From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
christina.schimpe@intel.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2022 16:35:34 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221203003606.6838-8-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221203003606.6838-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
on the shadow stack.
There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel
IBT. Refactor this fault handler into sparate user and kernel handlers,
like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode.
Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for
converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when
!cpu_feature_enabled(). This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack
code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which
is potentially recoverable.
The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
handler.
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
v3:
- Shorten user/kernel #CP handler function names (peterz)
- Restore CP_ENDBR check to kernel handler (peterz)
- Utilize CONFIG_X86_CET (Kees)
- Unify "unexpected" warnings (Andrew Cooper)
- Use 2d array for error code chars (Andrew Cooper)
- Add comment about why to read SSP MSR before enabling interrupts
v2:
- Integrate with kernel IBT fault handler
- Update printed messages. (Dave)
- Remove array_index_nospec() usage. (Dave)
- Remove IBT messages. (Dave)
- Add enclave error code bit processing it case it can get triggered
somehow.
- Add extra "unknown" in control_protection_err.
v1:
- Update static asserts for NSIGSEGV
Yu-cheng v29:
- Remove pr_emerg() since it is followed by die().
- Change boot_cpu_has() to cpu_feature_enabled().
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c | 2 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c | 2 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 2 +-
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +-
13 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
index e07f359254c3..9a3c9de5ac5e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_rseq_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
static_assert(NSIGILL == 11);
static_assert(NSIGFPE == 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 10);
static_assert(NSIGBUS == 5);
static_assert(NSIGTRAP == 6);
static_assert(NSIGCHLD == 6);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
index 9ad911f1647c..81b13a21046e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ void __init minsigstksz_setup(void)
*/
static_assert(NSIGILL == 11);
static_assert(NSIGFPE == 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 10);
static_assert(NSIGBUS == 5);
static_assert(NSIGTRAP == 6);
static_assert(NSIGCHLD == 6);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c
index 4700f8522d27..bbd542704730 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ void compat_setup_restart_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
static_assert(NSIGILL == 11);
static_assert(NSIGFPE == 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 10);
static_assert(NSIGBUS == 5);
static_assert(NSIGTRAP == 6);
static_assert(NSIGCHLD == 6);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
index dad38960d1a8..82da8a2d769d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_sys32_sigstack(u32 u_ssptr, u32 u_ossptr, unsigned long sp)
*/
static_assert(NSIGILL == 11);
static_assert(NSIGFPE == 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 10);
static_assert(NSIGBUS == 5);
static_assert(NSIGTRAP == 6);
static_assert(NSIGCHLD == 6);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
index 570e43e6fda5..b4e410976e0d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long orig_i0, unsigned long
*/
static_assert(NSIGILL == 11);
static_assert(NSIGFPE == 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV == 10);
static_assert(NSIGBUS == 5);
static_assert(NSIGTRAP == 6);
static_assert(NSIGCHLD == 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 7a2954a16cb7..b7646b471537 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@
#define DISABLE_USER_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#define DISABLE_IBT 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_IBT (1 << (X86_FEATURE_IBT & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -128,7 +134,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \
DISABLE_ENQCMD)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
+#define DISABLED_MASK18 (DISABLE_IBT)
#define DISABLED_MASK19 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 72184b0b2219..69e26f48d027 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_DF, xenpv_exc_double_fault);
#endif
/* #CP */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_CP, exc_control_protection);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index a58c6bc1cd68..5074b8420359 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
ISTG(X86_TRAP_MC, asm_exc_machine_check, IST_INDEX_MCE),
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, asm_exc_control_protection),
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index 879ef8c72f5c..d441804443d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL != 11);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE != 15);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 9);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 10);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS != 5);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 6);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 8b83d8fbce71..e35c70dc1afb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -213,12 +213,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_overflow)
do_error_trap(regs, 0, "overflow", X86_TRAP_OF, SIGSEGV, 0, NULL);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
-
-static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
-
-extern void ibt_selftest_ip(void); /* code label defined in asm below */
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
enum cp_error_code {
CP_EC = (1 << 15) - 1,
@@ -231,15 +226,87 @@ enum cp_error_code {
CP_ENCL = 1 << 15,
};
-DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
+static const char control_protection_err[][10] = {
+ [0] = "unknown",
+ [1] = "near ret",
+ [2] = "far/iret",
+ [3] = "endbranch",
+ [4] = "rstorssp",
+ [5] = "setssbsy",
+};
+
+static const char *cp_err_string(unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ unsigned int cpec = error_code & CP_EC;
+
+ if (cpec >= ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err))
+ cpec = 0;
+ return control_protection_err[cpec];
+}
+
+static void do_unexpected_cp(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "Unexpected %s #CP, error_code: %s\n",
+ user_mode(regs) ? "user mode" : "kernel mode",
+ cp_err_string(error_code));
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_CET */
+
+void do_user_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(cpf_rate, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
+ DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
+
+void do_user_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
- if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
- pr_err("Unexpected #CP\n");
- BUG();
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+ unsigned long ssp;
+
+ /*
+ * An exception was just taken from userspace. Since interrupts are disabled
+ * here, no scheduling should have messed with the registers yet and they
+ * will be whatever is live in userspace. So read the SSP before enabling
+ * interrupts so locking the fpregs to do it later is not required.
+ */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+
+ cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+ tsk = current;
+ tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+ tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+ /* Ratelimit to prevent log spamming. */
+ if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+ __ratelimit(&cpf_rate)) {
+ pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)%s",
+ tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+ regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
+ cp_err_string(error_code),
+ error_code & CP_ENCL ? " in enclave" : "");
+ print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+ pr_cont("\n");
}
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs) || (error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR))
+ force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, (void __user *)0);
+ cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
+}
+#endif
+
+void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
+
+extern void ibt_selftest_ip(void); /* code label defined in asm below */
+
+void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ if ((error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR) {
+ do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
return;
+ }
if (unlikely(regs->ip == (unsigned long)&ibt_selftest_ip)) {
regs->ax = 0;
@@ -285,9 +352,25 @@ static int __init ibt_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ibt=", ibt_setup);
-
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
+{
+ if (user_mode(regs)) {
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
+ do_user_cp_fault(regs, error_code);
+ else
+ do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
+ } else {
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ do_kernel_cp_fault(regs, error_code);
+ else
+ do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_CET */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
void handle_invalid_op(struct pt_regs *regs)
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index a7d83c7800e4..e58d6cd30853 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ static struct trap_array_entry trap_array[] = {
TRAP_ENTRY(exc_coprocessor_error, false ),
TRAP_ENTRY(exc_alignment_check, false ),
TRAP_ENTRY(exc_simd_coprocessor_error, false ),
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
TRAP_ENTRY(exc_control_protection, false ),
#endif
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
index 4a184f6e4e4d..7cdcb4ce6976 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ xen_pv_trap asm_exc_page_fault
xen_pv_trap asm_exc_spurious_interrupt_bug
xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coprocessor_error
xen_pv_trap asm_exc_alignment_check
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
xen_pv_trap asm_exc_control_protection
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index ffbe4cec9f32..0f52d0ac47c5 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7 /* Precise MCD exception */
#define SEGV_MTEAERR 8 /* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */
#define SEGV_MTESERR 9 /* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV 9
+#define SEGV_CPERR 10 /* Control protection fault */
+#define NSIGSEGV 10
/*
* SIGBUS si_codes
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-03 0:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-03 0:35 [PATCH v4 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:20 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 8:58 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-12-05 21:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:20 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:22 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 11:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 22:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-08 11:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:23 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 12:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 18:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:24 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2022-12-03 2:28 ` [PATCH v4 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler Kees Cook
2022-12-20 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 21:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-20 21:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:29 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 21:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 0:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 11:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 23:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 1:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:32 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 13:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 22:26 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 13/39] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:33 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 14/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 15/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:34 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 16/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-04 14:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 1:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:34 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 18/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:37 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 19/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 20/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:38 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 21/39] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:38 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 22/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:39 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 24/39] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:40 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 25/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:42 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 26/39] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:43 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 27/39] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 28/39] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:45 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 29/39] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:46 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 30/39] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:51 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-05 22:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 31/39] x86/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:52 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:35 ` [PATCH v4 32/39] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:52 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 33/39] x86: Prevent 32 bit operations for 64 bit shstk tasks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-12-04 20:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-15 0:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 34/39] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 35/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:55 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 17:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-12-09 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 38/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:56 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03 0:36 ` [PATCH v4 39/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 2:57 ` Kees Cook
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