From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
criu@lists.linux.dev, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2025 19:56:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250813185601.GJ222315@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEWA0a6jgj8vQhrijSJXUHBnCTtz0HEV66tmaVKPe83ng=3feQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Sat, Jul 26, 2025 at 02:01:20PM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote:
> > For a very mild example of fun to be had there:
> > mount("none", "/mnt", "tmpfs", 0, "");
> > chdir("/mnt");
> > umount2(".", MNT_DETACH);
> > mount(NULL, ".", NULL, MS_SHARED, NULL);
> > Repeat in a loop, watch mount group id leak. That's a trivial example
> > of violating the assertion ("a mount that had been through umount_tree()
> > is out of propagation graph and related data structures for good").
>
> I wasn't referring to detached mounts. CRIU modifies mounts from
> non-current namespaces.
>
> >
> > As for the "CAP_SYS_ADMIN within the mount user namespace" - which
> > userns do you have in mind?
> >
>
> The user namespace of the target mount:
> ns_capable(mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
To bring that thread back: how about the following? If nobody objects,
I'm going to throw it into viro/vfs.git #fixes...
[PATCH] use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes
do_change_type() and do_set_group() are operating on different
aspects of the same thing - propagation graph. The latter
asks for mounts involved to be mounted in namespace(s) the caller
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN for. The former is a mess - originally it
didn't even check that mount *is* mounted. That got fixed,
but the resulting check turns out to be too strict for userland -
in effect, we check that mount is in our namespace, having already
checked that we have CAP_SYS_ADMIN there.
What we really need (in both cases) is
* we only touch mounts that are mounted. Hard requirement,
data corruption if that's get violated.
* we don't allow to mess with a namespace unless you already
have enough permissions to do so (i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its userns).
That's an equivalent of what do_set_group() does; let's extract that
into a helper (may_change_propagation()) and use it in both
do_set_group() and do_change_type().
Fixes: 12f147ddd6de "do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ddfd4457d338..e7d9b23f1e9e 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2862,6 +2862,19 @@ static int graft_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct mount *p, struct mountpoint *mp)
return attach_recursive_mnt(mnt, p, mp);
}
+static int may_change_propagation(const struct mount *m)
+{
+ struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->mnt_ns;
+
+ // it must be mounted in some namespace
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ns)) // is_mounted()
+ return -EINVAL;
+ // and the caller must be admin in userns of that namespace
+ if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Sanity check the flags to change_mnt_propagation.
*/
@@ -2898,10 +2911,10 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags)
return -EINVAL;
namespace_lock();
- if (!check_mnt(mnt)) {
- err = -EINVAL;
+ err = may_change_propagation(mnt);
+ if (err)
goto out_unlock;
- }
+
if (type == MS_SHARED) {
err = invent_group_ids(mnt, recurse);
if (err)
@@ -3347,18 +3360,11 @@ static int do_set_group(struct path *from_path, struct path *to_path)
namespace_lock();
- err = -EINVAL;
- /* To and From must be mounted */
- if (!is_mounted(&from->mnt))
- goto out;
- if (!is_mounted(&to->mnt))
- goto out;
-
- err = -EPERM;
- /* We should be allowed to modify mount namespaces of both mounts */
- if (!ns_capable(from->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ err = may_change_propagation(from);
+ if (err)
goto out;
- if (!ns_capable(to->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ err = may_change_propagation(from);
+ if (err)
goto out;
err = -EINVAL;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-13 18:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <CANaxB-xXgW1FEj6ydBT2=cudTbP=fX6x8S53zNkWcw1poL=L2A@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <20250724230052.GW2580412@ZenIV>
2025-07-26 17:12 ` do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts Andrei Vagin
2025-07-26 17:53 ` Al Viro
2025-07-26 21:01 ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-31 2:40 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-07-31 7:53 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-31 8:11 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-08-13 18:56 ` Al Viro [this message]
2025-08-13 19:09 ` Tycho Andersen
2025-08-13 19:41 ` Al Viro
2025-08-14 4:08 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-08-14 4:42 ` Al Viro
2025-08-14 5:51 ` [PATCH][RFC][CFT] use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes Al Viro
2025-08-14 5:57 ` [RFC][CFT] selftest for permission checks in " Al Viro
2025-08-14 6:37 ` Al Viro
2025-08-14 7:07 ` do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts Pavel Tikhomirov
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