From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] seccomp.2: Clarify that bad system calls kill the thread
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 16:06:56 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202106301606.E710FF81EC@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87k0mbp0yc.fsf_-_@disp2133>
On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 03:11:23PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> ---
> man2/seccomp.2 | 5 +++--
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/man2/seccomp.2 b/man2/seccomp.2
> index a3421871f0f4..bde54c3e3e99 100644
> --- a/man2/seccomp.2
> +++ b/man2/seccomp.2
> @@ -69,9 +69,10 @@ The only system calls that the calling thread is permitted to make are
> .BR exit_group (2)),
> and
> .BR sigreturn (2).
> -Other system calls result in the delivery of a
> +Other system calls result in the termination of the calling thread,
> +or termination of the entire process with the
> .BR SIGKILL
> -signal.
> +signal when there is only one thread.
> Strict secure computing mode is useful for number-crunching
> applications that may need to execute untrusted byte code, perhaps
> obtained by reading from a pipe or socket.
Thanks!
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-30 23:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-29 22:54 Semantics of SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT? Eric W. Biederman
2021-06-30 5:02 ` Aleksa Sarai
2021-06-30 5:23 ` Kees Cook
2021-06-30 20:11 ` [PATCH] seccomp.2: Clarify that bad system calls kill the thread Eric W. Biederman
2021-06-30 23:06 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2021-08-10 2:07 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
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