwxrwx--- Where anyone in the group assigned (say "tracing") gets full access to the file system. The more I was playing with this, the less I see the need for CAP_TRACING for ftrace and reading the format files. -- Steve