From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Semantics of SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT?
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 22:23:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202106292156.9458CF22@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87r1gkp9i7.fsf@disp2133>
On Tue, Jun 29, 2021 at 05:54:24PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> I am the process of cleaning up the process exit path in the kernel, and
> as part of that I am looking at the callers of do_exit. A very
> interesting one is __seccure_computing_strict.
>
> Looking at the code is very clear that if a system call is attempted
> that is not in the table the thread attempting to execute that system
> call is terminated.
>
> Reading the man page for seccomp it says that the process is delivered
> SIGKILL.
>
> The practical difference is what happens for multi-threaded
> applications.
>
> What are the desired semantics for a multi-threaded application if one
> thread attempts to use a unsupported system call? Should the thread be
> terminated or the entire application?
>
> Do we need to fix the kernel, or do we need to fix the manpages?
I don't know of anyone actually using SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, but the
original implementation was (perhaps accidentally) thread-killing. It
turns out this is not a particularly desirable situation, and when
SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER was created, it continued with that semantic,
but later grew a process-killing flags, as that's what most programs
actually wanted.
It's likely the manpage needs fixing (we had to make similar updates
for SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER), since some of the early examples of using
SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT were basically "fork, calculate, write result to
fd, exit".
FWIW the seccomp selftests don't even check for the thread-vs-process
SIGKILL of SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT. :)
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-30 5:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-29 22:54 Semantics of SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT? Eric W. Biederman
2021-06-30 5:02 ` Aleksa Sarai
2021-06-30 5:23 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2021-06-30 20:11 ` [PATCH] seccomp.2: Clarify that bad system calls kill the thread Eric W. Biederman
2021-06-30 23:06 ` Kees Cook
2021-08-10 2:07 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
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