From: Ketan Bhardwaj <ketan@armoriq.io>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"HARIHARA SUDHAN . R" <harisudhan@armoriq.io>,
"Ketan Bhardwaj" <ketan@armoriq.io>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 4/6] security: kap: add the securityfs control plane
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 09:33:33 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261028133335.75899-5-ketan@armoriq.io> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261028133335.75899-1-ketan@armoriq.io>
Add the KAP control plane under /sys/kernel/security/kap.
securityfs has no mkdir, so igroups live in a small internal filesystem
mounted with kern_mount() and reached through the igroups link in the
kap directory, as AppArmor publishes its policy namespaces. An igroup is
created with mkdir, as a cgroup is, and gets one file per control:
kap.install writes the lineage root, authority epoch, expiry, transition
and authority in a single write that commits together or not at all,
and kap.procs binds a task. kap.default sits next to igroups/.
Writes need CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The internal filesystem type is never
registered, so it cannot be mounted from userspace.
Assisted-by: Claude
Co-developed-by: HARIHARA SUDHAN. R <harisudhan@armoriq.io>
Signed-off-by: HARIHARA SUDHAN. R <harisudhan@armoriq.io>
Assisted-by: Codex
Signed-off-by: Ketan Bhardwaj <ketan@armoriq.io>
---
security/kap/Makefile | 2 +-
security/kap/kap_lsm.c | 1 +
security/kap/kapfs.c | 524 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 526 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 security/kap/kapfs.c
diff --git a/security/kap/Makefile b/security/kap/Makefile
index 40a864c..6ef7c5e 100644
--- a/security/kap/Makefile
+++ b/security/kap/Makefile
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_KAP) := kap.o
-kap-y := kap_lsm.o igroup.o
+kap-y := kap_lsm.o igroup.o kapfs.o
diff --git a/security/kap/kap_lsm.c b/security/kap/kap_lsm.c
index b148b34..6750114 100644
--- a/security/kap/kap_lsm.c
+++ b/security/kap/kap_lsm.c
@@ -862,4 +862,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(kap) = {
.id = &kap_lsmid,
.blobs = &kap_blob_sizes,
.init = kap_lsm_init,
+ .initcall_fs = kap_securityfs_init,
};
diff --git a/security/kap/kapfs.c b/security/kap/kapfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36ef1e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/kap/kapfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,524 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Kernel Assurance Plane control plane in securityfs.
+ *
+ * /sys/kernel/security/kap/
+ * kap.default
+ * igroups/ link to the root of the internal kapfs mount
+ * <igroup>/ created with mkdir, as a cgroup is
+ * kap.install
+ * kap.procs
+ * kap.igfd
+ * kap.lineage_root
+ * kap.authority_epoch
+ * kap.authority
+ * kap.expires_at
+ * kap.transition
+ * kap.mode
+ * kap.events
+ *
+ * securityfs has no mkdir, so igroups live in a small internal filesystem that
+ * is mounted with kern_mount() and reached through a link under securityfs.
+ * AppArmor publishes its policy namespaces the same way.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "KAP: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/timekeeping.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include "kap.h"
+
+#define KAPFS_MAGIC 0x4b415046
+
+static struct vfsmount *kapfs_mnt;
+static struct dentry *kap_sfs_dir;
+static struct dentry *kap_sfs_default;
+static struct dentry *kap_sfs_igroups;
+static struct kap_file_ctx kap_default_ctx = { .kind = KAP_FILE_DEFAULT };
+
+static const char * const kap_file_names[KAP_FILE_COUNT] = {
+ [KAP_FILE_PROCS] = "kap.procs",
+ [KAP_FILE_IGFD] = "kap.igfd",
+ [KAP_FILE_LINEAGE_ROOT] = "kap.lineage_root",
+ [KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY_EPOCH] = "kap.authority_epoch",
+ [KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY] = "kap.authority",
+ [KAP_FILE_TRANSITION] = "kap.transition",
+ [KAP_FILE_MODE] = "kap.mode",
+ [KAP_FILE_EVENTS] = "kap.events",
+ [KAP_FILE_EXPIRES_AT] = "kap.expires_at",
+ [KAP_FILE_INSTALL] = "kap.install",
+};
+
+static const umode_t kap_file_modes[KAP_FILE_COUNT] = {
+ [KAP_FILE_PROCS] = 0600,
+ [KAP_FILE_IGFD] = 0400,
+ [KAP_FILE_LINEAGE_ROOT] = 0600,
+ [KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY_EPOCH] = 0600,
+ [KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY] = 0600,
+ [KAP_FILE_TRANSITION] = 0600,
+ [KAP_FILE_MODE] = 0600,
+ [KAP_FILE_EXPIRES_AT] = 0600,
+ [KAP_FILE_INSTALL] = 0200,
+ [KAP_FILE_EVENTS] = 0400,
+};
+
+static int kapfs_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ struct kap_file_ctx *ctx = m->private;
+ struct kap_igroup *igroup = ctx->igroup;
+ struct kap_bound_pid *entry;
+
+ spin_lock(&kap_lock);
+ switch (ctx->kind) {
+ case KAP_FILE_PROCS:
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, &igroup->pids, node)
+ seq_printf(m, "%d\n", entry->pid);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_IGFD:
+ seq_printf(m, "igroup=%s epoch=%llu root=%s\n",
+ igroup->name, igroup->epoch, igroup->lineage_root);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_LINEAGE_ROOT:
+ seq_printf(m, "%s\n", igroup->lineage_root);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY_EPOCH:
+ seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", igroup->epoch);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY:
+ seq_write(m, igroup->authority, igroup->authority_len);
+ if (igroup->authority_len && igroup->authority[igroup->authority_len - 1] != '\n')
+ seq_putc(m, '\n');
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_TRANSITION:
+ if (igroup->has_sequence)
+ seq_printf(m, "last_sequence=%llu\n", igroup->last_sequence);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_MODE:
+ seq_printf(m, "%s\n", igroup->revoked ? "revoked" : "enforce");
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_EVENTS:
+ seq_write(m, igroup->events, igroup->events_len);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_EXPIRES_AT:
+ seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", igroup->expires_at);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_DEFAULT:
+ seq_printf(m, "%s\n", kap_default_closed ? "closed" : "open");
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&kap_lock);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int kapfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return single_open(file, kapfs_show, inode->i_private);
+}
+
+static ssize_t kapfs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+ struct kap_file_ctx *ctx = seq->private;
+ struct kap_igroup *igroup = ctx->igroup;
+ struct kap_compiled_authority *compiled = NULL;
+ struct kap_bound_pid *entry = NULL;
+ struct kap_install_request req;
+ u64 value = 0;
+ pid_t pid = 0;
+ char *tmp;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* The opener's credentials, so a handed-over descriptor gains nothing. */
+ if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (len > (ctx->kind == KAP_FILE_INSTALL ? KAP_MAX_INSTALL_BYTES
+ : KAP_MAX_PREDICATE_BYTES))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ctx->kind == KAP_FILE_EVENTS || ctx->kind == KAP_FILE_IGFD)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tmp = memdup_user_nul(buf, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(tmp))
+ return PTR_ERR(tmp);
+ kap_trim_newline(tmp);
+ if (!tmp[0]) {
+ kfree(tmp);
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse, allocate and compile first: kap_lock is a spinlock. */
+ switch (ctx->kind) {
+ case KAP_FILE_PROCS:
+ rc = kstrtoint(tmp, 10, &pid);
+ if (!rc) {
+ entry = kzalloc_obj(*entry, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_LINEAGE_ROOT:
+ if (strlen(tmp) > KAP_MAX_ROOT_LEN)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_INSTALL:
+ rc = kap_install_parse(tmp, &req);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = kap_authority_prepare(req.authority, &compiled);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY:
+ rc = kap_authority_prepare(tmp, &compiled);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY_EPOCH:
+ case KAP_FILE_EXPIRES_AT:
+ rc = kstrtou64(tmp, 10, &value);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_TRANSITION:
+ rc = kap_parse_transition_sequence(tmp, &value);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_MODE:
+ if (!sysfs_streq(tmp, "revoked") && !sysfs_streq(tmp, "enforce"))
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_DEFAULT:
+ if (!sysfs_streq(tmp, "closed") && !sysfs_streq(tmp, "open"))
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ spin_lock(&kap_lock);
+ switch (ctx->kind) {
+ case KAP_FILE_PROCS:
+ rc = kap_bind_pid_locked(igroup, pid, &entry);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_LINEAGE_ROOT:
+ strscpy(igroup->lineage_root, tmp, sizeof(igroup->lineage_root));
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_INSTALL:
+ rc = kap_install_locked(igroup, &req, &compiled);
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY_EPOCH:
+ /* Writing an epoch also clears revoked mode. */
+ if (value < igroup->epoch) {
+ rc = -ESTALE;
+ } else {
+ igroup->epoch = value;
+ igroup->revoked = false;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_AUTHORITY: {
+ struct kap_compiled_authority *old = igroup->compiled;
+
+ strscpy(igroup->authority, tmp, sizeof(igroup->authority));
+ igroup->authority_len = strlen(igroup->authority);
+ igroup->compiled = compiled;
+ compiled = old;
+ break;
+ }
+ case KAP_FILE_TRANSITION:
+ if (igroup->has_sequence && value <= igroup->last_sequence) {
+ rc = -EALREADY;
+ } else {
+ igroup->last_sequence = value;
+ igroup->has_sequence = true;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_EXPIRES_AT:
+ /* An expiry already in the past is refused rather than installed. */
+ if (value && (u64)ktime_get_real_seconds() >= value)
+ rc = -ESTALE;
+ else
+ igroup->expires_at = value;
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_MODE:
+ igroup->revoked = sysfs_streq(tmp, "revoked");
+ break;
+ case KAP_FILE_DEFAULT:
+ WRITE_ONCE(kap_default_closed, sysfs_streq(tmp, "closed"));
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&kap_lock);
+out:
+ /* Whatever was not consumed: a refused document, or the replaced one. */
+ kvfree(compiled);
+ kfree(entry);
+ kfree(tmp);
+ return rc ? rc : len;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations kapfs_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = kapfs_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .write = kapfs_write,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+
+static struct inode *kapfs_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb);
+
+ if (!inode)
+ return NULL;
+ inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
+ inode->i_mode = mode;
+ simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
+ return inode;
+}
+
+static void kapfs_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ d_make_persistent(dentry, inode);
+}
+
+/* Names end up in kap.events and the kernel log, so keep them plain. */
+static bool kapfs_valid_name(const struct qstr *name)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (name->len == 0 || name->len > KAP_MAX_NAME_LEN || name->name[0] == '.')
+ return false;
+ for (i = 0; i < name->len; i++) {
+ unsigned char c = name->name[i];
+
+ if (!isalnum(c) && c != '-' && c != '_' && c != '.')
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Returns NULL on success: the passed dentry is the one instantiated. */
+static struct dentry *kapfs_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+ struct dentry *files[KAP_FILE_COUNT] = {};
+ struct inode *inodes[KAP_FILE_COUNT] = {};
+ struct kap_igroup *igroup;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ if (!kapfs_valid_name(&dentry->d_name))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ /* Allocate everything first, so a failure leaves nothing behind. */
+ igroup = kvzalloc_obj(*igroup, GFP_KERNEL);
+ inode = kapfs_make_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | 0700);
+ if (!igroup || !inode) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(igroup->name, dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&igroup->pids);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&igroup->node);
+ for (i = 0; i < KAP_FILE_COUNT; i++) {
+ files[i] = d_alloc_name(dentry, kap_file_names[i]);
+ inodes[i] = kapfs_make_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFREG | kap_file_modes[i]);
+ if (!files[i] || !inodes[i]) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ igroup->files[i].kind = i;
+ igroup->files[i].igroup = igroup;
+ inodes[i]->i_fop = &kapfs_fops;
+ inodes[i]->i_private = &igroup->files[i];
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&kap_lock);
+ if (kap_find_igroup_locked(igroup->name))
+ rc = -EEXIST;
+ else
+ list_add_tail(&igroup->node, &kap_igroups);
+ spin_unlock(&kap_lock);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+ inc_nlink(inode);
+ inc_nlink(dir);
+ /* Lookups in the new directory wait until its files are all there. */
+ inode_lock(inode);
+ kapfs_instantiate(dentry, inode);
+ igroup->dentry = dentry;
+ for (i = 0; i < KAP_FILE_COUNT; i++)
+ kapfs_instantiate(files[i], inodes[i]);
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+ return NULL;
+
+err:
+ for (i = 0; i < KAP_FILE_COUNT; i++) {
+ if (inodes[i])
+ iput(inodes[i]);
+ if (files[i])
+ dput(files[i]);
+ }
+ if (inode)
+ iput(inode);
+ kvfree(igroup);
+ return ERR_PTR(rc);
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations kapfs_root_inode_ops = {
+ .lookup = simple_lookup,
+ .mkdir = kapfs_mkdir,
+};
+
+static int kapfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ sb->s_magic = KAPFS_MAGIC;
+ inode = kapfs_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | 0700);
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ inode->i_op = &kapfs_root_inode_ops;
+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+ inc_nlink(inode);
+ sb->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
+ if (!sb->s_root)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int kapfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return get_tree_single(fc, kapfs_fill_super);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations kapfs_context_ops = {
+ .get_tree = kapfs_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int kapfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ fc->ops = &kapfs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Never registered, so it cannot be mounted from userspace. */
+static struct file_system_type kapfs_type = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .name = "kapfs",
+ .init_fs_context = kapfs_init_fs_context,
+ .kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
+};
+
+static const char *kap_igroups_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+ struct path path;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!dentry)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+ path.mnt = mntget(kapfs_mnt);
+ path.dentry = dget(kapfs_mnt->mnt_root);
+ rc = nd_jump_link(&path);
+ return ERR_PTR(rc);
+}
+
+static int kap_igroups_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer,
+ int buflen)
+{
+ char name[32];
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "kapfs:[%llu]",
+ (unsigned long long)d_inode(kapfs_mnt->mnt_root)->i_ino);
+ if (rc <= 0 || rc >= sizeof(name))
+ return -ENOENT;
+ return readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name, rc);
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations kap_igroups_link_iops = {
+ .readlink = kap_igroups_readlink,
+ .get_link = kap_igroups_get_link,
+};
+
+int __init kap_securityfs_init(void)
+{
+ struct dentry *dent;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!READ_ONCE(kap_lsm_active))
+ return 0;
+
+ kapfs_mnt = kern_mount(&kapfs_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(kapfs_mnt)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(kapfs_mnt);
+ kapfs_mnt = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ kapfs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags &= ~SB_NOUSER;
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_dir("kap", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(dent);
+ goto err_unmount;
+ }
+ kap_sfs_dir = dent;
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_file("kap.default", 0600, kap_sfs_dir,
+ &kap_default_ctx, &kapfs_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(dent);
+ goto err_remove;
+ }
+ kap_sfs_default = dent;
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_symlink("igroups", kap_sfs_dir, NULL,
+ &kap_igroups_link_iops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(dent);
+ goto err_remove;
+ }
+ kap_sfs_igroups = dent;
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(kap_ready, true);
+ pr_info("control plane at /sys/kernel/security/kap\n");
+ return 0;
+
+err_remove:
+ securityfs_remove(kap_sfs_default);
+ securityfs_remove(kap_sfs_dir);
+ kap_sfs_default = NULL;
+ kap_sfs_dir = NULL;
+err_unmount:
+ kern_unmount(kapfs_mnt);
+ kapfs_mnt = NULL;
+err:
+ pr_err("could not create the securityfs control plane: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+}
--
2.51.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-28 13:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 13:33 [RFC PATCH v2 0/6] security: introduce Kernel Assurance Plane Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/6] docs: security: Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane design Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 15:17 ` Günther Noack
[not found] ` <CAKS=Y5WqExXSEu3PPbFY5J0GDaYJyjxqQc8HYUKAnQ6fpEfAsQ@mail.gmail.com>
2026-10-28 16:36 ` Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] security: kap: add the LSM ID and internal headers Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] security: add the Kernel Assurance Plane LSM Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:33 ` Ketan Bhardwaj [this message]
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/6] kernel: add KAP checks for unshare and setns Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the Kernel Assurance Plane Ketan Bhardwaj
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261028133335.75899-5-ketan@armoriq.io \
--to=ketan@armoriq.io \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=gnoack@google.com \
--cc=harisudhan@armoriq.io \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox