From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 242D8C433E4 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2020 00:31:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 083042065F for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2020 00:31:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728496AbgHYAal (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Aug 2020 20:30:41 -0400 Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:28750 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728259AbgHYAad (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Aug 2020 20:30:33 -0400 IronPort-SDR: gkdM9hOxviYv5S2PRvDtZvzjDIIFKQqXtvni1clfxx+kf6AxaRK1qESdn+94Cle5RSHVQ8pjGJ x4mJ/pwiUJrw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9723"; a="174053256" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.76,350,1592895600"; d="scan'208";a="174053256" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by fmsmga101.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Aug 2020 17:30:33 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 67oZwxQgYdJmA+KUqL3mx/insEcOmQz8+Fw2zgB45hu4tE5sq6WVUE5kNs/tmLEdpDBb/61GGS r3onGRfXEP3g== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.76,350,1592895600"; d="scan'208";a="443429289" Received: from yyu32-desk.sc.intel.com ([143.183.136.146]) by orsmga004-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Aug 2020 17:30:32 -0700 From: Yu-cheng Yu To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang Cc: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v11 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking, PTRACE Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 17:26:35 -0700 Message-Id: <20200825002645.3658-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-api-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1]. This is the second part of CET and enables Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT). It is built on top of the shadow stack series. Changes from v9: - Remove the legacy bitmap arch_prctl() as it is not used by GLIBC anymore. Should it be needed in the future, I will re-post the patch separately. [1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual: https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32- architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4 [2] Previous IBT patches v9: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200205182308.4028-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/ There have been no major changes since v9, and there is no IBT patches v10. H.J. Lu (4): x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled Yu-cheng Yu (5): x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET arch/x86/Kconfig | 26 +++++++- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/regset.h | 7 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 8 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 17 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 44 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 8 ++- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 +++ arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 +++++ include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 1 + .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 ++- 15 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) -- 2.21.0