From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 14/37] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 15:35:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221104223604.29615-15-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221104223604.29615-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
A shadow stack PTE must be read-only and have _PAGE_DIRTY set. However,
read-only and Dirty PTEs also exist for copy-on-write (COW) pages. These
two cases are handled differently for page faults. Introduce
VM_SHADOW_STACK to track shadow stack VMAs.
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v3:
- Drop arch specific change in arch_vma_name(). The memory can show as
anonymous (Kirill)
- Change CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK to CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
in show_smap_vma_flags() (Boris)
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 +
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++
include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
index 898c99eae8e4..05506dfa0480 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
@@ -560,6 +560,7 @@ encoded manner. The codes are the following:
mt arm64 MTE allocation tags are enabled
um userfaultfd missing tracking
uw userfaultfd wr-protect tracking
+ ss shadow stack page
== =======================================
Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 8a74cdcc9af0..7dee7afbb01b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -703,6 +703,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR
[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)] = "ui",
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ [ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss",
+#endif
};
size_t i;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 5314ad0a342d..42c4e4bc972d 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -314,11 +314,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -334,6 +336,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
+#else
+# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_NONE
+#endif
+
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-04 22:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-04 22:35 [PATCH v3 00/37] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 01/37] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 02/37] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 03/37] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-07 17:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 04/37] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-07 18:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-07 18:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-07 19:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 19:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-07 19:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 05/37] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 06/37] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 07/37] x86/cet: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 08/37] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 09/37] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 10/37] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 11/37] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 12/37] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 13/37] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 11:20 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 17:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 15/37] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 11:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 21:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 23:13 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-16 10:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 16/37] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 17/37] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 18/37] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 12:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:40 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 20:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 21:49 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 19/37] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 20/37] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 12:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:41 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 21/37] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 22/37] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 23/37] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 24/37] x86: Introduce userspace API for CET enabling Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 12:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 13:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:55 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 14:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:55 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 25/37] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 12:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 21:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 26/37] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 27/37] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 14:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 23:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-16 10:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-16 22:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-17 14:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-18 17:05 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 14:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 28/37] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 29/37] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 30/37] x86/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 31/37] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 32/37] x86/cet/shstk: Wire in CET interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [PATCH v3 33/37] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [PATCH v3 34/37] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [PATCH v3 35/37] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 14:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 22:23 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-17 12:25 ` Schimpe, Christina
2022-11-17 14:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-18 17:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-18 17:25 ` Schimpe, Christina
2022-11-17 19:57 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-18 16:21 ` Schimpe, Christina
2022-11-18 17:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-21 7:40 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-11-21 15:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-22 9:36 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [PATCH v3 36/37] x86/cet/shstk: Add ARCH_CET_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 14:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 20:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 21:00 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-15 21:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [RFC 37/37] fs/binfmt_elf: Block old shstk elf bit Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:56 ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-06 9:33 ` Florian Weimer
2022-11-07 16:49 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 16:55 ` Florian Weimer
2022-11-07 17:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 19:10 ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-07 21:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 21:21 ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-07 21:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 21:47 ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-07 22:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 23:45 ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-08 9:14 ` Florian Weimer
2022-11-07 16:49 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
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