From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 73969C433DB for ; Wed, 17 Feb 2021 22:34:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B92C64E79 for ; Wed, 17 Feb 2021 22:34:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232642AbhBQWdw (ORCPT ); Wed, 17 Feb 2021 17:33:52 -0500 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:13791 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232969AbhBQWax (ORCPT ); Wed, 17 Feb 2021 17:30:53 -0500 IronPort-SDR: wvrg7kUiNlFzV2ilZvkEVNVHafEcqHzzOO7UT+zwcOHiacDtoCxzy8VWUBf7+41x4NZzi69LEu twckRb+yrUIg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9898"; a="183461467" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,185,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="183461467" Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 Feb 2021 14:28:04 -0800 IronPort-SDR: hOP+f7unHOCpmaKoUIGMxbzFKCFYz2EDXPySHn217Ws8h5oFpJwNDfP5hAZzi5sRWdF7TKEJQC 2Cib3rN1Av5A== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,185,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="400172661" Received: from yyu32-desk.sc.intel.com ([143.183.136.146]) by orsmga008-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 Feb 2021 14:28:03 -0800 From: Yu-cheng Yu To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , Pengfei Xu , Haitao Huang Cc: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v21 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2021 14:27:22 -0800 Message-Id: <20210217222730.15819-19-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20210217222730.15819-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> References: <20210217222730.15819-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Can_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid. Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty. Thus, in the can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check. Apply the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd(). Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- mm/gup.c | 8 +++++--- mm/huge_memory.c | 8 +++++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index e4c224cd9661..66ab67626f57 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -357,10 +357,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags, + struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return pte_write(pte) || - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte)); + ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte) && + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags)); } static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, @@ -403,7 +405,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte)) goto no_page; - if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) { + if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags, vma)) { pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl); return NULL; } diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c index ac651d529dbe..c18e4de3db62 100644 --- a/mm/huge_memory.c +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c @@ -1337,10 +1337,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd) * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags, + struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return pmd_write(pmd) || - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd)); + ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd) && + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags)); } struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, @@ -1353,7 +1355,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd)); - if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags)) + if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags, vma)) goto out; /* Avoid dumping huge zero page */ -- 2.21.0