From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp-190e.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-190e.mail.infomaniak.ch [185.125.25.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E509A38F9A for ; Fri, 5 Jul 2024 18:02:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=185.125.25.14 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720202535; cv=none; b=KrcvOIR6169hfIcFZRdxozA0no0B3Y23xaS1mZjBJY18py+4c9NKAKJXa7CkGWRLIlNyOPsYNWk72pJla0xG3YeoJfYWJhQ4iba3BZRcXdSLwr9S+gVnG3jJuhtku8h7ivuC973mqdblHaIFKXHeEAXhhx8Ix6flsGnirggVxW4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720202535; c=relaxed/simple; bh=1ovZsTEE4mGTjZJNE9Bn+x7nEz8rd0oYSMZQ7aLG7dE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=h0/Ue1iQyRm0vmi/pesMR06AawBfkzYNaZSwYCAqQiFPF+KUL+e5j9VAkvC2RJpMDmV5tFrKENrtveDmDxEmt6s+6OMi8Nf2ADKD7h2jN3PCeQN5KPgygTw0L1ICp7lNKgcEkLJB7UIwBPIMxTNnj86yyWVqEI0F1DmH/Tgci8g= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=digikod.net; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.b=vLPJ8Ots; arc=none smtp.client-ip=185.125.25.14 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.b="vLPJ8Ots" Received: from smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch [10.4.36.108]) by smtp-3-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4WG1Mk0nY6zGDF; Fri, 5 Jul 2024 19:53:22 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=digikod.net; s=20191114; t=1720202002; bh=EVA4xGWQR4aMmDX4txfboMVq0fyWNrcCv8C687hvy6M=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=vLPJ8OtssQOlAqvXDFLxhWrIipCNWzJ6q15HW0SkxoQATmx3f9vwxO6gOmyBI0HrA 4PSkXXW7A+42nK65h5f5pROfqbwAEkOnDtb09VPQhRvNKvA//vbxT1YWHTEfUB9nuq NcVdFfFqOavW6dvw976SzC/jNfIeam4utTzxBdMA= Received: from unknown by smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4WG1MY3F4nzGZx; Fri, 5 Jul 2024 19:53:13 +0200 (CEST) Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2024 19:53:10 +0200 From: =?utf-8?Q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: Kees Cook Cc: Al Viro , Christian Brauner , Linus Torvalds , Paul Moore , Theodore Ts'o , Alejandro Colomar , Aleksa Sarai , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Christian Heimes , Dmitry Vyukov , Eric Biggers , Eric Chiang , Fan Wu , Florian Weimer , Geert Uytterhoeven , James Morris , Jan Kara , Jann Horn , Jeff Xu , Jonathan Corbet , Jordan R Abrahams , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , Luca Boccassi , Luis Chamberlain , "Madhavan T . Venkataraman" , Matt Bobrowski , Matthew Garrett , Matthew Wilcox , Miklos Szeredi , Mimi Zohar , Nicolas Bouchinet , Scott Shell , Shuah Khan , Stephen Rothwell , Steve Dower , Steve Grubb , Thibaut Sautereau , Vincent Strubel , Xiaoming Ni , Yin Fengwei , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Message-ID: <20240705.uch1saeNi6mo@digikod.net> References: <20240704190137.696169-1-mic@digikod.net> <20240704190137.696169-2-mic@digikod.net> <202407041656.3A05153@keescook> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <202407041656.3A05153@keescook> X-Infomaniak-Routing: alpha On Thu, Jul 04, 2024 at 05:04:03PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Thu, Jul 04, 2024 at 09:01:33PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would be > > allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters and > > dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the kernel's > > security policy. Another use case is to add context to access logs e.g., > > which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As any > > executable code, scripts could also use this check [1]. > > > > This is different than faccessat(2) which only checks file access > > rights, but not the full context e.g. mount point's noexec, stack limit, > > and all potential LSM extra checks (e.g. argv, envp, credentials). > > Since the use of AT_CHECK follows the exact kernel semantic as for a > > real execution, user space gets the same error codes. > > Nice! I much prefer this method of going through the exec machinery so > we always have a single code path for these kinds of checks. > > > Because AT_CHECK is dedicated to user space interpreters, it doesn't > > make sense for the kernel to parse the checked files, look for > > interpreters known to the kernel (e.g. ELF, shebang), and return ENOEXEC > > if the format is unknown. Because of that, security_bprm_check() is > > never called when AT_CHECK is used. > > I'd like some additional comments in the code that reminds us that > access control checks have finished past a certain point. Where in the code? Just before the bprm->is_check assignment? > > [...] > > diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c > > index 40073142288f..ea2a1867afdc 100644 > > --- a/fs/exec.c > > +++ b/fs/exec.c > > @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags) > > .lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW, > > }; > > > > - if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0) > > + if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_CHECK)) != 0) > > return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); > > if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) > > open_exec_flags.lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW; > [...] > > + * To avoid race conditions leading to time-of-check to time-of-use issues, > > + * AT_CHECK should be used with AT_EMPTY_PATH to check against a file > > + * descriptor instead of a path. > > I want this enforced by the kernel. Let's not leave trivial ToCToU > foot-guns around. i.e.: > > if ((flags & AT_CHECK) == AT_CHECK && (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH) == 0) > return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); There are valid use cases relying on pathnames. See Linus's comment: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=whb=XuU=LGKnJWaa7LOYQz9VwHs8SLfgLbT5sf2VAbX1A@mail.gmail.com