From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>, linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: outreachy@lists.linux.dev, gnoack@google.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com,
jannh@google.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 1/8] Landlock: Add abstract UNIX socket restriction
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2024 15:32:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240913.AmeeLo0aeheD@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5f7ad85243b78427242275b93481cfc7c127764b.1725494372.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com>
On Wed, Sep 04, 2024 at 06:13:55PM -0600, Tahera Fahimi wrote:
> This patch introduces a new "scoped" attribute to the
> landlock_ruleset_attr that can specify
> "LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET" to scope abstract UNIX sockets
> from connecting to a process outside of the same Landlock domain. It
> implements two hooks, unix_stream_connect and unix_may_send to enforce
> this restriction.
>
> Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/7
> Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
>
> ---
> v11:
> - For a connected abstract datagram socket, the hook_unix_may_send
> allows the socket to send a data. (it is treated as a connected stream
> socket)
> - Minor comment revision.
> v10:
> - Minor code improvement based on reviews on v9.
> v9:
> - Editting inline comments.
> - Major refactoring in domain_is_scoped() and is_abstract_socket
> v8:
> - Code refactoring (improve code readability, renaming variable, etc.)
> based on reviews by Mickaël Salaün on version 7.
> - Adding warn_on_once to check (impossible) inconsistencies.
> - Adding inline comments.
> - Adding check_unix_address_format to check if the scoping socket is an
> abstract UNIX sockets.
> v7:
> - Using socket's file credentials for both connected(STREAM) and
> non-connected(DGRAM) sockets.
> - Adding "domain_sock_scope" instead of the domain scoping mechanism
> used in ptrace ensures that if a server's domain is accessible from
> the client's domain (where the client is more privileged than the
> server), the client can connect to the server in all edge cases.
> - Removing debug codes.
> v6:
> - Removing curr_ruleset from landlock_hierarchy, and switching back to
> use the same domain scoping as ptrace.
> - code clean up.
> v5:
> - Renaming "LANDLOCK_*_ACCESS_SCOPE" to "LANDLOCK_*_SCOPE"
> - Adding curr_ruleset to hierarachy_ruleset structure to have access
> from landlock_hierarchy to its respective landlock_ruleset.
> - Using curr_ruleset to check if a domain is scoped while walking in the
> hierarchy of domains.
> - Modifying inline comments.
> v4:
> - Rebased on Günther's Patch:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240610082115.1693267-1-gnoack@google.com/
> so there is no need for "LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_SCOPE", then it is
> removed.
> - Adding get_scope_accesses function to check all scoped access masks in
> a ruleset.
> - Using socket's file credentials instead of credentials stored in
> peer_cred for datagram sockets. (see discussion in [1])
> - Modifying inline comments.
> V3:
> - Improving commit description.
> - Introducing "scoped" attribute to landlock_ruleset_attr for IPC
> scoping purpose, and adding related functions.
> - Changing structure of ruleset based on "scoped".
> - Removing rcu lock and using unix_sk lock instead.
> - Introducing scoping for datagram sockets in unix_may_send.
> V2:
> - Removing wrapper functions
>
> [1]https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240610.Aifee5ingugh@digikod.net/
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 28 ++++
> security/landlock/limits.h | 3 +
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 7 +-
> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 24 +++-
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 17 ++-
> security/landlock/task.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
> 7 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> index 2c8dbc74b955..dfd48d722834 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
> * flags`_).
> */
> __u64 handled_access_net;
> + /**
> + * @scoped: Bitmask of scopes (cf. `Scope flags`_)
> + * restricting a Landlock domain from accessing outside
> + * resources(e.g. IPCs).
> + */
> + __u64 scoped;
> };
>
> /*
> @@ -274,4 +280,26 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
> #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0)
> #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1)
> /* clang-format on */
> +
> +/**
> + * DOC: scope
> + *
> + * Scope flags
> + * ~~~~~~~~~~~
> + *
> + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process from a set of IPC
> + * actions. Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain
> + * to forbid connections to resources outside the domain.
> + *
> + * IPCs with scoped actions:
> + *
> + * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: Restrict a sandboxed process
> + * from connecting to an abstract unix socket created by a process
> + * outside the related Landlock domain (e.g. a parent domain or a
> + * non-sandboxed process).
> + */
> +/* clang-format off */
> +#define LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET (1ULL << 0)
Thinking more about it, it makes more sense to rename it to
LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET (s/SCOPED/SCOPE/) because it
express a scope (not a "scoped") and it allign with the current
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_* and other internal variables such as
LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE...
However, it still makes sense to keep the "scoped" ruleset's field,
which is pretty similar to the "handled_*" semantic: it describes what
will be *scoped* by the ruleset.
> +/* clang-format on*/
> +
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
> index 4eb643077a2a..eb01d0fb2165 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/limits.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
> #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
> #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
>
> +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
> +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE ((LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE << 1) - 1)
> +#define LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE)
> /* clang-format on */
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-13 13:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <cover.1725494372.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com>
[not found] ` <5f7ad85243b78427242275b93481cfc7c127764b.1725494372.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com>
2024-09-13 10:46 ` [PATCH v11 1/8] Landlock: Add abstract UNIX socket restriction Mickaël Salaün
2024-09-13 13:32 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
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