From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8230C47423 for ; Fri, 25 Sep 2020 14:58:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B361E221EC for ; Fri, 25 Sep 2020 14:58:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729174AbgIYO6R (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Sep 2020 10:58:17 -0400 Received: from mga07.intel.com ([134.134.136.100]:47916 "EHLO mga07.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729114AbgIYO6O (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Sep 2020 10:58:14 -0400 IronPort-SDR: G4GEr9bvc6t349AnG1us96uc09AB6Ix7j7ZXzj8WH6QyvIjSFsf8Do1LMZYGZMpdpBrWnPjDjo Tx1+Wm/bbjUw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9755"; a="225704474" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,302,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="225704474" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Sep 2020 07:58:13 -0700 IronPort-SDR: URjgH0tF0D7TmKiW7s0Aj70ANXXmQDg/X2UeRBd2M/oHM/QpX6i8r0ifdPafqs1Tv4Binh7PPH jxdvhJJ53usw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,302,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="512916953" Received: from yyu32-desk.sc.intel.com ([143.183.136.146]) by fmsmga005-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Sep 2020 07:58:13 -0700 From: Yu-cheng Yu To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , Pengfei Xu Cc: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v13 0/8] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 07:57:56 -0700 Message-Id: <20200925145804.5821-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1]. This is the second part of CET and enables Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT). It is built on top of the shadow stack series. Changes in v13: - Drop the patch that disables vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, and re-introduce an earlier patch that fixes shadow stack and IBT for the emulation code. - Remove "INTEL" string from CET Kconfig options, update help text, and change IBT default configuration to N. [1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual: https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32- architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4 [2] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v12. https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200918192312.25978-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/ H.J. Lu (3): x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu (5): x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation arch/x86/Kconfig | 21 +++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S | 3 + arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 34 +++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 +++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_trace.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 8 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 17 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 8 ++- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 +++ .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 ++- 14 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.21.0