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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v9 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
Date: Wed,  5 Feb 2020 10:23:02 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200205182308.4028-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205182308.4028-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.

Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
oriented programming attacks.  It is active when the kernel has this
feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
work, but without IBT protection.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig  | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Makefile |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d1447380e02e..563f3c81f323 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1998,6 +1998,21 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
 
 	  If unsure, say y.
 
+config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+	prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+	select X86_INTEL_CET
+	---help---
+	  Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
+	  CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks.  It is active when
+	  the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
+	  the application support it.  When this feature is enabled,
+	  legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
+	  IBT protection.
+
+	  If unsure, say y
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index c34f5befa4c8..f97b2c1c4d04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
   endif
 endif
 
+# Check compiler ibt support
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+  ifeq ($(call cc-option-yn, -fcf-protection=branch), n)
+      $(error CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER not supported by compiler)
+  endif
+endif
+
 #
 # If the function graph tracer is used with mcount instead of fentry,
 # '-maccumulate-outgoing-args' is needed to prevent a GCC bug
-- 
2.21.0

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-05 18:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 18:23 [RFC PATCH v9 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
     [not found] ` <20200205182308.4028-1-yu-cheng.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-05 18:23   ` [RFC PATCH v9 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Add arch_prctl functions " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 6/7] mm: Update alloc_set_pte() for zero page Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 7/7] x86/cet/ibt: Introduce arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_MARK_LEGACY_CODE) Yu-cheng Yu

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