From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
christina.schimpe@intel.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2022 16:35:44 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221203003606.6838-18-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221203003606.6838-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
When serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if there is
a write access to it, and its vma has VM_WRITE. Shadow stack accesses to
shadow stack vma's are also treated as write accesses by the fault handler.
This is because setting shadow stack memory makes it writable via some
instructions, so COW has to happen even for shadow stack reads.
So maybe_mkwrite() should continue to set VM_WRITE vma's as normally
writable, but also set VM_WRITE|VM_SHADOW_STACK vma's as shadow stack.
Do this by adding a pte_mkwrite_shstk() and a cross-arch stub. Check for
VM_SHADOW_STACK in maybe_mkwrite() and call pte_mkwrite_shstk()
accordingly.
Apply the same changes to maybe_pmd_mkwrite().
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v3:
- Remove unneeded define for maybe_mkwrite (Peterz)
- Switch to cleaner version of maybe_mkwrite() (Peterz)
v2:
- Change to handle shadow stacks that are VM_WRITE|VM_SHADOW_STACK
- Ditch arch specific maybe_mkwrite(), and make the code generic
- Move do_anonymous_page() to next patch (Kirill)
Yu-cheng v29:
- Remove likely()'s.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 ++
include/linux/mm.h | 13 ++++++++++---
include/linux/pgtable.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
mm/huge_memory.c | 10 +++++++---
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 4a149cec0c07..e4530b39f378 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte)
return pte_set_flags(pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
}
+#define pte_mkwrite_shstk pte_mkwrite_shstk
static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte_t pte)
{
/* pte_clear_cow() also sets Dirty=1 */
@@ -556,6 +557,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd)
return pmd_set_flags(pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
}
+#define pmd_mkwrite_shstk pmd_mkwrite_shstk
static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd_t pmd)
{
return pmd_clear_cow(pmd);
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index b982c2749e7b..f10797a1b236 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -1004,12 +1004,19 @@ void free_compound_page(struct page *page);
* servicing faults for write access. In the normal case, do always want
* pte_mkwrite. But get_user_pages can cause write faults for mappings
* that do not have writing enabled, when used by access_process_vm.
+ *
+ * If a vma is shadow stack (a type of writable memory), mark the pte shadow
+ * stack.
*/
static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
- if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
- pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
- return pte;
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+ return pte;
+
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+ return pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte);
+
+ return pte_mkwrite(pte);
}
vm_fault_t do_set_pmd(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct page *page);
diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h
index 70e2a7e06a76..d8096578610a 100644
--- a/include/linux/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h
@@ -524,6 +524,13 @@ static inline pte_t pte_sw_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
#define pte_mk_savedwrite pte_mkwrite
#endif
+#ifndef pte_mkwrite_shstk
+static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte_t pte)
+{
+ return pte;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifndef pte_clear_savedwrite
#define pte_clear_savedwrite pte_wrprotect
#endif
@@ -532,6 +539,13 @@ static inline pte_t pte_sw_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
#define pmd_savedwrite pmd_write
#endif
+#ifndef pmd_mkwrite_shstk
+static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+ return pmd;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifndef pmd_mk_savedwrite
#define pmd_mk_savedwrite pmd_mkwrite
#endif
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 811d19b5c4f6..60451e588955 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -553,9 +553,13 @@ __setup("transparent_hugepage=", setup_transparent_hugepage);
pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
- if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
- pmd = pmd_mkwrite(pmd);
- return pmd;
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+ return pmd;
+
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+ return pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd);
+
+ return pmd_mkwrite(pmd);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-03 0:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-03 0:35 [PATCH v4 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:20 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 8:58 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-12-05 21:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:20 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:22 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 11:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 22:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-08 11:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:23 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 12:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 18:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:24 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 21:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-20 21:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:29 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 21:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 11:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 23:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 1:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:32 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 13:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 22:26 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 13/39] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:33 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 14/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 15/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:34 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 16/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-04 14:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 1:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2022-12-03 2:34 ` [PATCH v4 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 18/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:37 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 19/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 20/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:38 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 21/39] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:38 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 22/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:39 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 24/39] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:40 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 25/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:42 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 26/39] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:43 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 27/39] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 28/39] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:45 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 29/39] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:46 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 30/39] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:51 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-05 22:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 31/39] x86/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:52 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 32/39] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:52 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 33/39] x86: Prevent 32 bit operations for 64 bit shstk tasks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-12-04 20:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-15 0:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 34/39] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 35/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:55 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 17:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-12-09 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 38/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:56 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 39/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:57 ` Kees Cook
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