From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v9 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2020 10:23:02 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200205182308.4028-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205182308.4028-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
oriented programming attacks. It is active when the kernel has this
feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
work, but without IBT protection.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Makefile | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d1447380e02e..563f3c81f323 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1998,6 +1998,21 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
If unsure, say y.
+config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+ prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
+ def_bool n
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+ select X86_INTEL_CET
+ ---help---
+ Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
+ CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks. It is active when
+ the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
+ the application support it. When this feature is enabled,
+ legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
+ IBT protection.
+
+ If unsure, say y
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index c34f5befa4c8..f97b2c1c4d04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
endif
endif
+# Check compiler ibt support
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+ ifeq ($(call cc-option-yn, -fcf-protection=branch), n)
+ $(error CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER not supported by compiler)
+ endif
+endif
+
#
# If the function graph tracer is used with mcount instead of fentry,
# '-maccumulate-outgoing-args' is needed to prevent a GCC bug
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-05 18:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-05 18:23 [RFC PATCH v9 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
[not found] ` <20200205182308.4028-1-yu-cheng.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Add arch_prctl functions " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 6/7] mm: Update alloc_set_pte() for zero page Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v9 7/7] x86/cet/ibt: Introduce arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_MARK_LEGACY_CODE) Yu-cheng Yu
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